


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
TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The development of affairs in Mexico during the past few years as well as the change in European affairs have revived the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. In response to the consequent demand for material on the subject this volume has been compiled for the use of students, debaters, and others wishing to make a study of the question. This volume follows the general plan of the other volumes in this series and contains affirmative and negative briefs, a selected bibliography, and reprints of valuable material covering the history and present status of the Monroe Doctrine, and also the arguments for and against its retention as a part of our permanent foreign policy.

E. M. PHELPS.

February 27, 1915.



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BRIEF

Proposed
Resolved, That the Monroe Doctrine should be continued as part of the permanent foreign policy of the United States.

INTRODUCTION

- X* I. The Monroe Doctrine has been the subject of considerable discussion in the past few years.
 - A* A. In conferences which have convened for the special study of our international relations.
 - B* B. In the press, on the platform, and by the people, not only in the United States, but also in Europe and in Central and South America.
 - C* C. It has been condemned by some and vigorously reasserted by others as part of our foreign policy.
- II* II. The Monroe Doctrine, as formulated in President Monroe's message of 1823, was the result of two circumstances.
 - A* A. The claim of Russia to occupy territory in the Northwest.
 - B* B. The threatened intervention of the Holy Alliance to restore to Spain her former South American colonies.
- III* III. President Monroe's declaration ~~was~~ *indeed American State*
 - A* A. That the American continents were thereafter not to be considered open to colonization by European Powers.
 - B* B. That any intervention in South American affairs would be regarded as unfriendly toward the United States.
- IV* IV. It is generally admitted that the Doctrine has been extended to include *the whole world*.
 - A* A. ~~That~~ the United States has a paramount interest in American affairs.
 - B* B. ~~That~~ it will resist, forcibly if necessary, all European aggression.
 - 1* 1. The acquisition of new territory.
 - 2* 2. Political intervention.

BRIEF

3. The extension of existing boundaries.
4. The transfer of sovereignty or territory, if against the interests of the United States.

AFFIRMATIVE

- I. Both reason and authority support the Monroe Doctrine as part of our foreign policy.
 - A. It is based on the right of self-defense which is supported by international law.
 - B. It is also based on the duty of preserving the peace and safety and the desirability of maintaining the republican governments of our weaker neighbors.
 - C. It has been declared and followed by the United States ever since it was first stated.
 1. It has been declared and acted upon again and again by the executive branch of our Government.
 2. Although it has never been enacted into law by Congress, every resolution relating to it has been in its support.
 - D. It has been supported by other nations.
 1. European Powers have acquiesced in its maintenance.
 2. Every Latin-American republic has at some time or other affirmed it.
 - E. The argument that it has been extended, and without justification, beyond the limits set by Monroe is unsound.
 1. The underlying principle is the same.
 2. The extensions have been in harmony with the development of the interests of the United States.
 - F. It is not true that the Monroe Doctrine prevents European Powers from enforcing their just claims against Latin-American republics.
 1. European Powers have every right to intervene in behalf of their own interests or that of their subjects so long as they do not contemplate permanent occupation of Latin-American territory.

Any nation is free to collect its debts or protect its property as long as it does not attempt to force a new system of government upon the republic.

II. The Monroe Doctrine is supported by experience.

- A. Under it the Latin-American republics have been able to continue their independent existence and have grown and prospered free from the domination of any European Power.
- B. It has been of great value to the United States.
 - 1. It has made for our peace and prosperity.
 - 2. It has added to our prestige and strengthened our position among the world powers.
 - 3. It has given us moral supremacy in the western hemisphere.
- C. It has made for international peace.
 - 1. It has prevented the old-world Powers from bringing their quarrels into the new.

III. The Doctrine is still a necessary part of our foreign policy.

- A. It is still necessary for self-preservation.
 - 1. To abandon it would not only impair our prestige among nations but would invite danger from foreign aggression.
 - a. It would be necessary to increase our army and navy.
 - b. The mere fact that the Doctrine has existed has relieved us from this necessity so far.
 - 2. It is made more necessary than ever before by our duty to preserve the neutrality of the Panama Canal.
- B. It is essential to the welfare of Central and South America.
 - 1. The need of European Powers for more territory would soon bring about in South America a repetition of what has happened in Africa, if the Monroe Doctrine did not exist to prevent it.
 - 2. The argument that it would be to our advantage and that of Latin-America if these republics were to become European colonies is untenable.
 - a. These peoples are strong and progressive.
 - b. They have a right to an independent existence.

IV. There is no foundation for the attitude of hatred and suspicion that exists among some of the peoples of Central and South America toward the Monroe Doctrine.

A. When we have intervened in the affairs of these republics it has been done in a disinterested manner and has been for the benefit of all concerned.

B. In so far as the Doctrine applies to Argentina, Brazil and Chile, it is never likely to be enforced, both because these countries are fully able to protect their own interests and because they are so remote from the United States as to make any violation of the Doctrine with respect to them of little harm to our interests.

V. To invite the Latin-American republics to share with us the responsibility of maintaining the principles of the Monroe Doctrine on the American continents would be impracticable.

A. It is not likely that many of them would be willing to accept the responsibility

B. To join with some of them, say with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, in maintaining the Doctrine on behalf of the others would excite jealousy and suspicion among the remaining republics.

C- a conspiracy of nations to settle all disputes among their foreign creditors would be impossible and is a desirable thing to do. **NEGATIVE.** *adable govts.*

H 1. The Monroe Doctrine is supported neither by reason nor by authority.

A. It has no place in international law

1. It is contrary to international law in that it permits us to intervene in affairs between other nations where we are not concerned.

B. It is not supported by the laws of the United States.

1. It has never received legislative sanction.

2. It has not been uniformly supported in practice.

C. It is not supported by the practice of other nations.

1. It has been distinctly repudiated by some.

D. It has been expanded beyond the limits set by Monroe.

1. Monroe did not threaten to use force.
 2. He did not guarantee to maintain existing boundaries.
 - E. The circumstances which called it forth have ceased to exist.
 1. The Holy Alliance no longer exists.
 2. All parts of America are now under the rule of civilized nations.
 - F. The Doctrine is inconsistent.
 1. The United States forbids intervention in Central and South America but retains the privilege of interfering in old-world affairs.
- II. The Doctrine is not supported by experience.
- A. It has not been to the advantage of the Central and South American republics.
 1. European colonization would have made for stable government and for the development of commerce and natural resources.
 - B. It has been to the disadvantage of the United States.
 1. It has been a constant menace to friendly relations both with South America and with European Powers.
 2. It has been of no use to us in maintaining peace and safety.
- III. There is no reason why we should maintain the Monroe Doctrine in the future.
- A. There is no longer any necessity for it.
 1. There is no danger of colonization by any European Power.
 2. The peaceful colonization by European immigrants that is now going on means a higher type of civilization, and more efficient government, and is also the best security against foreign invasion.
 - B. The United States is not justified in continuing to declare it.
 1. It is an unwarranted interference with the right of the other American governments to do as they please.

which by geographic proximity, natural
clarity of institutions are the states
H. S. A. found together the U. S. goes

- C. Our claim that in continuing to declare this doctrine we are acting only in the interests of the Latin-American republics is no longer recognized.
 - 1. Our course in respect to Santo Domingo, Cuba, the Philippines and the securing of territory for the Panama Canal makes such a declaration seem inconsistent.
 - 2. The Latin-American countries feel that we are actuated by a desire for power and so they hate and fear us.
- IV. To continue to maintain the Monroe Doctrine will be greatly to our disadvantage.
 - A. It will be necessary to increase our navy in order to enforce it.
 - B. It puts on us the responsibility of maintaining order in these weaker republics and seeing that they meet their just obligations.
 - 1. Such a course is contrary to the principles of international relations.
 - C. It may result in making Argentina, Brazil and Chile our enemies and this, with their growing commercial and naval strength might some day be disastrous for us.
- V. It would be to the best advantage of the United States to abandon the Doctrine entirely and join with these Central and South American republics for mutual helpfulness and defense.
 - A. If this is not practicable we could at least enlist Argentina, Brazil and Chile with us to prevent foreign invasion and to defend the weaker countries.
 - 1. There is every reason to believe that they would favor such an alliance.

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SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION

One cannot proceed very far into the study of the Monroe Doctrine before it is evident to him that a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding exist in regard to the subject. We are tempted to agree with Mr. Philip M. Brown, former United States Minister to Honduras, who applies to it the dictum of James G. Blaine concerning the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, "imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious." It is well, therefore, that the student of this subject have clearly in mind just what the Doctrine was originally and know the essential facts of its history before delving into the mass of literature that has been published for or against it as a part of our foreign policy.

It is not the intention here to recite this history more than to state as briefly as may be done, the bare facts which may serve as a basis for study. For the details the student should consult the articles contained in the following General Discussion, as well as articles to be found in general histories and encyclopaedias.

The events which evoked the Monroe Doctrine were two: (1) The threatened intervention of the Holy Alliance to restore to Spain her former colonies in South America who had revolted recently and set up republican governments, and (2) The *Ukase* issued by the Emperor of Russia in 1821, to exclude all other nations from the northwest coast of North America from the Bering Strait down to the 51st parallel of north latitude.

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed as a part of President Monroe's message to Congress of 1823. The exact wording of this Doctrine will be found in the following articles. Briefly stated, it declared (1) That the intervention of European Powers in the affairs of the independent governments of the western hemisphere would be considered unfriendly to the United States,

and (2) That the American continents were thenceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers.

Following the publication of the message Henry Clay attempted to have a resolution endorsing it passed by Congress, but this attempt failed. The Monroe Doctrine has remained, however, as a part of our foreign policy and has been expanded beyond the intentions of its promoters. Up to the time of the beginning of President Polk's administration in 1845 the Doctrine was rarely mentioned in the United States although it was invoked in several instances by the Latin-American countries.

✓ It is in Polk's administration that we find the first extension of the Doctrine. In his first annual message Polk reaffirmed it by declaring against any European colonization on the North American continent. It was virtually extended when it was reasserted by Polk, in the annexation of Texas and the compromise with England's claim to Oregon territory, on the 49th parallel, to mean that the United States had a right to enlarge at the expense of its neighbors. Polk invoked it once more in 1848 to prevent foreign interference in Yucatan.

✓ It is generally agreed that the Doctrine was violated by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 but was splendidly vindicated by the withdrawal of France from Mexico in 1866 at the request of our Secretary of State, Mr. Seward. It is notable that the Monroe Doctrine was not mentioned in all the correspondence relating to this matter. The Monroe Doctrine was invoked again in 1866 by Secretary Seward when Chile and Peru were at war with Spain. Another appeal was made to it when the confederation of the Canadian provinces came about in 1867. Again, in 1870 President Grant urged the annexation of San Domingo as an "adherence to the Monroe Doctrine." No action was taken by Congress either time.

It was invoked again in 1895 during the dispute of Venezuela with England over the boundary line and was extended by President Cleveland and Secretary of State Olney to mean that the United States must settle the interior affairs of America itself. This was the occasion of Secretary Olney's famous dictum, "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

Later developments would seem to be in harmony with the principle thus laid down by President Cleveland, that the United States had the right itself to intervene actively in Central and South American affairs. We took control of Porto Rico and the Philippines and laid certain limitations on Cuba. 'President Roosevelt' declared our responsibility to European nations for the conduct of Latin-America. In San Domingo we took over the custom houses and are acting as receiver for European nations. Our course with respect to Nicaragua and Panama would seem to carry out the same principle. President Wilson's course in refusing to recognize Huerta and his Mobile speech are claimed by some to be still further extensions of our policy.

The events of the last few years, especially in Mexico and Panama have revived the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine and it is urged by many that it is outworn and should be abandoned. It is gradually being borne in upon us that our course has not gained for us such friendly relations with our southern neighbors as is desirable for our best interests. It is worthy of remark that two distinct bodies have thought it worth while to devote entire conferences to the study of our relations with these southern republics and incidentally of the Monroe Doctrine. The Clark University Conference, held late in 1913, was devoted to Latin-America, the papers and discussions having since been published in book form under the editorship of George H. Blakeslee. Most of them are also to be found in the *Journal of Race Development* for January, 1914. The eighth annual conference of the American Society of International Law was concerned largely with a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, which has since been published in the *Proceedings of this Society* for 1914. The July, 1914, number of the *Annals of the American Academy* is devoted also to a study of our international relations and includes much material of value on the Monroe Doctrine. These three collections have been quoted from liberally in the following pages.

The compiler of this volume has experienced more than ordinary difficulty in classifying the material both in the bibliography and the reprints because of the lack of any clear line of demarcation between the solutions suggested by the advocates and opponents of the Doctrine. For this reason the student will find in the General Discussion and in the section of the Bibliography headed General References, much material that will

supplement the arguments to be found in the Affirmative and Negative Discussions. As so much material has been published on the subject, references to general histories and encyclopaedias have not been included. It also seemed advisable to exclude a number of valuable books on Central and South America which would be useful to the student wishing to obtain a wider knowledge of these continents and their people and governments. Among them may be named Calderon's "Latin America," Bryce's "South America: Observations and Impressions," W. R. Shepherd's "Latin America," and Hiram Bingham's "Across South America."

E. M. PHELPS.

February 27, 1915.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Harper's Magazine. 109:857-69. November, 1904

Non-Intervention and the Monroe Doctrine. John Bassett Moore

Among the rules of conduct prescribed for the United States by the statesmen who formulated its foreign policy, none was conceived to be more fundamental or more distinctively American than that which forbade intervention in the political affairs of other nations. The right of the government to intervene for the protection of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high seas never was doubted; nor was such action withheld in proper cases. But, warned by the spectacle of the great European struggles that had marked the attempts of nations to control one another's political destiny, the statesmen of America, believing that they had a different mission to perform, planted themselves upon the principle of the equality of nations as expounded by Grotius and other masters of international law. This principle was expressed with peculiar felicity and force by Vattel, who declared that nations inherited from nature "the same obligations and rights," that power or weakness could not in this respect produce any difference, and that a "small republic" was "no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom." The same thought was tersely phrased by Chief-Justice Marshall, in his celebrated affirmation: "No principle is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights." And as the Declaration of Independence proclaimed life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be "unalienable rights" of individual men, so the founders of the American republic ascribed the same rights to men in their aggregate political capacity as independent nations.

While the principle of non-intervention formed an integral part of the political philosophy of American statesmen, its practical importance was profoundly impressed upon them by the narrowness of their escape from being drawn, by the alliance with France, into the vortex of the European conflicts that grew

out of the French revolution. Even before American independence was acknowledged by Great Britain, American statesmen scented the dangers that lurked in a possible implication in European broils. "You are afraid," said Richard Oswald to John Adams, "of being made the tool of the powers of Europe." "Indeed I am," said Adams. "What powers?" inquired Oswald. "All of them," replied Adams; "it is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually manœuvring with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. . . . But I think that it ought to be our rule not to meddle." In 1793 the revolutionary government of France, apparently doubting the applicability of the existing alliance with the United States to the situation in Europe, submitted a proposal for "a national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced." This proposal the American government declined; and its response found practical embodiment in its acts. The reasons for the policy of non-intervention and neutrality, to which the administration of the time so sedulously adhered, were eloquently summed up by Washington in that immortal political legacy, his Farewell Address. "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations," said Washington, "is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop." The same thought was conveyed by Jefferson, in his first inaugural address, in the apothegm, "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

In connection with the principle of non-intervention, a prominent place must be given to the Monroe Doctrine, the object of which was to render intervention unnecessary by precluding the occasions for it. On September 26, 1815, the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia signed at Paris a personal league commonly called the Holy Alliance, the design of which was declared to be the administration of government, in matters both internal and external, according to the precepts of justice, charity, and peace. To this end the allied monarchs, "looking upon themselves as delegated by Providence" to rule over their respective countries, engaged to "lend one another, on every

occasion and in every place, assistance, aid, and support." In the course of time, as revolt against the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna spread and grew more pronounced, the alliance came more and more to assume the form of a league for the protection of the principle of legitimacy—the principle of the divine right of kings as opposed to the rights of the people—against the encroachments of liberal ideas. Congresses were held at Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, and Laybach, for the purpose of maturing a programme to that end. The league was joined by the King of France; but England, whose Prince Regent had originally given it his informal adhesion, began to grow hostile.

Her own government, with its free and parliamentary institutions, was founded on a revolution; and the allies, in the circular issued at Troppau, had associated "revolt and crime," and had declared that the European Powers "had an undoubted right to take a hostile attitude in regard to those states in which the overthrow of the government might operate as an example." In a circular issued at Laybach they denounced "as equally null, and disallowed by the public law of Europe, any pretended reform effected by revolt and open force." In October, 1822, they held a congress at Verona for the purpose of concerting measures against the revolutionary government in Spain; and in yet another circular announced their determination "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place and under whatever form it might show itself." Their ultimate object was more explicitly stated in a secret treaty in which they engaged mutually "to put an end to the system of representative governments" in Europe, and to adopt measures to destroy "the liberty of the press." Popular movements were forcibly suppressed in Piedmont and Naples; and in April, 1823, France, acting for the allies, invaded Spain for the purpose of restoring the absolute monarch Ferdinand VII. Before the close of the summer such progress had been made in this direction that notice was given to the British government of the intention of the allies to call a congress with a view to the termination of the revolutionary governments in Spanish America.

At this time Lord Castlereagh, who had always been favorably disposed towards the alliance, had been succeeded in the conduct of the foreign affairs of England by George Canning, who reflected the popular sentiment as to the policy of the allied powers.

The independence of the Spanish-American governments, which had now been acknowledged by the United States, had not as yet been recognized by Great Britain. But English merchants, like those of the United States, had developed a large trade with the Spanish-American countries—a trade which the restoration of those regions to a colonial condition would, under the commercial system then in vogue, have cut off and destroyed.

In view of this common interest, Canning, towards the close of 1823, began to sound Richard Rush, the American minister at London, as to the possibility of a joint declaration by the two governments against the intervention of the allies in Spanish America. Canning once boasted that he had called into being the New World to redress the balance of the Old. The meaning of this boast can be understood only in the light of his proposals. In a "private and confidential" note to Rush, of August 23, 1823, he declared: "1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies of Spain to be hopeless. 2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstances. 3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiation. 4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves. 5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference."

If these opinions and feelings were shared by the United States, Canning thought the two governments should declare them in the face of the world, as the best means of defeating the project, if any European Power should cherish it, of subjugating the colonies in the name of Spain, or of acquiring any part of them itself by cession or by conquest. He therefore desired Rush to act upon his proposals at once, if he possessed the power to do so. It was said of Richard Rush by an eminent Senator that, in the course of an unusually long and important diplomatic career, he "never said a word that was improper, nor betrayed a thought that might peril his country's fortunes." On the present occasion he acted with his usual good judgment. His powers did not embrace the making of such a declaration as Canning desired; but, while he expressed the opinion that Canning's sentiments, except as to independence, which the United States had already acknowledged, were shared by his government,

he lost no time in reporting the matter to the President. Monroe, on receiving the correspondence, hastened to take counsel upon it. Jefferson, whose opinion was solicited, replied: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." He was disposed to look with favor upon cooperation with England in the direction suggested, and Madison shared his opinion. In the cabinet of Monroe, Calhoun inclined to invest Rush with power to join England in a declaration, even if it should pledge the United States not to take either Cuba or Texas. The President at first was inclined to Calhoun's idea of giving Rush discretionary powers, but this was opposed by John Quincy Adams, who maintained that we could act with England only on the basis of the acknowledged independence of the Spanish-American states. The views of Adams prevailed. His basal thought was the right of self-government, which he believed to be the duty and the interest of the United States to cherish and support. He thought that the United States should let England make her own declaration. This England did, without waiting for the decision of the United States. On October 9, 1823, Canning, in an interview with Prince de Polignac, French ambassador, declared that while Great Britain would remain "neutral" in any war between Spain and her colonies, the "junction" of any foreign power with Spain against the colonies would be viewed as constituting "entirely a new question," upon which Great Britain "must take such decision" as her interests "might require."

In his annual message to Congress of December 2, 1823, President Monroe devoted to the subject a long passage. The substance of it is, however, conveyed in a few sentences. After adverting to the abstention of the United States from European wars and to the dangers to be apprehended from the system of the allied Powers, he declared: "We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and

whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

The sentences just quoted specially relate to the aims of the Holy Alliance; but there is another passage in the message which is also often cited as embodying the Monroe Doctrine. In 1821, the Emperor of Russia issued a ukase, by which he assumed, as owner of the shore, to exclude foreigners from carrying on commerce and from navigating and fishing within a hundred Italian miles of the northwest coast of America, from Bering Strait down to the 51st parallel of north latitude. As this assertion of title embraced territory which was claimed by the United States as well as by Great Britain, both those governments protested against it. In consequence the Russian government proposed to adjust the matter by amicable negotiation; and instructions to that end were prepared by John Quincy Adams for the American ministers at London and St. Petersburg. At a meeting of the cabinet on June 28, 1823, while the subject was under discussion, Adams expressed the opinion that the claim of the Russians could not be admitted, because they appeared to have no "settlement" upon the territory in dispute; and on July 17 he informed Baron Tuyl, then Russian minister at Washington, "that we [the United States] should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for *any* new European colonial establishments." With reference to this subject, President Monroe, in the message above quoted, said: "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers."

By the term "future colonization" President Monroe evidently intended to convey the same meaning as was expressed by the

terms "settlement" and "colonial establishments" previously employed by Adams. They were used to denote, what they were then commonly understood to mean, the acquisition of title to territory by original occupation and settlement. But in the course of time the phrase "future colonization" came to receive a broader interpretation. President Polk, in his annual message of December 2, 1845, declared that, while existing rights of every European nation should be respected, it should be "distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North-American continent." By pronouncing against the establishment by a European Power of any "dominion"—a term which included even the voluntary transfer of territory already occupied—President Polk expressed a conception which has come generally to prevail, and which is embodied in the popular phrase, "No more European colonies on these continents." The same meaning is conveyed in the phrase, "America for the Americans," which signifies that no European Power shall be permitted to acquire new territory or to extend its dominions in the western hemisphere.

In this sense, but apparently with the qualification in the particular case that only a forcible acquisition of territory was forbidden, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked by President Cleveland in respect of the Venezuelan boundary question. This incident, as is well known, grew out of a long-standing dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, which was the continuation of a dispute two centuries old between the Netherlands and Spain as to the limits of the Dutch and Spanish settlements in Guiana. In 1844 Lord Aberdeen proposed to Venezuela a conventional line, beginning at the river Moroco. This proposal was declined; and, chiefly in consequence of civil commotions in Venezuela, negotiations remained practically in abeyance till 1876. Venezuela then offered to accept the Aberdeen line; but Lord Grenville suggested a boundary farther west; and in subsequent negotiations the British demand was extended still farther in that direction. Venezuela, representing that this apparent enlargement of British dominion constituted a pure aggression of her territorial rights, invoked the aid of the United States on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine. Venezuela asked for arbitration, and in so doing included in her claim a large portion of British Guiana.

Great Britain at length declined to arbitrate unless Venezuela would first yield all territory within a line westward of that offered by Lord Aberdeen. In these circumstances, Mr. Olney, as Secretary of State, in instructions to Mr. Bayard, American ambassador at London, of July 20, 1895, categorically inquired whether the British government would submit the whole controversy to arbitration. In these instructions Mr. Olney declared that the Monroe Doctrine did not establish a "protectorate" over other American states; that it did not relieve any of them "from its obligations as fixed by international law nor prevent any European Power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them"; but that its "single purpose and object" was that "no European Power or combination of European Powers" should "forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government, and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies." This principle he conceived to be at stake in the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, because, as the dispute related to territory, it necessarily imported "political control to be lost by one party and gained by the other."

"To-day," declared Mr. Olney, "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." All the advantages of this superiority were, he affirmed, at once imperilled if the principle should be admitted that European Powers might convert American states into colonies or provinces of their own. Lord Salisbury declined unrestricted arbitration; and when his answer was received, President Cleveland, on December 17, 1895, laid the correspondence before Congress. "If a European Power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring republics against its will and in derogation of its rights," it was, said President Cleveland, the precise thing which President Monroe had declared to be "dangerous to our peace and safety"; but, he added, "any adjustment of the boundary which that country [Venezuela] may deem for her advantage and may enter into of her own free will cannot, of course, be objected to by the United States."

He then recommended the appointment by the United States of a commission to investigate the merits of the controversy, and declared that, if the title to the disputed territory should be

found to belong to Venezuela, it would be the duty of the United States "to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela."

This declaration produced great excitement, in the United States as well as in England. So far as it seemed to imply, as the language has often been construed to do, that the United States possessed the right, by means of an *ex parte* commission, appointed by itself and composed of its own citizens, authoritatively to fix the boundary between two other independent nations, it went beyond the immediate necessities of the case. If the commission had ever reported, its conclusions probably would have been treated as advisory rather than definitive, and would have been made the basis of further correspondence with both governments.

The actual position insisted upon in Mr. Olney's instructions to Mr. Bayard, as well as in the rest of President Cleveland's message, was that the United States would resist the palpable and substantial seizure and appropriation by Great Britain of Venezuelan territory. This position was quite in harmony with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Congress unanimously provided for the appointment of a commission of investigation; but the commission, immediately after its organization, addressed to Mr. Olney, through its president, Mr. Justice Brewer, a letter setting forth its peaceful and non-partisan character and the desirability of securing the cooperation of Great Britain and Venezuela in obtaining evidence. At the close of his letter, Mr. Justice Brewer observed: "The purposes of the pending investigation are certainly hostile to none, nor can it be of advantage to any that the machinery devised by the government of the United States to secure the desired information should fail of its purpose."

This statement was communicated to Great Britain as well as to Venezuela, and both governments promptly responded to the appeal. The labors of the commission were, however, brought to a close by the conclusion of a treaty of arbitration, signed by Great Britain and Venezuela, but negotiated between Great Britain and the United States, the predominant feature of which

was the application of the principle of prescription, under the definite rule that fifty years' adverse holding of a district, either by exclusive political control or by actual settlement, should suffice to constitute national title. The adoption of the principle of prescription, on which the arbitrators would necessarily have acted, even if it had not been incorporated into the treaty, at once rendered nugatory the greater part of the Venezuelan claim. Although the extreme British claim was not allowed, the territorial results of the arbitration were decidedly favorable to that government. It must, however, be conceded that the most important political result of the Venezuelan incident was not the decision upon the territorial question, but the official adoption of the Monroe Doctrine by the Congress of the United States, and its explicit acceptance by the principal maritime power of Europe.

The latest official exposition of the Monroe Doctrine was given by President Roosevelt in his annual message of December 3, 1901, in which he said: "The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. . . . This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. . . . We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." An occasion for the practical application of this definition soon arose. On December 11, 1901, the German ambassador at Washington left at the Department of State a memorandum in which it was stated that the German government proposed to take certain coercive measures against Venezuela, for the satisfaction of claims, based partly on breaches of contract and partly on violent wrongs, which it had been found to be impracticable otherwise to bring to a settlement. At the same time the memorandum declared that "under no circumstances" would the German government consider in its proceedings "the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory." In acknowledging the receipt of this memorandum, on the 16th of December, Mr. Hay adverted to the fact that the German ambassador, on

his recent return from Berlin, had conveyed personally to the President, and had afterwards repeated to himself, the assurance of the German Emperor that the imperial government had no purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South-American continent or the adjacent islands; and in view of this circumstance, and of the further assurance given in the memorandum, Mr. Hay declared that the President, while "appreciating the courtesy of the German government in making him acquainted with the state of affairs referred to," did not regard himself "as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in question." The coercive measures contemplated by the German government were postponed for a year, and were then taken in conjunction with the British government, which also made to the United States, on November 13, 1902, a frank communication of its purposes. To this communication Mr. Hay replied that "the government of the United States, although it regretted that European Powers should use force against Central and South American governments, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated." In the hostilities with Venezuela that ensued the assurances of the powers were honorably kept, but peaceful relations were eventually restored through the frank exercise of the friendly offices of the United States.

In popular discussions the position has sometimes been urged that it is a violation of the Monroe Doctrine for a European Power to employ force against an American republic for the purpose of collecting a debt or satisfying a pecuniary demand, no matter what may have been its origin. For this supposition, which is discredited by the declarations and the acts of President Roosevelt and Mr. Hay, there appears to be no official sanction. It is true that in Wharton's *International Law Digest*, under the head of the "Monroe Doctrine," two alleged manuscript instructions by Mr. Blaine to the American minister at Paris, of July 23 and December 16, 1881, are cited as authority for the statement that "the government of the United States would regard with grave anxiety an attempt on the part of France to force by hostile pressure the payment by Venezuela of her debt to French citizens." The citation, however, is wholly inadvertent. Both instructions are published in the volume of Foreign Relations for

1881; and they refer, not to "hostile pressure," but to a rumored design on the part of France of "taking forcible possession of some of the harbors and a portion of the territory of Venezuela in compensation for debts due to citizens of the French Republic." Even in regard to this they nowhere express "grave anxiety," but merely argue that such a proceeding would be unjust to other creditors, including the United States, since it would deprive them of a part of their security; while they avow the "solicitude" of the government of the United States "for the higher object of averting hostilities between two republics for each of which it feels the most sincere and enduring friendship."

In 1861 the United States formally admitted the right of France, Spain, and Great Britain to proceed jointly against Mexico for the satisfaction of claims. "France," said Mr. Seward on that occasion, in an instruction to the American minister at Paris, of June 26, 1862, "has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have the right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up an anti-republican or anti-American government, or to maintain such a government there." In a similar vein, Mr. Seward, writing to the American minister in Chile, on June 2, 1866, with reference to the hostilities then in progress between Spain and the republics on the west coast of South America, and particularly to the bombardment of Valparaiso by the Spanish fleet, declared that the United States did not intervene in wars between European and American states "if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point"; that the United States had "no armies for the purpose of aggressive war; no ambition for the character of a regulator."

A tendency is often exhibited to attach decisive importance to particular phrases in President Monroe's message of 1823, or to the special circumstances in which they originated, as if they furnished a definitive test of what should be done and what should be omitted under all contingencies. The verbal literalist would, on the one hand, make the United States an involuntary party to all controversies between European and American governments, in order that the latter may not be "oppressed"; while the historical literalist would, on the other hand, treat Monroe's declarations as obsolete, since the conditions

to which they especially referred no longer exist. But when we consider the mutations in the world's affairs, these modes of reasoning must be confessed to be highly unsatisfactory. The "Monroe Doctrine" has in reality become a convenient title by which is denoted a principle that doubtless would have been wrought out if the message of 1823 had never been written—the principle of the limitation of European power and influence in the Western Hemisphere. We have seen, in the first paper of this series, that as early as 1778 the Continental Congress, in the treaty of alliance with France, obtained from its ally the renunciation of any claim to the British possessions in North America. When Washington, in his Farewell Address, observed that Europe had "a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation," he lent emphasis to the thought that it was desirable so far as possible to dissociate America from the vicissitudes of European politics. Giving to this thought a further reach, Jefferson, while President, in 1808, declared: "We shall be satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence, but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and our as the same, and the object of both must be to exclude European influence from this hemisphere." On January 15, 1811, twelve years before Monroe's message was published, Congress, in secret session, "taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain and her American provinces," and "the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States might have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce," resolved that the United States could not "without serious inquietude see any part of said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power"; and the President was authorized to occupy all or any part of the Floridas, "in the event of an attempt to occupy the same, or any part thereof, by any foreign government."

In the long struggle, which was eventually crowned with success, to exclude European domination from the interoceanic canal routes, and to secure the construction of a neutralized canal under American auspices, American statesmen no doubt were aided by the authority of Monroe's declarations, but were by no means dependent upon them. It is a remarkable fact that Seward, neither in the formal demand upon France in 1865 to desist from

armed intervention in Mexico for the purpose of overthrowing the domestic republican government under Juarez and establishing on its ruins the foreign imperial government under Maximilian, nor in any of the official correspondence relating to the subject, mentioned the "Monroe Doctrine," although his action came within the letter as well as the spirit of the message of 1823. President Polk, on the other hand, in pronouncing against the acquisition of new "dominion" in North America by a European Power, although he was well within the limits of the "Monroe Doctrine" as it is now understood, invoked a passage that fell far short of sustaining his position. It would be easy to cite many similar examples.

The Monroe Doctrine, as a limitation upon the extension of European Power and influence on the American continents, is now generally recognized as a principle of American policy. To its explicit acceptance by Great Britain and Germany there may be added the declaration which was spread by unanimous consent upon the minutes of the Hague Conference, and which was permitted to be annexed to the signature of the American delegates to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, that nothing therein contained should be so construed as to require the United States "to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state," or to relinquish "its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

Chautauquan. 22: 549-56. February, 1896.

Monroe Doctrine and Some of Its Applications. James Albert Woodburn

The times since 1823 at which claims have been put forth for the application of this doctrine have been numerous. The Panama Congress in 1825-6; repeated discussions concerning Cuba; the case of Yucatan in 1848; the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 1850, and the Nicaraguan Canal; the French intervention in Mexico, 1861-5, and numerous minor instances since our Civil War—in connection with all these the Monroe Doctrine has been brought

into discussion. Our space does not permit us to discuss here more than one of these, and we choose the only one in which, as it seems to us, the Monroe Doctrine has ever been fairly applicable—the case of Mexico, 1861-5.

On October 31, 1861, a convention was held in London between England, France and Spain, avowedly to consider how these nations might secure redress and security for their citizens in Mexico. Some of these citizens held Mexican bonds which that government, it was said, was not willing, or not able, to pay. Complaint was also made that life and property were not safe in Mexico. The convention provided for such occupation of Mexico and "such other operations" as should be necessary or suitable to secure these objects.

Payment of debts might be secured under the then existing government of Mexico, but to secure the other object, i. e., the permanent security of life and liberty, these new allied powers deemed that a new government for Mexico was necessary. This meant a war of conquest upon that country, though it was asserted that the Mexicans themselves might determine of what form their new government should be. The United States was invited to become a party to this treaty—that is, after the terms of the treaty had been arranged and its execution begun. Secretary Seward endeavored to remove the occasion for this interference by offering our aid to Mexico to help her pay her debt. Mexico consented to the arrangement; but when Mr. Seward gave information of such proposals to the allied Powers, the propositions for a peaceful settlement were rejected as unsatisfactory. One apology for their proposed intervention could now no longer be urged by the allies. But they could no longer be satisfied by the payment of the debts due them. Their bald proposition now was that they would make war on Mexico in order to change her form of government upon the pretext that foreign residents were not safe in that country.

The motives behind the movement are best seen from the letter of the French emperor ordering the French commander to march upon the capital of Mexico: "to redress grievances; to establish bounds to the extension of the United States further south, to prevent her from becoming the sole dispenser of the products of the New World." The allies were moving for power

and commercial influence, though the French emperor disclaimed any design of forcing a government upon Mexico. But there are those unreasonable enough to remember that the avowals made to the world are not always those which reveal the real influences behind the scenes in cabinet councils. The sequel proves the suspicion.

On April 9, 1862, at another conference between these three Powers (at Orizaba) England and Spain objected that France had gone beyond the terms of the first convention in giving military aid in Mexico to the party favoring an imperial government, and these two Powers therefore withdrew from further cooperation. Says Mr. Dana:

But France, whose pecuniary claims upon Mexico were much smaller than those of the other powers, and more questionable, left to itself in Mexico, proceeded, by military aid to the Imperialist party, to establish that party in possession of the capital, and, under the protection of the French forces, an Assembly of Notables was called, without even a pretense of a general vote of the Mexican people. This assembly undertook to establish an imperial form of government, and to offer the throne to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria.

The French emperor acknowledged this government and entered into a treaty to give it support and security by military aid.

Now, where, during all this time, was the Monroe Doctrine? Here was a plain case. Here was a clear, undisputed European "interposition for the purpose of controlling the destiny" of an American state. If the Monroe Doctrine were not to be asserted in such a flagrant intervention in the affairs of an American state it is not to be doubted that it could never again have been consistently referred to as a principle, or precedent, in our foreign relations. As a policy the Monroe Doctrine would have fallen into a state of "innocuous desuetude." It is important to note how the precedent of Monroe and Adams was followed by Lincoln, Seward, and Grant.

On April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives passed a resolution by unanimous vote, denouncing the French intervention. Mr. Seward, our secretary of state for foreign affairs, set forth our position that we regarded France as a belligerent in Mexico. We acknowledged the right of one nation to make war upon another for international objects, and that one belligerent might secure military possession of the soil of the other, if she could. And, as between these belligerents, we did not enter into the

merits of the controversy. Mr. Seward, in his dispatch to the French government says:

But France appears to us to be lending her great influence to destroy the domestic republican government of Mexico, and to establish there an imperial system under the sovereignty of a European prince. This is the real cause of our national discontent, that the French army which is now in Mexico is invading a domestic republican government there, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical government, whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions. We have constantly maintained, and still feel bound to maintain that the people in every state on the American continent have a right to secure for themselves a republican government if they choose, and that interference by foreign states to prevent the enjoyment of such institutions deliberately established is wrongful, and in its effects antagonistical to the free and popular form of government existing in the United States.

This is a very fair re-expression of the Monroe Doctrine. Certainly the circumstances justified this reassertion. This was at the close of the Civil War, four years after intervention began—four eventful years during which our hands were pretty well tied against foreign controversy. What was said we have seen from Seward; what was done let the silent soldier tell. Grant in his memoirs says:

England, France, and Spain, under the pretext of protecting their citizens, seized upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged, and supposed, as a matter of course, that the United States would treat it as such where their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles on our hands. All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way.

After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before they could be stopped and went to Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to the request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of

theirs.' Finally Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French government. From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us.

This theoretical and practical reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine bore tangible results, and it indicated a policy which is unanimously approved by the American people.

Since the intervention in Mexico there have been several minor incidents which have given rise to a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. Repeatedly, in the public discussions, the doctrine of Monroe has been misinterpreted and misapplied. Nicaragua treats Great Britain with international discourtesy by the expulsion of a consul, or in other ways inflicts injuries. Great Britain demands satisfaction and a money indemnity and, upon Nicaragua's refusal to pay, proceeds, by the occupation of a Nicaraguan port, to collect forcibly the sum demanded. It was asserted by some that, in pursuance of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States ought to interfere in behalf of Nicaragua. Had we used the Monroe Doctrine as the apology for interference in such a quarrel, it would have been equivalent to asserting that the great precedent of Seward and Adams had committed us to the folly of interfering in all the quarrels of other American states with European Powers and of protecting those states from the just consequences of their insolence and misdeeds. The Monroe Doctrine is not to be belittled in such a way.

The Monroe Doctrine did not commit us to the policy of interfering to protect our American neighbors against a forcible territorial aggression by a European Power. No student of history will venture to say that it did. Whether we shall interfere in such a case and make another's quarrel our own is a matter to be determined by public policy and national interests. The precedent of Monroe need not be quoted, or relied upon, to justify us. Mr. Calhoun, in opposing President Polk's application of the doctrine in the case of Yucatan, in 1848, denied that the doctrine had reference to transfers of sovereignty in territory by coercion or agreement. In 1856 Senator Cass made the same denial. To-day Secretary Olney holds that the doctrine applies in a case of territorial transfer by coercion, but not in a case of transfer by agreement; while Senator Lodge and others would still further enlarge the doctrine by making it apply to cases both of coercion and agreement. But when Calhoun announced the

limitations of this doctrine within what he well knew was its original scope, he had no wish to hamper or restrain our national activities. Calhoun spoke like a statesman:

In disavowing a principle which will compel us to resist every case of interposition of European Powers on this continent, I would not wish to be understood as defending the opposite, that we should never resist their interposition. This is a position which would be nearly as dangerous and absurd as the other. But no general rule can be laid down to guide us on such a question. Every case must speak for itself, every case must be decided on its own merits. Whether you will resist or not and the measure of your resistance—whether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or some intermediate measure, or by a resort to arms,—all this must be decided on the merits of the question itself.

Calhoun here set forth the truth of history, and he voiced the highest and truest statesmanship for American administrations in dealing with this question.

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Monroe Doctrine. A. T. Mahan

The formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, as distinguished from its origin, resulted, as is universally understood, from the political conditions caused by the revolt of the Spanish colonies in America. Up to that time, and for centuries previous, the name Spain had signified to Europe in general not merely the mother country, but a huge colonial system, with its special economical and commercial regulation; the latter being determined through its colonial relations, upon the narrowest construction of colonial policy then known, which was saying a great deal. Spain stood for the Spanish Empire, divisible primarily into two chief components, Spain and Greater Spain; the mother country and the colonies. The passage of time had been gradually reversing the relative importance of the two in the apprehension of other European States. In Sir Robert Walpole's day it was believed by many besides himself that Great Britain could not make head against France and Spain combined. The naval power of Spain, and consequently her political weight, still received awed consideration; a relic of former fears. This continued, though in a diminished degree, through the War of American Independence; but by the end of the century, while

it may be too much to affirm that such apprehension had wholly disappeared—that no account was taken of the unwieldy numbers of ill-manned and often ill-officered ships that made up the Spanish navy—it is true that a Spanish war bore to British seamen an aspect rather commercial than military. It meant much more of prize money than of danger; and that it did so was due principally to the wealth of the colonies.

This wealth was potential as well as actual, and in both aspects it appealed to Europe. To break in upon the monopoly enjoyed by Spain, and consecrated in international usage both by accepted ideas and long prescription, was an object of policy to the principal European maritime states. It was so conspicuously to Great Britain, on account of the pre-eminence which commercial considerations always had in her councils. In the days of William III., the prospective failure of the Spanish royal house brought up the question of what other family should succeed, and to whom should be transferred the great inheritance won by Columbus, Cortez, and Pizarro. Thenceforth the thought of dividing this spoil of a decadent empire—the sick man of that day—remained in men's memory as a possible contingency of the future, even though momentarily out of the range of practical politics. The waning of Spain's political and military prestige was accompanied by an increasing understanding of the value of the commercial system appended to her in her colonies. The future disposition of these extensive regions, and the fruition of their wealth, developed and undeveloped, were conceived as questions of universal European policy. In the general apprehension of European rulers, they were regarded as affecting the balance of power.

It was as the opponent of this conception, the perfectly natural outcome of previous circumstances and history, that the Monroe Doctrine entered the field; a newcomer in form, yet having its own history and antecedent conditions as really as the conflicting European view. Far more than South America, which had seen little contested occupation, the northern continent had known what it was to be the scene of antagonistic European ambitions and exploitation. There had been within her territory a balance of power, in idea, if not in achievement, quite as real as any that had existed or been fought for in Europe. Canada in the hands of France, and the mouth of the Mississippi in alien control, were

matters of personal memory to many, and of very recent tradition to all Americans in active life in 1810. Florida then was still Spanish, with unsettled boundary questions and attendant evils. Not reason only, but feeling, based upon experience of actual inconvenience, suffering and loss—loss of life and loss of wealth, political anxiety and commercial disturbance—conspired to intensify opposition to any avoidable renewal of similar conditions. To quote the words of a distinguished American Secretary of State—for Foreign Affairs—speaking twenty years ago, "This sentiment is properly called a Doctrine, for it has no prescribed sanction, and its assertion is left to the exigency which may invoke it." This accurate statement places it upon the surest political foundation, much firmer than precise legal enactment or international convention, that of popular conviction. The sentiment had existed beforehand; the first exigency which invoked its formulated expression in 1823 was the announced intention of several great Powers to perpetuate by force the European system, whether of colonial tenure, or balance of power, or monarchical forms, in the Spanish colonies; they being then actually in revolt against the mother country, and seeking, not other political relations to Europe, but simply their own independence.

This political question of independence, however, involved also necessarily that of commercial relations; and both were interesting to outside States. So far as then appeared, renewed dependence meant the perpetuation of commercial exclusion against foreign states. This characterised all colonial regulation at that time, and continued in Spanish practice in Cuba and other dependencies until the final downfall of her diminished empire in 1898. It must be recognised, therefore, that all outside parties to the controversy, all parties other than Spain and her colonies, which had special incitements of their own, were influenced by two classes of motives, political and commercial. These are logically separable, although in practice intertwined. That of the Continental Powers—Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with the subsequent accession of France—was primarily political. Their object was to perpetuate in South America political conditions connected with the European system, by breaking down popular revolt against absolutist government, and maintaining the condition of dependence upon Spain. Whither this might lead in case

of armed intervention, which was contemplated, was a question probably of the division of spoil; for in the end Spain could hardly pay the bill otherwise than by colonial cessions. But whether the movement of the Holy Alliance, as it was self-styled, issued merely in the suppression of popular liberties, or introduced further a European balance of power with its rivalries and conflicts, its war and rumours of wars, both results were politically abhorrent to American feelings and disturbing to American peace. They gave rise to distinctly political objections by the people and statesmen of the United States. From these sentiments the exigency evoked the first reasoned official expression of the national conviction and purpose, which we now know as the Monroe Doctrine. Subsidiary to this political motive, but clearly recognised and avowed, was the legitimate inducement of commercial interest, benefited by the rejection of European rule, and to be injured by its restoration.

It will not be expected that a British Tory administration, before the Reform Bill of 1832 and with the protective system and Navigation Act in full force, should have shared the particular political prepossessions of the American states, geographically closely concerned, lately themselves colonies, and but very recently emerged from a prolonged conflict with British commercial regulations based upon the ancient conception of colonial administration. But Great Britain, in addition to commercial ambitions and interests greater than those of the United States, and the outcome of a century of effort against the Spanish monopoly, did have also a distinct political leaning in the matter. There ran through both political parties a real and deep sympathy with communities struggling for freedom. The iniquity of suppressing such efforts by external force of third parties, not immediately concerned, was strongly felt. There was accepted also among British statesmen a clearly defined rule of conduct, which had been conspicuously illustrated in the early days of the French Revolution, still a matter of recent memory in 1820, that interference in the intestine struggles of a foreign country, such as those then afflicting both the Spanish kingdom and colonies, was neither right in principle nor expedient in policy.

Basing its action firmly on these convictions, the British Ministry, under the influence of Canning, intimated clearly that, while neutral towards the intervention of the Holy Alliance in

Spain itself, to restore there the old order of things, it would not permit the transport of armies to South America for a like purpose. The course of the Alliance in Spain was viewed with disapproval, but it did not immediately concern Great Britain to an extent demanding armed resistance. The case of the colonies was different. Intervention there would be prejudicial to British mercantile enterprise, already heavily engaged in their trade and economical development; while, politically, the occupation of the Peninsula by French armies would be offset by the detachment of the colonies from their previous dependence. To the effect of this British attitude the position of the United States Government, defined by President Monroe in his Message of December, 1823, constituted a powerful support, and the news of it evoked general satisfaction in England. However motivated, without formal concert, still less in alliance, the two English-speaking countries occupied the same ground and announced the same purpose. Spain might conquer her colonies unaided, if she could; neither would interfere; but the attempt of other Powers to give her armed assistance would be regarded by each as unfriendly to itself.

From this momentary community of position exaggerated inferences have been drawn as to the identity of impulses which had brought either State to it. It was a case of two paths converging; not thenceforth to unite, but to cross, and continue each in its former general direction, diverging rather than approximating. Though crumbling before the rising stream of progress, the ideas appropriate to the eighteenth century had not yet wholly disappeared from British conceptions; still less had the practice and policy of the State conformed themselves to the changed point of view which, in the middle of the nineteenth century, began to characterize British statesmanship with reference to colonies. The battles of reformed political representation and of free trade were yet to fight and win; old opinions continued as to the commercial relationship of colonies to the mother country, although modification in details was being introduced. The West Indies were still the most important group in the British colonial system, and one of the latest acts of Canning, who died in 1827, was to renew there commercial discrimination against the United States; a measure which, however prompted, could scarcely be said to reflect the image of the Monroe Doctrine.

For a generation then to come, British statesmen remained under the domination of habits of thought which had governed the course of the two Pitts; and they failed, as men usually fail, to discern betimes changes of condition which modify, if not the essentials, at least the application even of a policy sound in general principle. In 1823, not ten years had elapsed since the British Government had contemplated exacting from the United States, as the result of our prostration at the close of the war of 1812, territorial cessions and concessions which might make an American of to-day, ignorant of the extremes to which his country was then reduced, gasp with amazement. How then could it be that Great Britain, which for centuries had been acquiring territory, and to whom the Americas were still the most immediate commercial interest, should heartily accept the full scope of the Monroe Doctrine, as applicable to the extension of her own dominion, by conquest or otherwise, to any part of the American continents where she did not at that moment have clear title? As a matter of fact she did not in any wise accept this. The American declaration against "the extension of *the system of the allied Powers* to any portion of this hemisphere" was welcomed as supporting the attitude of Great Britain; for the phrase, in itself ambiguous, was understood to apply not to the quintuple alliance for the preservation of existing territorial arrangements in Europe, to which Great Britain was a party, but to the Holy Alliance, the avowed purpose of which was to suppress by external force revolutionary movements within any state—a course into which she had refused to be drawn. But the complementary declaration in the President's Message, that "the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European Power," was characterised in the "Annual Register" for 1823 as "scarcely less extravagant than that of the Russian ukase by which it was elicited," and which forbade any foreign vessel from approaching within a hundred miles of the Russian possession now known as Alaska. The British Government took the same view; and in the protocol to a Conference held in 1827 expressly repudiated this American claim.

There was therefore between the two countries at this moment a clear opposition of principle, and agreement only as to a particular line of conduct in a special case. With regard to the interventions of the Holy Alliance in Europe, Great Britain,

while reserving her independence of action, stood neutral for the time; but from motives of her own policy showed unmistakably that she would resist like action in Spanish America. The United States, impelled by an entirely different conception of national policy, now first officially enunciated, intimated in diplomatic phrase a similar disposition. The two supported one another in the particular contingency, and doubtless frustrated whatever intention any members of the Holy Alliance may have entertained of projecting to the other side of the Atlantic their "union for the government of the world." In America, as in Europe, Great Britain deprecated the intrusion of external force to settle internal convulsions of foreign countries; but she did not commit herself, as the United States did, to the position that purchase or war should never entail a cession of territory by an American to a European State; a transaction which would be in so far colonisation. In resisting any transfer of Spanish American territory to a European Power, Great Britain was not advancing a general principle, but maintaining an immediate interest. Her motive, in short had nothing in common with the Monroe Doctrine. Such principles as were involved had been formulated long before, and had controlled her action in Europe as in America.

The United States dogma, on the contrary, planted itself squarely on the separate system and interests of America. This is distinctly shown by the comments of the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, in a despatch to the American Minister in London, dated only two days before Monroe's Message. Alluding to Canning's most decisive phrase in a recent despatch:

Great Britain could not see any part of the colonies transferred to any other Power with indifference [he wrote]. We certainly do concur with her in this position; but the principles of that aversion, so far as they are common to both parties, resting only upon a casual coincidence of interests, in a national point of view *selfish* * on both sides, would be liable to dissolution by every change of phase in the aspects of European politics. So that Great Britain, negotiating at once with the European Alliance and with us concerning America, without being bound by any permanent community of principle, would still be free to accommodate her policy to any of those distributions of power, and partitions of territory, which for the last half-century have been the *ultima ratio* of all European political arrangements.

* Adams's italics.

For this reason Adams considered the recognition of the independence of the revolted colonies, already made by the United States, in March 1822, must be given by Great Britain also, in order to place the two states on equal terms of co-operation. From motives of European policy, from which Great Britain could not dissociate herself, she delayed this recognition until 1825; and then Mr. Canning defined his general course towards the Spanish colonies in the famous words, "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old. I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies." His coincidence with the policy of the United States is thus seen to be based, and properly, upon British interests as involved in the European system; but that, so far from being the Monroe Doctrine, is almost the converse of it.

Nor was it only in direction that the impulses of the two states differed. They were unequal in inherent vital strength. The motive force of the one was bound to accumulate, and that of the other to relax, by the operation of purely natural conditions. An old order was beginning to yield to a new. After three centuries of tutelage America was slipping out of European control. She was reaching her majority and claiming her own. Within her sphere she felt the future to be hers. Of this sense the Monroe Doctrine was an utterance. It was a declaration of independence; not for a single nation only, but for a continent of nations, and it carried implicitly the assertion of all that logically follows from such independence. Foremost among the conditions ensuring its vitality was propinquity, with its close effect upon interest. Policy, as well as war, is a business of positions. This maxim is perennial; a generation later it was emphasized in application, but not originated, by the peopling of the Pacific coast, the incidental discovery of gold in California, and the consequent enhanced importance of the Isthmus of Panama to the political strategy of nations. All this advanced the Monroe Doctrine on the path of development, giving broader sweep to the corollaries involved in the original proposition; but the transcendent positional interest of the United States no more needed demonstration in 1823 than in 1850, when the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was made, or than now, when not the Pacific coast only, but the Pacific Ocean and the farther East, lend increased consequence to the isthmian communications.

The case of the United States is now stronger, but it is not clearer. Correlatively, the admission of its force by others has been progressive; gradual and practical, not at once or formal. Its formulation in the Monroe Doctrine has not obtained the full legislative sanction even of the country of its origin; and its present development there rests upon successive utterances of persons officially competent to define, but not of full authority to commit the nation to their particular expressions. So, too, international acquiescence in the position now taken has been a work of time, nor can there be asserted for it the final ratification of international agreement. The Monroe Doctrine remains a policy, not a law, either municipal or international; but it has advanced in scope and in acceptance. The one progress as the other has been the result of growing strength; strength of numbers and of resources. Taken with position, these factors constitute national power as they do military advantage, which in the last analysis may always be resolved into two elements, force and position.

In the conjunction of these two factors is to be found the birth of the Monroe Doctrine and its development up to the present time. It is a product of national interest, involved in position, and of national power dependent upon population and resources. These are the permanent factors of the Monroe Doctrine; and it cannot be too strongly realised by Americans that the permanence of the Doctrine itself, as a matter of international consideration, depends upon the maintenance of both factors. To this serious truth record is borne by History, the potent mother of national warning and national encouragement. That the Doctrine at its first enunciation should not at once have obtained either assent or influence, even in its most limited expression, was entirely natural. Although not without an antecedent history of conception and occasional utterance by American statesmen, its moment of birth was the announcement by Monroe; and it had then all the weakness of the newborn, consequent upon a national inadequacy to the display of organised strength which had been pathetically manifested but ten years before. After the destruction of the rule of Spain in her colonies, except in Cuba and Porto Rico, Great Britain remained the one great nation besides the United States possessed of extensive territory in America. She also was the one State that had had experience of us as an

enemy, and known the weakness of our military system for offensive action. What more natural than that she should have welcomed the first promulgation of the Doctrine, in its original scope directed apparently merely against a combination of Continental Powers, the purposes of which were offensive to herself, and yet fail to heed a root principle which in progress of time should find its application to herself, contesting the expansion of her own influence in the hemisphere, as being part of the European system and therefore falling under the same condemnation? Yet even had she seen this, and fully appreciated the promise of strength to come, it was to be expected that she should for the meantime pursue her own policy, irrespective of the still distant future. It may be advantageous to retard that which must ultimately prevail; and at all events men who head the movements of nations are not able at once to abandon the traditions of the past, and conform their action to new ideas as yet unassimilated by their people.

There is then this distinguishing feature of the Monroe Doctrine, which classifies it among principles of policy which are essentially permanent. From its correspondence to the nature of things, to its environment, it possessed from the first a vitality which ensured growth and development. Under such conditions it could not remain in application at the end of a half-century just what it had been in terms at the beginning. Apprehended in leading features by American statesmen, and by them embraced with a conviction which the people shared—though probably not fully understanding—it received from time to time, as successive exigencies arose to invoke assertion, definitions which enlarged its scope; sometimes consistently with its true spirit, sometimes apparently in excess of evident limitations, more rarely in defect of them. But from the fact of Great Britain's existing territorial possessions in America, and from her commercial pre-eminence and ambitions, to which territorial acquisition is often desirable, it was also in the nature of things that with her successive contentions should arise. If not a balance of power, such as had distracted Europe, at least opposing scales existed from the first; connected, not perhaps with the European system as a whole, but certainly with a most important component of that system. Moreover, the strength of Great Britain in America, relatively to the United States, was not

American strength, but European strength. It was therefore unavoidably invidious to the sentiment breathed in the Monroe Doctrine, and much more so when the United States was weaker than when she became strong.

From these circumstances, it has been through discussion with Great Britain chiefly that the Doctrine, marking the advance of the sentiment, has progressed from definition to definition, no one of which is final in an authoritative sense, because in no case clothed with full legislative sanction; but possessing, nevertheless, the weight which attaches to the utterances of those who both by personal ability and official position are recognised as competent interpreters. Such enunciations, *ex cathedrâ*, have the force of judicial decisions, accepted as precedents to a degree dependent upon the particular person, or upon subsequent general acceptance. Not in every case have the positions of American administrations in this matter been endorsed by their successors or the public.

It is vain, therefore, to argue narrowly concerning what the Monroe Doctrine is, from the precise application made of it to any one particular emergency. Nor can there be finality of definition, antecedent to some national announcement, formally complete, which it is to be hoped will never be framed; but which, if it were, would doubtless remain liable to contrary interpretations, sharing therein a fate from which neither the enactments of legislatures nor the Bull of a Pope can claim exemption. The virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, without which it would die deservedly, is that, through its correspondence with the national necessities of the United States, it possesses an inherent principle of life, which adapts itself with the flexibility of a growing plant to the successive conditions it encounters. One of these conditions of course is the growing strength of the nation itself. As Doctor Johnson ungraciously said of taxing Americans for the first time, "We do not put a calf to the plough, we wait till he is an ox." The Monroe Doctrine, without breach of its spirit, can be made to bear a burden to which the nation a hundred years ago was unequal; but also, as our present Chief Magistrate has wisely warned us, if we now propose to assume a load we must see to it that the national strength is organised to endure it. That also is a matter of national policy, quite as important as the Doctrine itself.

For these reasons it is more instructive, as to the present and future of the Monroe Doctrine, to consider its development by successive exhibitions in the past than to strive to cage its free spirit within the bars of a definition attempted at any one moment. Such an attempt the present writer certainly will not make. The international force of the proposition lies in its evolution, substantially consistent, broadening down from precedent to precedent; not in an alleged finality.

The aversion manifested by the Government of the War of Independence towards any attempted restoration of French dominion in Canada, may be justly considered a premonition of the Monroe Doctrine, anticipatory of the ground taken by both Monroe and Canning against a transfer of Spanish colonies to any other European Power. At the earlier period no remonstrance was raised against such transfers of West India Islands, which occurred frequently during both that war and those of the French Revolution and Napoleonic period. The cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, in 1801, excited the keenest susceptibilities. How far resistance might have been carried it is bootless to surmise; the inoperativeness of the transaction did not permit the full consequences to develop. Objection, however appears to have turned upon the more immediate and special motive of the substitution of a strong power for a weak one, in control of an artery of trade essential to our people, than upon the formulated dogma that American territory was not matter for political exchange between European States. Moreover, it needed no broad maxim, wide-reaching in application, to arouse popular feeling, and guide national action, in a matter of such close and evident importance. Repulsion was a matter of instinct, of feeling, which did not need to give account of itself to reason. The Louisiana question laid its hand at once upon the heart of the nation. It concerned the country, not the hemisphere; and in essential principle did not lead out beyond itself, pointing the way to further action. It had finality.

The real stepping-stone by which national interest advanced to hemispheric considerations was Cuba. From every circumstance this island was eminently fitted to point the way of the future; to be the medium, and to mark the transition, from a strictly continental policy to one that embraced the hemisphere. It possessed in a very high degree the elements of power, from

its position, size, and resources, which involved immense possibility for development of strength. Its intrinsic value was therefore very great; but further, while it had relations to our continental territory only less important than the lower course of the Mississippi, it nevertheless did not belong to the Continent, to which the Jeffersonian school of thought, in power from 1801 to 1825, would strictly confine national expansion. The point where a powerful navy would be needed to maintain the integrity of the national possessions marked the limit of advance in the theory of Jefferson. Nevertheless, to him also, minimising possibly the need of a fleet to ensure access over so narrow a strip of sea, "the addition of Cuba to our Confederacy is certainly exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest." To prevent its falling as yet into the hands of any other European Power, he expressed to Monroe in 1823 his approval of entering with Great Britain into a joint guarantee to preserve the island to Spain; for this, he argued, would bind the most dangerous and most suspected Power. On subsequent information, however, that Great Britain had stated positively she would not acquire for herself any Spanish colony under the present distress of Spain, he retracted this opinion; for why, said he, by engaging in joint guarantee, concede to her an interest which she does not otherwise possess? Before this, however, Great Britain had offered to assure the island by her own sole action, on condition of Spain acknowledging the independence of her Continental colonies; thus constituting for herself the interest from which Jefferson would have debarred the consent of the United States.

To such a point anxiety for American ends, and consciousness of American lack of organised strength, would then carry a practical statesman of keen American instincts. To join with a European State in guaranteeing an American interest was not yet an anachronism. A like anxiety and a like consciousness were responsible for the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which proved so fertile a source of diplomatic contention and national ill-will in later days. Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, the contemporary and survivor of Jefferson, had clearer views and stronger purpose. Recognising in Cuba an importance to the United States scarcely inferior to any part of the then existing Union, he held that there were still numerous and formidable

objections to territorial dominion beyond sea. The aim of his policy therefore was that Spain should retain Cuba; but when he succeeded Monroe in the Presidency in 1825, having received the suggestion of a joint guarantee by Great Britain, France, and the United States, upon condition of Spain acknowledging the independence of the Spanish-speaking Continent, he replied merely that the matter would be held under advisement, and followed this in 1826 by an express refusal: "We can enter into no stipulations by treaty to guarantee the islands." At the same time it was clearly stated that "the United States would not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico by any other European Power than Spain, under any contingency whatever." Persistence and advance on this line are indicated by the words of Webster, when Secretary of State in 1843. "The Spanish Government has been repeatedly told that the United States would never permit the occupation of Cuba by British agents or forces upon any pretext; and that, in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she might rely upon the whole military and naval resources of the nation to aid in preserving or recovering it." In 1851 a farther advance in definition is marked. An intimation was received that Great Britain and France would give orders to their squadrons in the West Indies to protect the coasts of Cuba from filibustering expeditions, fitted out in the United States. Such an action, it was replied, "could not but be regarded by the United States with grave disapproval, as involving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of protectorship over *American waters*."

By this time the discovery of gold in California, and the developing interest of the Pacific, had constituted the isthmus a second stepping-stone, as Cuba had been the first, leading the United States to recognise an external territorial interest; not indeed extra-continental, but much more severed from her approach by natural and military obstacles than ever Cuba could be. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, framed in 1850, was the outward sign of a far-reaching interest that stretched from the isthmus to all the Caribbean regions through which lay the road to it. Of this an indication was given by a renewed proposal, made in concert by Great Britain and France, that they with the United States should enter into a joint disclaimer of all intent, now or hereafter, to obtain possession of Cuba. The reply to this, given

in December 1852, was that to enter into such a compact "would be inconsistent with the principles, the tradition, and the policy of the United States." The proposition involved in fact an alliance, similar in principle to that by which the Great Powers of Europe guaranteed the settlement of Vienna; and its being made implied a sense of a balance of power and interests in the American hemisphere in which European Governments would form a preponderant constituent. The administration of that day had no desire to get Cuba, for it apprehended from it serious peril to the Union of the States, which had just passed with difficulty through one of those crises that presaged the great war of 1861 to 1865. In 1853 the opposite party came into power, identified with the policy of strengthening the institution of slavery. To that end the acquisition of Cuba became a prominent object; not with the simple view, held by Jefferson and Adams, of rounding off and securing the national domain, but to embrace and control a slave region, the present conditions and future promise of which were believed to imperil the system in the Southern States.

The nation was already entered upon the rapids which swept it down to civil war and revolution. Nevertheless, during this period was successfully fought out the diplomatic battle with Great Britain concerning the Mosquito Coast and the Honduras Bay Islands. That the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty secured to Nicaragua and Honduras the surrender of these, the British title to which was disputed, had been the belief of the United States. This was the *quid pro quo* for her departure from traditional policy, by entering into a joint guarantee of an American canal, and of territory belonging to an American state. She was already by treaty with Colombia, sole guarantor of transit across the Isthmus of Panama, and would have preferred to be such in the case of the Nicaraguan Canal; but the claim of Great Britain to the Mosquito Coast, though denied by the United States, involved the Atlantic terminus—San Juan or Greytown. It was a question of fight or compromise, and the United States, though powerful for many reasons as a weight in international balances, was not yet strong enough to go to war over a disputed title. The concession which she understood herself to have made was that of accepting a joint guarantee with a European Power for an American interest and enterprise; the concession she was to receive was the abandonment of British political control over the regions

mentioned. To her surprise she found that the British understanding was not that they would abandon what they had, but that they would not press their tenure beyond that actually enjoyed. The controversy terminated in the prevalence of the United States contention, so that in 1860 the President was able to report to Congress a settlement perfectly satisfactory to him.

In this prolonged discussion the influence of the Monroe Doctrine was not only evident, but predominant. Alike in what it knowingly surrendered—the privilege of sole guarantee—and in what it obtained—the relinquishment of a doubtful title to American territory—the spirit of the doctrine was consciously and continuously in the minds of the American statesmen and people; and there can be little doubt that the general principle, as distinguished from sensitiveness over particular incidents, gained decisively both in definiteness and depth of impression. There was advance from theory to action, even if action had been limited to verbal insistence; and the outcome was positive, if not wholly satisfactory on the score of our own concessions. The subsequent intervention of Louis Napoleon in Mexico came most aptly to confirm this result. Nothing could have been more opportune. The principle became concrete in a striking instance. The interference of a European ruler with the internal affairs of an American state had gone to the point of overthrowing its government, and establishing a monarchy in its place; and this not only happened just across the border, but coincided with the immense organisation of force left by the Civil War. Action here was yet more positive and convincing. Again the United States had obtained by pressure the restitution of American control over American territory, asking no compensation beyond the satisfaction of principle maintained.

The realization of power, forced upon national consciousness by the prodigious exertions of the Civil War, could not but be felt in subsequent external policy. Of this the Monroe Doctrine was a leading element. From its enunciation in 1823 it had grown slowly to 1850, the year of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The acceptance in this instrument of a joint guarantee with a European State over American territory was felt to be in violation of its general spirit, and was substantially an admission of national weakness, of which the compromise measures of the same year were an internal indication. The foundations of the Union

were shaking. At nearly the same moment, 1850-51, the United States co-operated with France and Great Britain to compel peace between Haiti and Santo Domingo. These steps, scarcely consistent with the tradition, were under the same political administration, although the death of President Taylor involved a change in head and members. Shortly before its close, the Secretary of State, in a paper that commanded wide approval, used words which have value as indicating the point to which national vision had as yet reached.

It has been a steady rule of our policy to avoid as far as possible all disturbance of existing political relations of the West Indies. We have felt that any attempts on the part of any one of the great maritime Powers to obtain exclusive advantages in any one of the islands would be apt to be followed by others, and to end in converting the archipelago into a theatre of national competition.

This was a policy of marking time, the departure from which at the present day, if the United States is to be reckoned among maritime powers, is evident. An advance in position was indeed close at hand. The exigency of the isthmus, already felt, was about to invoke a fresh assertion of the predominant political interest of the nation against European influence there; both in general, as American territory, and in particular, as the line of communication between our Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Point was given to this, and its importance emphasised to the national consciousness during this decade, by the prolonged discussion over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which centred attention upon the relations of the isthmus to the Monroe Doctrine. If one administration in 1856 suggested a joint guarantee for the neutrality of the transit zone, its successor hastened in 1857 to affirm that such a procedure, in common with other Powers, was inconsistent with the policy of the United States; and the President in successive Messages strongly urged the purchase of Cuba.

Despite occasional inconsistencies the general tendency is manifest throughout. The period of 1850-1860 was one of suspended action, but of rapid progress in the realm of idea. Opinion was expanding, and hardening into conviction; but the anxieties and uncertainties attending incipient civil convulsion are unfavourable to external effectiveness. The return to quiet was not merely to former conditions, but to vastly enlarged conception of national interests and strength. The constraint upon Napoleon

III to leave Mexico, in 1867, was the act of the administration that directed the Civil War. To it succeeded the Presidency of General Grant, among whose first utterances is found, in 1869, that American "dependencies of European Powers are no longer regarded as subjects of transfer from one European Power to another." Upon this advance in position the Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, a year later commented thus:

This is not a policy of aggression, but it opposes the creation of European dominion on American soil, and its transfers to other European Powers; and it looks hopefully to the time when, by the *voluntary* departure of European Governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American. It does not contemplate forcible intervention in any legitimate contest; but it protests against permitting any such contest to result in increase of European power or *influence*.*

This hope of a voluntary departure was not infrequently expressed by the same Secretary to the British Minister, 1869-71, during the discussions antecedent to the Treaty of Washington; and it was grounded in part at least upon the well-known disposition then of many British statesmen to foster the detachment of the colonies from the mother country. On American lips the words were scarcely more than a pious aspiration, towards conditions which would remove still further the chance of European entanglements. Though congruous in spirit, they form no part of the Monroe Doctrine, which in origin was, and in scope still is, essentially conservative, not revolutionary; expressly disclaiming, indeed, all purpose to infringe existing conditions.

The national consciousness of a peculiar and critical relation to the Central American isthmus is reflected in another utterance of Secretary Fish.

No attack upon the sovereignty of New Granada has taken place since the (guarantee) treaty of 1846, though this Department has reason to believe that one has been on several occasions threatened, but has been averted by a warning from this Government as to its obligations under the treaty.

The position thus indicated was maintained by following administrations, which lay especial stress upon the isthmian conditions. These had become the focus, upon which converged all the national feelings and policy which united to elicit the Monroe Doctrine. Particular indisposition was expressed to any joint guarantee.

* My italics.

The President (1881) is constrained to say that the United States cannot take part in extending an invitation for a joint guarantee, and to state with entire frankness that the United States would look with disfavour at an attempt at concert of political action by other Powers in that direction.

It was joint guarantee, together with joint disclaimer of acquiring future tenure over any part of Central America in order to control the canal, that brought the Clayton-Bulwer treaty into conspicuous disfavour; probably as seeming to imply equality of political interest between the United States and the other guaranteeing and self-denying Power. The equality does not exist, and apparent admission by ourselves was even more distasteful than its suggestion by others. It was, as has been said, "a consent to violate the traditional and time-honoured policy of the country."

Though necessarily traced only in outline, the Monroe Doctrine is seen to be a policy substantially consistent throughout, manifesting advance in expression and expansion in application; both proofs of essential vitality. Yet, neglecting the occasional fluctuations to which all progress is liable, it may fairly be said that the entire history is contained, as in a seed, in a definition of Monroe's, rarely quoted, of the year (1824), following the one so widely known.

The deep interest we take in their (the Spanish colonies) independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important one of instituting their own Governments, has been declared. . . . It is impossible for European Governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to, without affecting us; indeed the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war would appear to be equally applicable to us.

This does not indeed explicitly state every several proposition of subsequent administrations; but of those which have remained, endorsed by the general consent of the nation, all are to be found in germ, though not in development, in the above words. Though firm as well as clear, they bear the impress of national immaturity and consequent weakness. The fear, known to have been entertained by some of Monroe's Cabinet, that the motives impelling the Holy Alliance to intervene in South America might entail similar steps toward the United States, would doubtless be scouted now; but the wary attitude of to-day, with its increased scope of assertion, simply reproduces what in the earlier period was apprehension.

It is considered by the United States essential to her interests and peace to withstand the beginnings of action which might lead to European intervention in the internal concerns of an American state, or render it contributive in any way to the European system, a makeweight in the balance of power, a pawn in the game of European international politics; for such a condition, if realised, brings any European contest to this side of the Atlantic; and the neighbourhood of disputes, as of fire, is perilous. A rumour of the transfer of a West India island, or such an occurrence as the existing difficulty between Venezuela, Germany, and Great Britain, engages instant and sensitive attention. This does not imply doubt of the wisdom and firmness of the Government, but indicates an instinctive political apprehension, not elicited by greater and immediate interests in quarters external to the continents. It is remembered that intervention was contemplated in our own deadly intestine struggle because of the effect upon European interests, although only economic; for we were embarrassed by no political dependence or relation to Europe. Public sentiment intends that such a danger to the American continents, the recurrence of which can only be obviated by the predominant force and purpose of this country, shall not be indefinitely increased by acquiescing in European Governments acquiring relations which may serve as occasions for interference, trenching upon the independence of action, or integrity of territory of American states.

It is evident that for a nation to owe money to a foreign Government, directly or by guarantee, is a very different political condition to that of indebtedness contracted in open market to individuals. It is evident that a disputed boundary is a perennial source of danger; and of implicit threat where there is a great difference of strength. Such an ember might blow into a flame at a moment otherwise unpropitious for the United States to assert its traditional policy; just as the long-standing Transvaal trouble might very conceivably have been precipitated into war at a moment most inconvenient to Great Britain. As it was, her course in other quarters is believed to have been embarrassed by the South African War. It is the part of wisdom, and substantially of justice, to exclude such occasions of offence, or to insist upon timely settlement where they exist.

Granting the military effect of the isthmus and Cuba upon

the United States, it is clear that for them to contract relations of dependence upon a European Power involves the United States at once in a net of secondary relations to the same Power potential of very serious result. Why acquiesce in such? But the fundamental relations of international law, essential to the intercourse of nations, are not hereby contradicted. National rights, which are summed up in the word independence, have as their correlative national responsibility. Not to invade the rights of an American state is to the United States an obligation with the force of law; to permit no European State to infringe them is a matter of policy; but as she will not acquiesce in any assault upon their independence or territorial integrity, so she will not countenance by her support any shirking of their international responsibility. Neither will she undertake to compel them to observe their international obligations to others than herself. To do so, which has been by some most inconsequently argued a necessary corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, would encroach on the very independence which that political dogma defends; for to assume the responsibility which derives from independence, and can only be transferred by its surrender, would be to assert a quasi suzerainty. The United States is inevitably the preponderant American power; but she does not aspire to be paramount. She does not find the true complement of the Monroe Doctrine in an undefined control over American states, exercised by her, and denied to Europe. Its correlative, as forcibly urged by John Quincy Adams at the time of formulation, and since explicitly adopted by the national consciousness, is abstention from interference in questions territorially European. These I conceive embrace not only Europe proper, but regions also in which propinquity and continuity, or long recognised occupancy, give Europe a priority of interest and influence, resembling that which the Monroe policy asserts for America in the American continents and islands. In my apprehension, Europe, construed by the Doctrine, would include Africa, with the Levant and India, and the countries between them. It would not include Japan, China, nor the Pacific generally. The United States might for very excellent reasons abstain from action in any of these last named quarters, in any particular instance; but the deterrent cause would not be the Monroe Doctrine in legitimate deduction.

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Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine

Professor John Bassett Moore has rendered a great service to students of American history by his Digest of International Law, as this is embodied in diplomatic discussions, treaties, and other international agreements, international awards, the decisions of municipal courts, and the writings of jurists. This work, which has just been completed in eight volumes, may be regarded as practically exhaustive. There is no subject connected with the international relations of the United States with regard to which it may not be consulted with profit. It is to what Mr. Moore has to tell us about the Monroe Doctrine that we would direct attention at this time, inasmuch as the Santo Domingo Treaty is coming up for ratification at the approaching session of Congress, and inasmuch as the Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro decided to interrogate the next Hague Congress as to whether it should be deemed permissible to enforce by violence the payment of contractual debts. To the Monroe Doctrine more than two hundred pages of Mr. Moore's sixth volume are devoted. By a series of quotations he shows that the germ of the Monroe Doctrine existed long before it was formulated by the fifth President. For example, as early as 1793, Jefferson, then Secretary of State, warned our ministers at Madrid not to bind us by any treaty clause to guarantee to Spain any of her American colonies against the success of its struggle for independence, or even against attack by any other nation. In 1801, Rufus King, then minister to England, told Lord Hawkesbury that we should be content to let the Floridas remain in the hands of Spain, but should not be willing to see them transferred, except to ourselves. In 1808 President Jefferson wrote to Governor Claiborne of Louisiana: "We should be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence, but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere." In 1811, Congress, replying to a secret message from President Madison, resolved in secret session that the United States could not, without serious inquietude, see any part of the territory adjoining the

southern border of the United States pass into the hands of any foreign power, but that "a due regard to their own safety compelled them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory."

Nothing could be more clear than the foreshadowing of the Monroe Doctrine in a letter addressed by Jefferson to William Short on August 4, 1820. The writer dwelt on the advantages of a cordial fraternization among all the American nations, and the importance of their coalescing in an American system of policy totally independent of and unconnected with that of Europe. Less than three years later, in April, 1823, J. Q. Adams, Secretary of State, writing to Mr. Nelson, minister to Spain, declared that the rumored intention of Spain to transfer Cuba to Great Britain would, if carried out, prove unpropitious to the interests of our Union. He did not hesitate to assert that the commanding position of that island with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, gave it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory could be compared, and little inferior to that which bound the different members of our Union together.

It was in August, 1823, that George Canning, British Secretary, sent to Mr. Rush, American minister at London, a private confidential memorandum, in which he said that England aimed not at the possession of any part of Spanish America, but could not see with indifference any section of it transferred to any other power. This memorandum was forthwith transmitted to J. Q. Adams, Secretary of State, and was, by President Monroe, forwarded to ex-Presidents Jefferson and Madison. Monroe's own impression was at the time, he said, that we ought to view any interference on the part of the European Powers with the New World, and especially an attack on the South-American colonies by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend their aggression to us. Sensible, however, of the breadth and difficulty of the question, he desired counsel of his two predecessors. Jefferson, in a reply dated October 24, 1823, said that he could honestly join in the proposed declaration that we did not aim at the acquisition

of any Spanish-American possessions, and would not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and their mother country; but that we would oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power under any form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. Madison concurred with Jefferson. On November 15, J. Q. Adams stated in his diary that President Monroe had shown him the letters from Jefferson and Madison, and that "Calhoun is perfectly moon-struck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says the Holy Allies, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and all South America to Spanish dominion." With these data before us, we can understand how Monroe came to put forth his famous message on December 2, 1823, in which he declared that while with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we had not interfered, and should not interfere, yet "with the governments who had declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

So much for the gradual genesis of the Monroe Doctrine during the thirty years following the first indication of it by Jefferson in 1793. Let us pass to some of the more significant cases in which it has been applied. Toward the close of 1827 the Argentine Republic, being at war with the empire of Brazil, addressed to Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, an inquiry as to the scope of the declarations contained in President Monroe's message of December 22, 1823. Clay replied that the war raging between the Argentine Republic and the empire of Brazil could not be conceived as presenting a state of things bearing the remotest analogy to the case which Monroe's message had deprecated. "It is," continued Clay, "a war strictly American in its origin and its objects. It is a war in which European allies have taken no part." Even if Portugal and the Brazils had remained united, and the war had been carried on by their joint arms against the Argentine Republic, that, Clay thought, would have been far from presenting the case which the message con-

templated. Interesting, too, is the case of Yucatan, where, an Indian outbreak having occurred in the forties, the authorities offered to transfer the dominion and sovereignty to the United States, and, at the same time, made a similar offer to Great Britain and Spain. With reference to this offer, President Polk said, in a special message to Congress, that while it was not his purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure with a view to the acquisition of the dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European Power.

As early as October, 1858, reports came from Europe that a naval and military armament was about to leave Spain destined to attack Mexico, with a view to acquiring political ascendancy there. Lewis Cass, then Secretary of State, in a letter to our minister at Madrid, pointed out that, with respect to the causes of war between Spain and Mexico the United States had no concern and did not undertake to judge them. Neither should we claim to interpose in any hostilities which might take place. Our policy of observation and interference would be limited to protection against the permanent subjugation of any portion of the territory of Mexico or of any other American state by any European Power whatever. Two years later, Cass, in a letter to our minister in Paris, declared that the United States did not call in question the right of France to compel the government of Mexico, by force, if necessary, to do it justice, but that the permanent occupation of any part of the territory of Mexico by a foreign power, or an attempt in any manner forcibly to interfere in its internal concerns or to control its political destiny, would give great dissatisfaction to the United States. It is well known that, in spite of this warning, Napoleon III, taking advantage of our absorption in a civil war, undertook, by force, to establish in Mexico an empire under an Austrian arch-duke. No sooner was the Union restored, however, than General Sheridan was sent with an army of about fifty thousand men to the line of the Rio Grande, and another army was organized for the purpose of acting against the French army in Mexico in case of need. About the same time, Seward, Secretary of State, notified the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that whenever might have been the purposes of France when she sent an army

to Mexico, the proceedings which had been adopted by a class of Mexicans for subverting the republican government there and for availing themselves of French intervention to establish on its ruins an imperial monarchy, were regarded in the United States as having been taken without authority, and as having been prosecuted against the will and opinion of the Mexican people. The French government ultimately agreed to withdraw its forces from Mexico within the term of seventeen months, and as a matter of fact they left Mexican soil in March, 1867.

We come, lastly, to the view taken by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay in December, 1901, at a time when a joint blockade of Venezuelan seaports was contemplated by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. The German government had disavowed any intention of making the smallest acquisition of territory on the South-American continent or the adjacent islands. In view of this disavowal, President Roosevelt said, in his message of December 3, 1901, that "The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the old world. He added that "we do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." That is the latest authoritative definition of the Monroe Doctrine. It turned out, however, that, by the prolonged sequestration of the customs revenue of a Latin-American republic, the destiny of that commonwealth might be affected materially. It was in order to avert such a result that by the San Domingo Treaty, now pending in the Senate, President Roosevelt undertook to interpose in the capacity of revenue-collector and apportioner between the Dominican Republic and its foreign creditors.

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Latin America and International Law. Alejandro Alvarez

In 1823, a new era opens in the policy followed by the United States in its relations with the rest of America. That republic

then understood that it was bound to the other states of the hemisphere not only by reason of being neighbors, but because of a continental solidarity in everything pertaining to the independence and sovereignty of the new nations. In that year, under historic circumstances known to all, Monroe, while having primarily in view the interests of his country, expressed and epitomized in such a clear manner the essence of the international situation of the New World, that his declaration became, as we have already said, although he did not aim to formulate an invariable norm of international policy, the gospel of the new continent. This message, which declares that the political system of Europe is different from that of the American states, contains declarations which may be epitomized in the following points:

1. The states of the new world are entirely independent and sovereign.
2. And, consequently, the régime of the balance of power and intervention, the basis at that time of the international politics of the old world, can not be extended to them. European intervention is condemned, not only when its object is to change the form of government adopted by the states, but when it aims to oppress them or to control their destinies in any way.
3. That the states of Europe can not acquire by occupation any part of the American continent.

Together with these three explicit declarations, there are three others of a more or less explicit character which complete the "Doctrine":

1. That respecting the colonies of Europe then existing in America.
2. The political equality of the states of the continent, particularly from the point of view of their independence which therefore negated the right of any to interfere in the internal affairs of another.
3. The non-interference of the United States in the domestic affairs of Europe, save when they constitute a menace for the independent existence of America.

On declaring the intervention of Europe in America is not to be tolerated and that the American continent is not open to European colonization, Monroe contradicted two principles of international law at that time in force: that of intervention and

that of the acquisition by occupation of the territories that were *res nullius*. The contradiction of this second principle is particularly important, as it in reality amounted to establishing, that, in America, all territory, even that which was not explored, and which was consequently *nullius* (and in this condition there were vast stretches of country), was subject to the sovereign authority of the American country within whose limits it was located during the colonial epoch. The view is obtained on the basis that the territory of this continent has already been distributed among the states of America, and that each one exercises real sovereign authority over all the land which belongs to it, even though the regions be totally uninhabited.

The Monroe Doctrine may be synthesized in this fundamental idea: *no one of the two continents may intermeddle in the affairs of the other*, and on this all America stands united.

On recognizing that solidarity of interests as to the continuance of their independence existed between the states of America, Monroe did not do more than serve as an echo of the sentiment that then predominated in all the republics. Therefore, whether the famous message of 1823 had been written or not, the principles contained in it would always have been sustained in the New World. In this sense, it may be said, and not without a certain amount of truth, that the Monroe Doctrine is neither *doctrine* nor *of Monroe*. But that which constitutes its undeniable merit and makes it famous, is that such an exact synthetic statement of the destinies of America should have been given thus early in the period of emancipation, by a people whose increasing power would not permit the rest of the world to regard that statement as merely utopian. It was this that enabled America, from the very beginning of independent life, to give to its foreign policies a safe norm instead of the vague ideas then existent on these subjects. In this sense the Monroe Doctrine is *doctrine* and is *of Monroe*.

The best proof of the statement that the Monroe Doctrine expressed the aspirations of all America, is to be found in the fact that from the date of the Congress of Panama of 1826, all the Latin-American states have not only striven to proclaim it solemnly but also to unite to make it respected; the resolutions passed by this congress and by the others of this period; not only agree with it and clearly show the effect of its influence,

but make an effort to extend it; a similar influence is seen to have been exerted by this Doctrine upon the conventions celebrated by the Latin states with one another.

Publicists have not only failed to see the real origin and nature of the Doctrine, but have disfigured its true meaning. For the majority of persons, it is the basis of the policy of hegemony which the United States is developing on the American continent. The writers, however, are not agreed as to the significance of this policy. The publicists of the Old World believe that the United States has repelled Europe from America only with the object of substituting its own influence for that of Europe. Anglo-Americans believe that the Monroe Doctrine is the sacred text which the United States should apply and interpret in its relations with the mass of Latin-American states; and the few publicists of these countries who have studied the Doctrine see in it a mere pretext for the gradual and progressive absorption by the great republic of the rest of the continent.

These points of view are inadmissible, since the idea of hegemony does not grow out of the Monroe Doctrine nor is its development dependent upon it: and the same objection may be made to the attempt to include within the category of *adversely* "hegemony" every step taken by the United States in international policy in the American continent.

The hegemony of the United States is the fruit of the prodigious and rapid development attained by this country, outdistancing the other American republics, and the *de facto* recognition of this circumstance not only by the states of Europe but also by those of America. So it has been able to pursue a policy on the continent which may be considered from three different points of view and which has worked toward three different ends:

In the first place, the United States as the most powerful country in the western world, has maintained the Monroe Doctrine not only in the cases originally foreseen by it, but also (as in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, in looking to its own interest) has caused it to serve as an expression of the growing necessities and aspirations of the states of America, aiming to assure their independence and territorial integrity. In this direction it has aimed to maintain and develop the Monroe Doctrine.

In the second place, and keeping pace with the above, may be noted the effort of the United States to assert its material preponderance in the new continent, especially when there has been a question of its own interests.

Thirdly, with the purpose of protecting the state of America, it has taken active part in all the international questions of these republics that it believed to be of continental importance, particularly when the latter have become involved in conflicts with European states.

The following belong to the first category:

Cases involving the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine: declaration of the Secretary of State Buchanan in 1848, at the time of the attempt of General Flores to invade Ecuador; declarations and attitude of the United States upon the French invasion of Mexico in 1862; declaration of Secretary of State Seward, during the war between Spain and Chile-Peru; protest of the government of the United States against the re-incorporation of the island of Santo Domingo by Spain.

Cases of the development of the Monroe Doctrine: (a) To prevent the states of Europe from acquiring under any pretext, even with the acquiescence of the American countries, any portion of the continent, or from establishing a protectorate over any American state: declaration of Polk in 1848 as to Yucatan; declaration of 1895 upon the proposal of Nicaragua to cede to England Corn Island as a Naval Station; declaration of 1904 and 1905 in connection with the coercive measures of England, Italy and Germany against Venezuela.

(b) To prevent any European state from entering upon an occupation of a more or less permanent character, even as a war measure, of any part of the territory of an American country; declaration in 1840 by Van Buren that the United States would prevent by force the military occupation of Cuba by England; declaration of President Roosevelt at the time of the above-mentioned action of England, Italy and Germany.

The first class of questions can not be placed under the heading "hegemony of the United States." As in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, they synthesize and accentuate the sentiments of the entire continent. The United States as the most powerful of the states of America becomes the natural spokesman of the continent and charges itself with the duty of making

their ideas respected, to the mutual advantage of all. This is proved not only by the fact of the logical extension of the Doctrine, but also because the points comprised in the first division of questions have been proclaimed by the Latin states in their congresses, as we have already seen. This view gains strength also through the circumstance that whenever the Latin states found themselves in any of these difficult situations, they turned to the Republic of the North for protection; and, finally, because these states have striven to discover new applications for the Monroe Doctrine such as the famous proposal of the Argentine Government, known under the name of the Drago Doctrine, regarding which we will have something to say later on.

To the second category belong:

(a) To prevent one European state from transferring to another, without the consent of the United States, the colonies it possesses on the New Continent: declaration of Clay in 1823 to the governments of France and England, to the effect that the Union would not permit Spain to transfer Cuba or Puerto Rico to a European country. President Grant later reaffirmed this.

(b) To present itself as the sole master and guardian of every highway between the United States and Panama to connect the two great oceans: Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. This treaty is "anti-Monroe" as it accepts the principle that a European power may have a word in American affairs, but the negotiations of the United States to abrogate the treaty constitute manifestations of the leadership of the nation.

(c) To intervene in the formation of new states in America whether their establishment be through act of emancipation, secession or otherwise (emancipation of Cuba and secession of Panama).

In the third category are to be found numerous well-known examples, among which it may be well duly to call to mind here the interference of the United States in 1895 at the time of the dispute between England and Venezuela as to the boundary of British Guiana. In this intervention, which is a most characteristic act of hegemony, the discussion between the chancelleries of the United States and England on the Monroe Doctrine, involved the point advanced by Olney that American

problems could only be solved by Americans. President Cleveland (message of December 17, 1895) invoked the Monroe Doctrine. The conflict was terminated by the Treaty of February 2, 1897, between England and Venezuela which submitted the question to arbitration, and on the 3rd of October, 1899, almost the entire territory was adjudged British soil.

The second and third categories come properly within the limits of the idea of hegemony and not of the Monroe Doctrine, to which, indeed, they rather run counter.

If the states of Latin America do not look with great favor upon the policy indicated under the second heading, they at least do not condemn it, providing it be pursued with reason and all proper moderation. As to the third category, these states not only do not reject it, but have sought and always will seek protection under it whenever it may operate to their benefit. But the circumstance that the United States has not always taken the lead with the necessary tact, has not at all times given its protection to the countries of America, and has held itself aloof with disdain from these republics until a late day, explains the dread they have felt of the hegemony of the Union, a fear fomented by the press and literature of Europe which represents the United States as preparing to absorb all America.

The extension given to the Monroe Doctrine and the hegemony of the United States, unlike the doctrine itself, have not been formulated as one piece nor at one time or in a solemn manner; on the contrary, they have grown little by little as circumstances have required them. And it is even more curious to note that the United States did not appeal to the doctrine during the time when it was strictly applying the principles contained therein, and that it has appealed to it when its application was not in point and when the act in question was one of hegemony (e. g., in the above mentioned conflict between England and Venezuela).

The hegemony of the United States, as well as the Monroe Doctrine, has been attacked in Europe as lacking any basis in international law. But the truth of the matter is that the leadership of the United States as well as the doctrine have been tacitly recognized by the states of Europe, which have been the first to turn to the United States in conflicts with Latin-

American states. Further, the United States solemnly and emphatically re-asserted its determination in the matter in the first Hague Conference. This country then showed itself more firmly than ever disposed, according to the expression of one of its delegates, "to maintain this policy and the Monroe Doctrine, in its later *approved and extended form*, carefully and energetically."

It may be said regarding the position of hegemony of the United States, that it has usually asserted itself in efforts to prevent civil wars in countries on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Only one case is to be found where it has acted in the rest of the continent: viz., in opposition to the restoration of the monarchy of Brazil, in 1893-1894.

It may be further said that its manifestations have not shown the same intensity in every part of the continent: it has been much more effective in countries lying close to the United States than in those that are more distant. The interference of the northern republic has been particularly marked in countries situated on the Gulf of Mexico (Cuba, Panama Canal, secession of the Republic of Panama, boundary dispute between Venezuela and England). However, there is one case on record where it not only did not desire to intervene but when it refused to do so after having been called upon for assistance—in the matter of Lueders out of which grew the difficulty between Germany and Haiti. On this occasion Secretary of State Sherman declared that the Monroe Doctrine did not compel the United States to be involved in the continual conflicts between American republics and other nations.

As to the countries situated south of the equatorial line, the leadership of the United States has hardly ever been asserted, owing to the small interests the Union has in these regions, the difficulties of distance, and the more perfect organization of the governments there, which has not made it necessary to interfere in their relations with foreign powers. On several occasions, the United States refused to intervene: as, in 1881, at the time of the war between Chile and Peru, when it declined to join France and Great Britain in order to put an end to hostilities, and, in 1897, in the boundary dispute between Chile and Argentina.

The hegemony of the United States, above all, according to

the significance it has in the third division, is comparable to the system of "balance of power" which was exercised in Europe by the Great Powers, though the two notions are by no means to be confounded. Far from deserving absolute condemnation, as has been lightly said by certain publicists, it should be differently judged, as having been generally beneficial to America, as it has made this hemisphere respected by the countries of Europe in spite of the acts of intervention that have been carried out against it. But, if this hegemony is not more burdensome than the European "balance of power," its application possesses this one defect, however,—that, being exercised by a single country it is not subject to proper control. Consequently it will never have the prestige and moral weight that is enjoyed by the former.

The conclusion which we reach is that the Monroe Doctrine with the extension of its principles, as well as the policy of hegemony, gives yet another characteristic touch to the international relations of the states of the new world, and, is, consequently, of great importance to international law.

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1912**

Magdalena Bay Resolution

Midway in the southerly third of the west coast of Lower California, and perhaps 3,000 miles from Panama, is a large bay. The back country is barren and thirsty, but on the shore and off it is moss which contains a dye and fish. Lumber and cattle are said to be possibilities also. An American company secured here from Mexico a large tract of land, several million acres, which border on the bay and run back from it. This company was unprofitable. Its chief creditor, a New Hampshire lumberman, has taken it over and tried to secure himself by making a sale to certain Japanese subjects. Before concluding any bargain, however, his agent very properly consulted the United States Department of State to learn its attitude. This was adverse, it being aware of the outcry sure to be made if a Japanese coaling, fishery or other station or colony were to be established on our side of the Pacific. Nor did Mr. Knox look

with more favor upon a sale limiting the ownership of the Japanese to a minority. The owner and creditor of the concession seemed to have sought Japanese aid in colonization because no other labor there was available. The Japanese Government had nothing whatever to do with the scheme. Moreover by Mexican law no concession holds good under heavy penalty, if transfer is sought by the concessionnaires to a foreign government.

This was the situation then when the susceptibilities of the Senate were aroused last July, and Mr. Lodge introduced the following Resolution:

Resolved: That when any harbor or other place in the American continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government not American as to give that government practical power of control for national purposes.

It is understood that in secret session for the last word but one "national" was substituted "naval or military."

A Senate resolution is an expression of its opinion. This resolution was intended to be an announcement of national policy to foreign Powers. It was introduced after information had been sought from the President on the subject. This went to show that the conduct of other Powers in regard to those lands had been entirely correct. In the discussion which led up to and which followed the introduction of this resolution it appeared that its mover chose not to regard it as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine but as based upon the law or right of self-defense which is fundamental, the Agadir incident being a precedent. But in Africa, the German action was official governmental. Whereas at Magdalena Bay, as Senator Rayner had well brought out in May, it was a question of private commercial use only. Has the United States a right to assume that private commercial use of such a harbor as this, could be so easily converted into government use as to warrant its prohibition before any sign whatever of abuse or of danger was visible? That the Senate so believes is clear, for it passed

the Lodge resolution. That the legal mind shares this view is not so clear. Let us state it in general terms. On the ground of self-defense a state may forbid its neighbor to sell lands of strategic value to the private subject of a third Power, there being no act, but mere suspicion to warrant the fear that the third Power will make sinister use of its subjects' property. What becomes of the sovereign right of the neighbor to dispose of its lands, for commercial development? If the principle of self-defense is unduly stretched, will it not break down and become ridiculous? Is an attitude of constant suspicion consistent with international good-will? These are doubts which fairly arise from the Lodge resolution.

Annals of the American Academy. 54:84-91. July, 1914

Effects of the Panama Canal on Our Relations with Latin America. John Holladay Latané

The original Monroe Doctrine announced our purpose to protect all the independent Latin-American states against political interference by European Powers. We have now gone a step further and established formal protectorates by treaty over Cuba and Panama guaranteeing them not only against outside interference, but against internal disorders, and a similar protectorate over Nicaragua has been proposed. On July 19, 1913, a treaty signed with Nicaragua by Mr. Bryan was submitted to the Senate. It embodied almost word for word the Platt amendment, which defined our relations with Cuba. Nicaragua agreed not to declare war without the consent of the United States; not to sign treaties giving foreign powers a foothold on her soil; not to contract any foreign debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the country; and to recognize the right of the United States to intervene for the purpose of protecting the independence of Nicaragua.

There were other equally important features of the treaty which will be considered in a moment. But the Senate refused to ratify it. The committee on foreign relations reported it unfavorably by a vote of eight to four. The press reports indicate, however, that this treaty project has not yet been finally

abandoned, but that ratification will be again urged upon the Senate as soon as more pressing matters are disposed of.

President Roosevelt's Dominican policy added an important corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. He held in brief that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt American republic in the hands of receivers, the United States must undertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of its finances; that to allow a European Power to take possession of the custom houses to collect the duties, the only effective method of paying the foreign debt, would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He boldly adopted this policy and finally forced a reluctant Senate to acquiesce. In spite of the criticism that this policy encountered, the Taft administration adopted it and proposed to extend it to Honduras and Nicaragua. In January, 1911, a treaty placing the finances of Honduras under the supervision of the United States was signed by Mr. Knox, and in June a similar treaty was signed with Nicaragua. These treaties provided for the refunding of the foreign debt in each case through loans made by American bankers and secured by the customs duties, the collector in each case to be approved by the President of the United States, and to make an annual report to the department of state. These treaties were not ratified by the Senate.

Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question. February 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to the Senate. By the terms of this treaty Nicaragua agreed to give the United States an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a naval base in Fonseca Bay in return for a payment of \$3,000,000. The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the Taft administration was at hand. In July Mr. Bryan submitted to the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition the provisions of the Platt amendment, as already stated above. This arrangement has so far failed to receive the approval of the Senate. It is to be noted that the second Knox treaty and the Bryan treaty did not propose financial administration by the United States, but the Bryan treaty bound Nicaragua not to create a public debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the island.

President Wilson's attitude toward foreign concessions is a

matter of importance and carries our Latin-American policy a step further. As he expressed it, it is this:

You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege, and the states that are obliged because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs—a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . .

What these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has been inevitable to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate.

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which Pearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia. This concession covered practically all of the oil interests in Colombia, and carried with it the right to include harbors and canals in the country. As oil is coming into use as a naval fuel the occupation of the Colombian oil fields and harbors by a foreign corporation presented a serious question. However, before the meeting of the Colombian Congress in November, 1913, which was to confirm the concession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, withdrew the contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the United States.

The next policy which we shall consider is that of acquiring control of all possible canal routes so that no competing canal may at any time in the future be dug by other powers. The manner in which we acquired the Panama Canal Zone produced a very bad effect throughout Latin America. Following Roosevelt's assertion of the big-stick policy and of the duty of the United States to play policeman in the western hemisphere, his seizure of the Canal Zone—to adopt his own view of the transaction—aroused serious apprehension and made the countries of Latin America believe that the United States had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy to a policy of selfish aggression. His hasty recognition of the Panama Republic tended to strengthen belief in the reports that he had instigated the revolution. Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved,

and this feeling was not alleviated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech to the students of the University of California in which he boasted that he had taken the Canal Zone, and that if he had not acted as he did the matter would still be under discussion.

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the Roosevelt administration, Secretary Root had undertaken to reestablish friendly relations with Colombia by means of a tripartite treaty between the United States, Panama and Colombia. The proposed agreement provided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by Colombia and for the transference to Colombia as Panama's share of the public debt of the first ten instalments of the annual rental of \$250,000 which the United States had agreed to pay to Panama for the lease of the Canal Zone. The treaty was ratified by the United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia. The Taft administration made repeated efforts to placate Colombia, which resulted in the formulation of a rather remarkable proposition by Secretary Knox shortly before the close of the Taft administration. His proposals were that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaty just referred to the United States would be willing to pay Colombia \$10,000,000 for an exclusive right of way for a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetual lease of the Islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence. These proposals were rejected by Colombia. The American minister, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsibility, asked informally whether \$25,000,000 without options of any kind would satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Knox in reporting the matter to the President said that Colombia seemed determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.

In his message to the Colombian congress, September, 1913, President Restrepo referred to the conciliatory attitude of President Wilson, and added: "The probability that the service of the Isthmian Canal will soon be available, the advantage of cultivating frankly cordial relations with the United States, the clear and progressive development of our nationality, and the peculiar needs of our maritime departments, are making every day more close our *rapprochement* with the great Republic of the North."

It would probably be wise policy as well as an act of justice on our part to agree upon some compromise with Colombia.

While ordinarily a political act like the recognition of a new state is not a proper subject for arbitration, there are certain features of the Panama case which possibly afford legal ground for Colombia's demand for pecuniary damages. I refer to President Roosevelt's interpretation of the treaty of 1846. That treaty was a contract between the United States and Colombia, and yet President Roosevelt construed it as an obligation assumed by the United States for the benefit of the world at large, and under this interpretation he refused to allow Colombia to land troops in Panama for the purpose of putting down the insurrection. If Colombia should continue to insist on arbitration, basing her claims on President Roosevelt's forced construction of the treaty, it is difficult to see how the United States could refuse to submit the question to arbitration.

The Nicaraguan treaty, signed by Mr. Bryan but not ratified by the Senate, provided that the United States should have an exclusive right of way over the Nicaraguan canal route. It was stated at the time that this treaty was negotiated that Germany was considering the possibility of getting the right of way for a canal through Nicaragua, but such a suggestion seems extremely improbable.

Another important policy is the acquisition of naval stations in the Pacific and in the Caribbean. The Bryan treaty with Nicaragua, as we have already seen, provided for a ninety-nine-year lease of a naval base in Fonseca Bay and also for the lease of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean. The Knox proposals to Colombia provided for coaling stations on the islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence in the Caribbean.

The last policy to which I shall refer is President Wilson's requirement that the governments of Latin-American states shall be constitutional in form and based on the consent of the governed, or, to state it negatively, the doctrine of non-recognition. This is of course the policy that the administration has adopted in the case of Mexico. In his Swarthmore speech President Wilson said: "I would like to believe that all this hemisphere is devoted to the same sacred purpose and that nowhere can any government endure which is stained by blood or supported by anything but the consent of the governed." The refusal to recognize a revolutionary government is not as novel a policy

as some of the opponents of the Wilson administration would have us believe, but as this question has a special place in this volume I shall not venture to discuss it further.

The building of the canal has thus led to new developments of the Monroe Doctrine, developments not applicable to firmly established states like Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, but limited to what we Americans erroneously regard as typical Latin-American states, that is, the states within the zone of the Caribbean. The new applications of the simple principle announced by President Monroe in 1823 have aroused the apprehensions of certain Latin-American writers, and their denunciations of what they are pleased to call this pseudo-Monroeism have not failed to win the sympathetic support of a more or less limited number of writers in this country. Some of these writers appear to cherish a personal grievance against this cardinal principle of American diplomacy and one writer in particular has vehemently denounced it as an obsolete shibboleth. It is in vain that the critics point out the difference between the doctrine of 1823 and the doctrine of 1914 or the difference between the international situation then and now. If the original policy had not expanded with the lapse of time or taken on new phases with the development of new situations, it would long since have ceased to be of any value to us, for the exact situation that called forth the original declaration in 1823 can never again arise. The Monroe Doctrine is merely a name that Americans have given for ninety years to our Latin-American policy, which in the necessity of things has undergone changes and will continue to undergo them, and it is no more likely that the public will repudiate the name than that the State Department will repudiate the policy.

Señor Calderón, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for March, 1914, takes issue with Professor Bingham's recent attack on the Monroe Doctrine on several points. He says:

It is not true, as Professor Bingham maintains, that amongst the republics which form the A B C alliance, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, powerful and solidly organized states, one finds any jealous opposition to the neo-Saxon power—such as would explain, according to Professor Bingham's theory, the alliance of these ambitious peoples. On the contrary, among these nations, out of range of North American action, the liveliest sympathy with the politics of the United States is discernible. . . . It is rather in the "zone of influence" of the United States, between the northern frontier of Mexico and Panama, in the Antilles, in Colombia and Venezuela, that hatred against the United States has become a popular passion.

His final conclusion as to the future of the Monroe Doctrine we may safely accept: "The wisest statesmen have no thought of divorcing this doctrine from the future history of America, even though they criticize its excesses most severely."

North American Review. 199: 833-40. June, 1914

Monroe Doctrine Fundamentals. Theodore S. Woolsey

The Monroe Doctrine in its ninety years of life has been so overlaid with comment and so modified and enlarged in development that we are apt to lose sight of its real and fundamental character. By studying its essential nature, by appreciating upon what it is founded and how it is limited, perhaps we may form a juster sense of its usefulness, its meaning, its legality. But before all and throughout all we must keep in mind that it is a policy, not a law, municipal or international. The distinctions between policy and law are wide and vital; here are certain of them.

A nation's policy is unilateral. Though affecting other states, it is formed without their consent: it may therefore be changed without reference to their wishes. Germany has adopted a naval programme, that is, a policy of building up an important navy, without consulting Great Britain. The United States determined to dig a Panama Canal itself, without getting the consent of other commercial powers except that of England, which had been given a veto of such action by treaty.

A nation's policy is changeable as self-interest dictates. Thus France, a few years ago, nagged England wherever their interests met, by a policy of pin-pricks; then, after her Russian ally proved a broken reed, changed attitude and welcomed England to the Triple Entente—all within a decade.

Policy imposes no continuous obligation upon a state. We here in America are quite accustomed to have the action of one Administration disavowed by the next. Our financial attitude toward China under President Taft and again under President Wilson is an instance.

Policy is based upon considerations which are selfish rather than altruistic. This is because the state, like any other incorporate body, has a fiduciary duty toward its subjects which

forbids the sacrifice of their interests for the sake of another state.

In all these aspects policy and law differ. A rule of international law comes into being in the last analysis by the common consent of nations. It cannot be created, though it may be suggested, by a single power. Great Britain's maritime strength backed by her administrative and judicial attitude, somewhat more than a century ago, asserted a right to impress seamen out of neutral vessels on the high seas—i. e. to enforce a municipal statute outside of British jurisdiction. Unwarranted by the consent of other states, this practice, though persisted in for years, never became law and finally lapsed. A law is universal, not unilateral; it is fixed, not changeable unless changed by the consent of those who framed it; it is binding upon a state even if damaging to that state's interests; it is neither selfish nor altruistic because, once having become operative, no question of self or of interest enters into it. Bearing in mind these distinctions, it remains to show that the Monroe Doctrine has always remained what it was at its inception, a policy. The proof is twofold. First no international agreement can be found which converts it from policy into law. Secondly, there has not come about such acquiescence in it as to change its nature. The first statement is a matter of record and is perfectly clear. The second may be doubted. As examples of an opinion contrary to the above an article in the *North American Review* for 1903, by Mr. Scruggs, may be quoted, also the reference in Cleveland's Venezuelan Message.

Mr. Scruggs argues thus. "Not one of the European Powers has ever entered formal protest against it; on the contrary, all have acquiesced in it and thus tacitly assented to it. It is therefore a valid part of the public law of this continent, and until abandoned by us or until formally challenged by Europe or until modified or abrogated by public treaty, it will continue to be recognized as part of the International Code of the Christian world."

And Mr. Cleveland said in reply to Lord Salisbury's objection: "It may not have been admitted in so many words to the Code of International Law, but since in international councils every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim, it has

its place in the Code of International Law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned." The first writer refutes himself, for in the same breath he calls the Doctrine law, yet says we can abandon it; the second expresses himself too vaguely for specific refutation. It is enough to say in reply that the right of the United States to surrender and escape from the Monroe Doctrine or to alter it at will is admitted by every one. If it were a law it could not be escaped from without the assent of those accepting and framing it. To say that it can become a law by mere acquiescence and then be abrogated or modified by the *ex parte* act of one state, is to have a loose and mistaken idea of the nature of the law of nations. Hence when a writer asserts that the Monroe Doctrine is an "obsolete shibboleth" he simply means that it is a policy which has outgrown its usefulness, and, not being law, can be and should be given up, which is a perfectly legitimate argument.

There are now three fundamental principles which characterize the policy of President Monroe as it was and as it is. For the sake of coherence and completeness they are stated together here and then examined separately.

I. The Monroe Doctrine was a statement of policy, originated and maintained by reason of self-interest, not of altruism.

II. It was justifiable by reason of the right of self-defense (which is a recognized principle of International Law).

III. It called no new *rights* into being, therefore whenever it oversteps the principle of self-defense reasonably interpreted, the right disappears and the policy is questionable because it then violates the rights of others.

I. The Monroe Doctrine dictated by self-interest. The circumstances which called the Monroe Doctrine into being are too familiar to need repetition. But the underlying motive in it may not be so clear. This had nothing to do with fear of enhancement of Spanish power in Europe which was incidentally struck at, because in the same message the United States was made to disclaim all European ambitions. "Our policy in regard to Europe which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers."

Nor was it designed primarily to aid the Latin-American

states in winning their independence or to preserve that independence if already won. If, however, Spain should recover her American possessions by the help of her European backers (apostles of absolutism), she would become a menace to the United States upon this continent.

"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power," said Mr. Monroe, "we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

And later in the message came this other reference to the South-American states: "If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other parties will pursue the same course."

The policy then was one of neutrality, of "leaving the parties to themselves" so far as Spain was concerned, which would not have been the case had the United States desired primarily to help them.

But when intervention was threatened by certain great Powers in behalf of Spain, then indeed was there evidence of "an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." This idea was amplified thus: "It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either [American] continent without endangering our peace and happiness." And again: "We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to

extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

Seventy years later, President Cleveland in his Venezuelan message asserted the same principle in much the same language. "Without attempting extended argument in reply to these positions it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government."

Incidentally, no doubt, the Monroe policy safeguarded Latin America, but its prime object was to protect the United States; it was entered into from motives of self-interest, not of altruism. Neither ethical reasons nor legal reasons, therefore, stand in the way of its alteration or abrogation if a changed policy so wills.

II. The Monroe Doctrine is based upon the right of self-defense.

This is the first law of nations as of individuals. A few sentences are quoted almost at random from a recent and very sound authority, Professor Hershey, to show the nature of this right.

The right of self-preservation takes precedence in a sense of all other rights and duties and is more than a right in the ordinary use of this term. . . . A state has unquestionably the right under modern conditions to make such preparations and to take such measures as it may deem necessary for its own safety and defense, but it has no right to make a disposition of its forces or assume an attitude threatening to the existence or safety of another state. . . .

The right of self-preservation includes the right to preserve the integrity and inviolability of its territory with the corresponding duty of respecting that of other states.

It is upon this right of self-defense that the balance of power principle was based, as well as the balancing of alliances, which is its modern substitute. But the danger which warrants action must threaten national territory or national life or the integrity of a nation's institutions. It must be real and serious, not a mere blow at commercial interests or political prestige. And if we study again the language of Monroe's message we shall see how real the menace to the existence of the United States and of its institutions was, which he believed he was combating. "Dangerous to our peace and safety," "endangering

our peace and happiness." These are the words by which Monroe characterized the proposed intervention of the Holy Alliance in this hemisphere. Such language we should use to-day were a great European Power to seize Cuba, or a great Oriental Power a slice of Lower California.

There are two lines of reasoning to show that self-defense was and is the principle upon which the Monroe Doctrine rests. The first is that upon subsequent declarations of it, this principle has been adhered to and restated in language the most explicit. Examine again the Venezuelan version in 1895. President Cleveland objected to British encroachment upon Venezuela because (in words already quoted) it threatened "our peace and safety as a nation"; because it endangered "the integrity of our free institutions"; because it jeopardized "the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government." Every argument tending to show that the policy was not altruistic proves also, looking at the obverse of the medal, that it must have been based upon the idea and desire of self-protection.

The second proof of our contention is that there exists no other principle upon which the Doctrine can be founded.

Notice what the Monroe Doctrine involved. It met a policy of intervention by a warning of "hands off." It set a limit upon the freedom of action of a friendly Power. In other words, it denied the full sovereignty of that Power. Such a denial of a fundamental right can only be justified by reason of some principle equally fundamental. There is no such principle except that of self-defense. Here was no claim to intervene on the score of outraged humanity as in Greece or Cuba; nor was there any question of international police power such as in south-eastern Europe has attempted to justify its interferences, though this in fact is itself dictated by fear, is itself a case of self-defense. The United States, warned by its somewhat sympathetic friends abroad that a plan was on foot to crush the Latin-American republics and restore them to Spain, their former sovereign, realized the danger to itself, announced that it was a danger, and stopped the plan by a public protest. It acted in defense of vital interests; one can hardly reiterate the fact too often.

III. The Monroe Doctrine called no new *rights* into existence.

Here is the opportunity for much loose thinking. Because the Doctrine, as a policy, has taken on new forms, has been

altered, expanded, developed like the opportunist thing which it is, we are apt to forget that its fundamental base remains and must remain unaltered. It is indeed a paradox that the stronger we have become as a nation, the less we need to fear any power or to consider any principle of self-defense, so much the more broadly has the policy been construed. Whether this expanded policy is justified or unjustifiable is not here discussed. It is the legal right of a principle, not the policy of the Doctrine, under examination. Whatever becomes of the policy, whether it be expanded or be surrendered, whatever the power of a great state may read into it, the principle upon which it is based remains unchanged. A policy guiding one state and acquiesced in by others may readily change. A law of nations, except with the consent and by the act of all states, does not change. We may, however, well remember that if a right is pushed beyond its reasonable and logical limits, it becomes an aggression upon the rights of others. A policy, therefore, has its limitations. They are reached when the rights of others are violated. By the Ashburton treaty of 1842, disputed territory in northern Maine was by compromise divided between Great Britain and the United States. No one thought the Monroe Doctrine violated, though it meant a gain of territory upon this continent by a European Power and at our very doors. It is reasonable, therefore, to ask for proof that a somewhat similar struggle for territory by the same Power in distant Venezuela, in 1895, was a violation of the Doctrine, was a real danger to *our* safety and to *our* institutions as Cleveland said it was. As a policy, submitted to, by a nation desirous of our good will, it may be defended; as the exercise of a right, not so easily, because the basic principle was probably exceeded and thereby British rights invaded.

This is a single illustration of what seems to the writer a self-evident proposition. If a state pushes its action beyond the rights, reasonably interpreted, upon which that action is based, then *ipso facto*, an aggression has been committed upon some other state's rights, just as truly as one army crossing its own frontier invades a neighbor's territory. There is no middle ground. And inasmuch as rights are based upon law, without a change in the law there can be no expansion of rights.

The Monroe Doctrine thus is to be regarded from a two-

fold point of view: as a policy meaning and accomplishing what other states submit to, and what seems to the United States useful: as a measure of self-defense which cannot be pushed beyond the facts calling for self-defense and yet be legally justifiable.

The writer does not desire to call in question the development of the Monroe Doctrine. That it has greatly changed in course of time is patent to every one. As now ordinarily interpreted it denies to a European Power, under any pretext, fresh acquisition of territory upon the American hemisphere. If European Powers put up with this policy, well and good. If the Latin-American states resent the air of superiority implied in this interpretation, that is a phase of the policy which must be taken into account. If the responsibility which the United States unconsciously assumes for the actions of its neighbors becomes a burden and a danger, that too is a factor. The only purpose of the present argument is to call fresh attention to the fundamental basis of the Doctrine and to its legal, not its practical, limitations, with the thought in mind, however, that no civilized state, the United States least of all, would care to gain the reputation of unscrupulousness in its observance of International Law.

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What European Countries Think of the Monroe Doctrine.
Herbert Kraus

It would be interesting to present a picture of the many international conflicts which the Monroe Doctrine has prevented, and at the same time to attempt to portray what would have been the probable condition of affairs on the American continent had the Monroe Doctrine never been promulgated. But it is impossible for any human brain to furnish a detailed picture of this imaginary situation. To do so would require the prophetic vision of a seer.

No stretch of imagination is necessary, however, to recognize clearly that Central and South America without this great *principle of isolation* would be a field of great rivalry for coloniza-

tion; a rivalry which, on account of the higher value of the prizes offered, and also on account of the greater power of resistance of the American states in question, would make the struggle for the division of Africa seem small in comparison, and cause the shedding of rivers of blood. This side of the Monroe Doctrine is, as a rule, not yet sufficiently understood, and hence not appreciated, by the public opinion of Europe, which follows, registers, notes and criticizes the circumstances in which this dogma of American politics is applied.

European interest in the Monroe Doctrine, at least in the three countries chiefly concerned, viz., Germany, England and France, is uncommonly great. In Europe as in America it is only necessary to connect a particular incident with the Monroe Doctrine in order to arouse a lively public interest. Very different, however, are the feelings which this word arouses on the opposite shores of the Atlantic. In the United States one always finds confirmed the words of one of its leading statesmen, who once wrote me that "it may, indeed, almost be said that all our government has to do to rally the people to the support of any measure . . . is to couple it with the revered title of the Monroe Doctrine."

European opinion, on the contrary, generally taking a critical attitude towards such matters as are coupled with the Monroe Doctrine, oscillates between a dignified reserve and a certain distrust which soon develops into open hostility on the part of the chauvinistic press. That Europe has not fully appreciated the causes, aims and accomplishments of this doctrine, and that the full comprehension of its character and its tasks only slowly and hesitatingly makes its way in the public opinion, is hardly to be wondered at. Is the situation, after all, very different in the United States? How many are there in that country who really have a correct idea of the purport and limitations of the Monroe Doctrine, based on an intimate and unprejudiced knowledge? How often, for instance, is it associated with affairs with which it has no connection whatever? For example, what relation has it with the much discussed question of the Panama Canal tolls? This controversy is nothing more than a dispute about the interpretation of treaty rights. And yet the Monroe Doctrine is incessantly drawn into the discussion. Even such a man as Champ Clark declared in his recent speech, in the House, against

the amendment to the Panama Canal act, that "repeal would mean practical abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine."

Although some German papers recently went so far as to express the opinion that the journey of Prince Henry of Prussia, the Kaiser's brother, to South America, was a protest on the part of the Kaiser against the Monroe Doctrine, and that he was thereby showing that he did not feel himself bound by it, nevertheless the people of Germany treat such a groundless statement with the contempt it deserves.

The chief difficulty the European experiences in interpreting the Doctrine lies in the fact that he unconsciously judges American conditions and affairs by European standards. It would require a conscious effort for the people of a continent whose political sense and feeling are at present influenced by an incessant rivalry for colonial expansion, to conceive that a state may have any other political ideal; that its ambition may not necessarily strive for increase of power by colonial acquisitions.

That the United States, until now, has not shared such ambitions is proved by the history of her foreign policy. This policy furnishes an almost unbroken line of examples to sustain such a contention, with the single exception of the wave of imperialism directed toward colonial expansion which arose at the time of the war with Spain, but which quickly subsided. It is impossible to understand American foreign policy, and with it the Monroe Doctrine, without thoroughly considering this difference between the political ideals of Europe and the United States—a difference which, at present, undoubtedly exists.

On the other hand, I may venture to say that the feeling in Europe towards the Monroe Doctrine is slowly changing. It is true, one sometimes reads, even now, heated arguments against this Doctrine, in which, unfortunately, is often quoted that remark made by Bismarck when he called the Monroe Doctrine "an international impertinence." But such arguments seem to become less frequent, and, on the whole, the number of sensible and more reasonable critics, who consider the merits as well as the weaknesses of the Monroe Doctrine, steadily increases. A convincing appeal may be made to the teachings of history. They refute the hitherto generally accepted argument raised against the doctrine, that its purpose was to give to the United States a monopoly of political expansion on the American continent. In fact, not one

instance can be proved in which the United States has added territory in America under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. What she has done again and again, acting on this principle, is to prevent the over-sea expansion of any non-American state.

Of particular interest is the change of public opinion in Europe in another direction. Formerly discussion was chiefly centered on question of the justification, or rather the lack of justification, for the existence of the Doctrine. This question has now been relegated to the background by two others. One is whether the United States can and will maintain the Monroe Doctrine, or whether, in the course of time this principle will turn against the country which formulated it and become a burden. The second question involves the duty of the United States, resulting from the doctrine, to provide for peace and order in Central and South America, and a reasonable protection for non-American interests. Events in Mexico, prior to the recent active measures on the part of the United States, chiefly the murder of the British subject Benton, have given a number of European newspapers the opportunity to remind the United States of her duty—to play the rôle of American policeman—a duty which ex-President Roosevelt, in particular, repeatedly emphasized as a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. When, however, the United States interfered in Mexico most of those newspapers had, unfortunately, already forgotten their former admonition.

It is clear that Europeans, becoming more and more reconciled to the Monroe Doctrine, accept it as an existing fact and begin to discuss its consequences.

The above refers only to the old style Monroe Doctrine, to the doctrine which wants to prevent the increase of political power of non-American states in America, and which may be styled the political Monroe Doctrine. The affair takes a different aspect when we consider that new tendency to extend the doctrine into a prevention or limitation of the purely economic activity of non-American states, or their citizens, in America.

But one cannot say that the Monroe Doctrine has actually developed in this direction, although such a development would not be inconsistent with its character. Its transformation into a "commercial Monroe Doctrine" is relatively easy, and signs are not wanting that it already tends toward a development in this direction. Recall the last stage of the Panama Canal affair, and

recall more especially the Magdalena Bay incident. It is clear that such a claim as "America for the Americans, economically as well as politically" would meet with an opposition and attack far more violent than any which the political Monroe Doctrine has ever aroused. It is probable that these attacks would come not only from the non-American camp, but also from American and even from the United States itself.

It is difficult to formulate a decided opinion as to the attitude of European diplomacy toward the Monroe Doctrine. Available material, necessary for that purpose, is lacking. One fact, however, is certain, viz., the Monroe Doctrine, to the present time, has not been expressly recognized as a rule of *international law* by any country.

The question as to whether it has been internationally recognized as a *political principle* of the United States is of no great importance. Since it is, in fact, a political principle of the United States which has been in practice for almost a century, such a recognition would be only the acknowledgment of an existing fact, and as such would have no real significance. It is of much greater importance to note that the other states evidently reckon with the doctrine as a factor which must be taken into consideration.

The last instance in which a European state questioned the validity of the Monroe Doctrine was the controversy between England and the United States as to the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, commonly known as the "Venezuelan boundary dispute." In the settlement of this dispute the United States won its most brilliant diplomatic victory for the doctrine. The victory was so complete that the affair has repeatedly given occasion for the assertion that England, by her attitude, actually recognized the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of international law.

Since the time of the Venezuelan boundary dispute there has been only one dubious example of a disregard for the great American doctrine—the Magdalena Bay incident with Japan in 1912. Even here the Japanese government did not contend that the Monroe Doctrine could not hinder the acquisition by a Japanese syndicate of a concession of land from Mexico in lower California, to which the United States objected, but simply denied that such a transaction was being carried out.

The case of the Venezuelan debts of 1901-1904 gave the German government occasion for the celebrated declaration "that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory," a declaration which some, incorrectly, have construed as a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by that government.

It is even reported that during the recent Mexican troubles some European governments have directly applied to the United States to act as intermediary in seeking redress for the injustice which their subjects have suffered in Mexico (consider in this connection the Benton case). Should these reports prove true it would be such a perfect acquiescence in the doctrine, of the governments concerned, that the jurist would have to consider seriously the question: Have not these powers actually conceded such a position to the United States on the American continent, that she is entitled to the general observance of the principle that the Monroe Doctrine proclaims?

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Monroe Doctrine and Latin America. Joseph Wheless

The single purpose which moves me to a discussion of the phase of this subject indicated by the title of this paper is to endeavor to clear away the obscuring mists of misunderstanding which have been blown up around the Monroe Doctrine in its immediate relation to Latin America. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free," is the inspired text of the evangel of better understanding which I come to preach. It is the same high desire as actuated Mr. Calhoun in his great speech in the Senate on the same subject—"I remove a false interpretation, which makes safe and proper declarations improper and dangerous." To accomplish this, I shall rely not upon arguments of mine own, and but a few North American interpretations, but shall appeal to the best accredited utterances of the most authoritative statesmen and publicists of our neighboring states of Latin America.

That a false interpretation and misunderstanding of the Monroe Doctrine, and of the policy of the United States thereunder, do exist, and have been responsible for no little ill-

feeling and irritation, is unfortunately true and cannot be ignored. This fact was regarded by President Roosevelt as of such importance as to be made the subject of special comment in a message to Congress. In his message of December, 1905, he refers to this fact, and seeks to dispel the error underlying it in emphatic language:

In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States towards the other American republics. An idea has become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied, or carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that doctrine applies. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet that impression continued to be a serious barrier to good understanding, to friendly intercourse, to the introduction of American capital and the extension of American trade. The impression was so widespread that apparently it could not be reached by any ordinary means.

Certainly no one has been more earnest or used more emphasis than has Mr. Roosevelt, in proclaiming the true gospel of the policy and mission of the United States in respect to the American nations, and in striving to allay the baseless fears of aggression and aggrandizement which many profess to feel towards the government at Washington. The truth of his so often repeated declarations of the good will and peaceful designs of the United States regarding Latin America cannot be gainsaid. From his repeated utterances on the subject two representative and official statements may be cited. In his message to Congress of December 3, 1901, the President said:

The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. . . . This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires.

Again in the message of December, 1904, President Roosevelt states strongly his views of the policy and duty of the United States:

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards other nations of the western hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship.

One of the most friendly critics of the Latin-American policy of the United States is Señor Alejandro Álvarez, of Chile, whose work, "Le Droit International Américain," is a luminous study of this and kindred subjects. Frequently, in this and other published works, he calls the Monroe Doctrine "the political gospel of the New World." But this same writer expresses the further truth that there exists in the minds of many persons, even statesmen and writers on international law, a serious confusion of ideas as to what is the Monroe Doctrine; they confuse with it and attribute to it every action and policy of the United States having any relation to Latin America. Señor Álvarez goes directly to the root of the matter, saying: "Distinctions should be made between (1) the Monroe Doctrine in its primitive form; (2) the hegemony of the United States on the American continent; and (3) the imperialistic policy of that nation." Failure to make these very obvious distinctions, due to confusion of thought or to inadequate knowledge of American history as it relates to Latin America, is responsible for the whole unfortunate crop of hostile criticisms of the Monroe Doctrine and of ill-will towards the United States as sponsor for that doctrine, except such part of these attacks as is due wholly to the ignorance or malevolence of their authors. This fact is clearly recognized by Señor Álvarez, who says: "Publicists have not only failed to see the real origin and nature of the doctrine, but have disfigured its true meaning;" and he adds: "For the majority of persons, it is the basis of the policy of hegemony which the United States is developing on the American continent." Further, on this latter point he says:

These points of view are inadmissible, since the idea of hegemony does not grow out of the Monroe Doctrine nor is its development dependent upon it; and the same objection may be made to the attempt to include within the category of "hegemony" every step taken by the United States in international policy in the American continent.

The hegemony of the United States is the fruit of the prodigious and rapid development attained by that country, outdistancing the other American republics, and the *de facto* recognition of this circumstance not only by the states of Europe but also by those of America. . . .

The United States as the most powerful of the states of America becomes the natural spokesman of the continent and charges itself with the duty of making its ideas respected, to the mutual advantage of all.

This "confusion of ideas" in respect to the Monroe Doctrine,

and the very prevalent disposition to make it a sort of scapegoat for all the manifestations of the policy of the United States, which are regarded by our neighbors as acts of "hegemony" and of "imperialism," has had a recent striking exemplification. This was the failure of the gracious and just act contemplated in the Fourth Pan-American Conference looking to an expression of appreciation of the benefits of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin America. The Latin-American delegations feared, as expressed by Señor Álvarez, that "while approving it, they might sanction along with it many acts of hegemony committed by the United States by which more than one country had felt its sovereign dignity to have been wounded."

This state of facts should give sober pause to all those in the United States who are charged with the important and delicate task of shaping the relations between our country and our neighbors of Latin America. The latter, it will be seen, cordially approve "the principles which properly belong to the Monroe Doctrine," while they have taken offence at and cherish resentment of "certain trends of policy which are foreign to it," but which they undiscerningly confuse with the Monroe Doctrine, to its disparagement and to the detriment of the good relations which it is our desire and our duty to cultivate with our sister republics. It behooves us then, who desire to steer our course along the safe and pleasant paths of international friendship and goodwill, to do our utmost to dispel the misunderstanding, at home and abroad, of the true import of the Monroe Doctrine, and by future considerate conduct avoid all offensive "acts of hegemony" which are complained of, even by friendly critics, as having wounded the sensibilities and the sovereign dignity of our neighbors.

The most succinct, as well as authoritative, statement of the Monroe Doctrine is found, naturally, in the text of President Monroe's historic message of December 2, 1823. It embraces two separate but correlated propositions, the essential words of which are:

1. . . . the American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers.

2. . . . we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any

European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.

In the Annals of this Academy for May, 1911, Señor Álvarez makes an analysis of President Monroe's Message, and deduces the generally accepted estimate of its political content. He thus summarizes:

The declarations of an international character contained in this document may be reduced to three:

1. No European country may gainsay the right gained by the nations of the New World to their independence and sovereignty.
2. The right is recognized of these same American nations to organize such forms of government as best suit their interests without the intervention of any European country in the affairs relating to internal regulation; and
3. European nations are prohibited acquiring by occupation any part of the American continent.

The foregoing simple propositions are the "whole of the law and the prophets" of the Monroe Doctrine. As Señor Álvarez proceeds to say: "These declarations, by their preciseness and definiteness, became henceforth the political creed of all the nations of the new world. . . . And this is so true that all those nations strove for the solemn proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine at the American International Congress which met at Panama in 1826." No candid mind can justly discover in any of the propositions of this traditional American policy any broader scope or ulterior purpose than those stated.

In view of the carping criticism of our American patriots-at-large in aid and comfort of its ill-advised maligners abroad, we must discover what really is the status of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, officially and among those whose opinion is authoritative.

With the utmost enthusiasm and gratitude was the message hailed by the South American states, whose independence was forever assured by the policy declared by President Monroe; their governments, and the heroes of their independence, declared their hearty approbation of its principles. Bolívar proposed it for general ratification at his projected Panama Congress; and from that date, says Señor Álvarez, "all the Latin states have not only striven to proclaim it solemnly but also to unite to make it respected"—for, he says, it "expressed the aspirations of all America." A distinguished Spanish pub-

licist, Exmo. Señor Alejo Garcia Moreno, in a study of "The Monroe Doctrine," in 1909, says:

These principles proclaimed by Monroe were accepted universally, in the first place, in the opinion of the people of the United States, and then in that of the other American republics, and the Monroe Doctrine was thus converted into a principle of American public law, which received its solemn consecration in the Congress of the States of the South, reunited in Panama in 1826.

The highest and most authoritative men of the states of Latin America are outspoken in approval and praise of the Monroe Doctrine, which has indeed long been an acknowledged Pan-American principle. Señor A. de Manos-Albas, called by the late William T. Stead "one of the shrewdest and ablest public men to whom Latin America has given birth in our time," says: "There was an element of prophetic inspiration in the declaration of President Monroe, uttered in 1823. It rang through the world like a peal of thunder; it paralyzed the Holy Alliance, and defined, once and for all time, as far as Europe is concerned, the international status of the newly constituted American republics." The brilliant Peruvian, Garcia-Calderón, in his justly celebrated new work, "*Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*," says, in grudging admission of the truth: "The United States proclaimed the autonomy of the continent and contributed to the preservation of the originality of southern America, by forbidding the formation of colonies within their vacant territories, by defending republican and democratic states against reactionary Europe." Before the Fourth Pan-American Conference, Dr. Victoriano de la Plaza, Argentine minister of foreign affairs, recognized the same truth: "This condition of precarious autonomy and liberty of action, and the constant danger of being subjugated or suffering the mutilation of their territory, would have continued among those weak states but for the wise and famous declarations of President Monroe, to which we ought to render due homage." I present a final citation from the highest authority, the eminent Argentine, Señor Luis M. Drago, whose words are commended especially to those who persist in a misconception of the spirit and purpose of the Monroe Doctrine. In his famous note, in 1902, formulating the "Drago Doctrine," he appealed to the saving grace of the Monroe Doctrine as against European

aggression in Venezuela; elsewhere he calls it "the formula of foreign policy of the new world." In a recent exposition of his own celebrated doctrine, he uses these measured and weighty words:

The Monroe Doctrine is in fact a formula of independence. It imposes no dominion and no superiority. Much less does it establish protectorates or relation of superior to inferior. It creates no obligations and no responsibilities between the nations of America, but simply calls upon all of them, with their own means and without foreign aid, to exclude from within their respective frontiers the jurisdiction of European Powers. Proclaimed by the United States in the interest of their own peace and security, the other republics of the continent have in their turn proceeded to adopt it with an eye alone to their own individual welfare and internal tranquillity. This moral consort of intentions and tendencies constitutes in itself alone a great force without need of treaties or formal alliances or definite obligations. Thus understood, the Monroe Doctrine, which in the end is nothing more than the expression of the will of the people to maintain their liberty, assures the independence of the states of that continent in respect to one another as well as in relation to the Powers of Europe.

Such illuminating statements of the principles which inspire the policy known as the Monroe Doctrine, and its hearty acceptance in Latin America, should have the happy effect of dissipating the misunderstanding of that doctrine which is so prevalent among many not only in Latin America and Europe, but among some in the United States who should better understand their government and its historic polity. It may be added, that every nation of Latin America, admitted through the action of the United States to the last "Parliament of Mankind" at The Hague, has, in concert with all the other nations of the world, given its express assent to the Monroe Doctrine as an essential Pan-American principle.

The last word of authoritative interpretation was uttered but the other day by ex-President Roosevelt in his address before the University of Buenos Aires, in which he declared:

The Monroe Doctrine is meant to express the fact that the western hemisphere is not to be treated as Africa or mid-Asia is treated, as a subject for conquest by any old world power. It is a doctrine which the United States promulgated, partly as a matter of policy in its own interest, partly as a matter of policy in the interest of all the republics of the New World.

And in expression of a very patent, but often perversely unrecognized truth, he added:

But as rapidly as any other republic grows to possess the stability, the

self-respecting insistence upon doing right to others and exacting right from others, just so soon that country becomes itself a sponsor and guarantor of the Monroe Doctrine with which the United States of the North no longer has any concern, so far as the doctrine relates to it. . . . As far as you (of the Argentina) are concerned, we have no more concern with the Monroe Doctrine about you than you have about us. If ever it became vitally necessary to enforce it, each would help the other.

The Monroe Doctrine, in its pristine significance, is thus seen to stand accredited, approved, and adopted by all America; it has won universal acceptance on its merits, and needs no defender or apologist. It will endure as an active principle until its protective and civilizing mission is accomplished with the emergence of all the American countries into self-sustaining nationality; until, in the eloquent words of Exmo. Señor Bermejo in his closing address before the Fourth Pan-American Conference,—“the day when America entire shall have finished her institutional evolution in the sense of forming ‘an indestructible union of indestructible states,’ as runs the phrase consecrated by the most authoritative Areopagus on earth.” Then only may the Monroe Doctrine be dubbed, by irreverent schoolmen, an “obsolete shibboleth”; but it will be cherished by the emancipated nations as of blessed memory through all coming time.

As a ward against European aggression, the Monroe Doctrine is not yet “obsolete.” Those who so passionately demand that we “abandon the Monroe Doctrine,” show that in their zeal they reckon not the lessons of history and that they “ignore the plain facts of the present.” Señor Álvarez recognizes that it is still the welcome shield and buckler of Latin American independence and integrity, saying: “These states not only do not reject it, but have sought and always will seek protection under it whenever it may operate for their benefit.” The Peruvian, Señor Calderón, who virulently assails the United States because of his own “confusion of ideas” respecting the Monroe Doctrine, terrified by the spectre which he raises before himself of a Japanese invasion and conquest of Latin America, “to erect there a new Japan,” takes comfort to his fears, exclaiming: “The Monroe Doctrine, which liberated Latin America from the tutelage of the Holy Alliance, is perhaps destined to protect it also against the Orient.” He begins his chapter “Le Danger Allemand,” with the fearsome words: “The Teutonic invasion

disquiets the Hispano-American writers. The tutelary protection of the United States does not suffice to make them forget the European peril." Elsewhere he dwells upon the fact that tenacious Teutonic colonizers" flow into Brazil, Chile, and other countries of South and Central America,—“the German danger remains.” As for Japan, he says: “her statesmen and publicists consider that Peru, Chile and Mexico are lands for Japanese expansion,” and he gloomily predicts “a struggle between half-breed America and stoical Japan, in which the former will lose its autonomy and its traditions.”

History has been a long record of expansion of active and populous nations into the territories of weaker and less populated states. There is nothing to indicate that this movement has reached its final period. Indeed, the struggle for expansion for over-flowing populations is reaching its most acute stage. The possibility of a “scramble for South America” does not exist alone in the fears of some South American theorists. Practical men of state openly express them, and some of the land-hungry have been frank to avow their annoyance with the restraints of the Monroe Doctrine. An English writer in the *Nineteenth Century Magazine*, December, 1896, speaks cynically and covetously of the alluring possibilities in a “scramble for South America,” and says, “if it once begins, neither the latent resources nor the moral influence of the United States will avail to protect its clients without the display of effective military strength.”

Again an English writer, Mr. Somers Somerset, in the same magazine, for April, 1903, at the time of the Venezuela troubles, defines the “new economic necessities” which look towards Latin America for a solution, and says:

In proportion as the available surface of the earth that is suitable for colonization decreases, it becomes more and more evident that not only is there no time to be lost in founding an empire, but that the price which a people may be able to allow itself to pay for the acquisition of that territory is greatly rising. The constant pressure of the peoples of Europe, the commercial struggle, and the natural desire for national aggrandizement are bound to be powerful factors; and the consideration of “now or never” will very soon mark the policy of various European chancelleries. We have already seen that the Old World offers few attractions—there remains only the New World to be considered.

The veto of the Monroe Doctrine, in the opinion of this

writer, has up to this time saved the American countries from European aggression; but he adds: "it must be remembered that during that time the world afforded many opportunities for colonization in other regions, and that that period is drawing to its close, and it is scarcely to be expected that a mere formula or opinion will continue to protect those countries for long." That this is a real condition, and not a theory, is the belief of the most accredited Latin American statesmen. The events in Venezuela, says Dr. Juan A. Garcia, are not isolated facts, measures of policy, or reparation of wrongs, "but the opportunity which materialized a tendency latent in Europe since the middle of the past century which in the last years has been emphasized and fortified by the new economic necessities." This subject is treated at length and very seriously by Dr. Luis M. Drago, in a recent explanation of his action, in 1902, in appealing to the protection of the Monroe Doctrine in behalf of Venezuela as against the aggression of England, Germany and Italy. His note pointed out, he says:

A danger that lay very near and it aimed to forestall it. At the time when it was transmitted everything combined to inspire the greatest alarm. There was rife in political and diplomatic circles a constant agitation which was dominant, and was disseminated by the greatest newspapers of the world, the most important and best accredited reviews and the books of thoughtful men, and which pointed out these countries as the best fields for the colonial expansion of the great powers, once the doors of Africa and the Orient were closed.

Thinkers of the highest rank have suggested the advisability of turning in this direction the great efforts which the principal Powers of Europe have hitherto made for the conquest of sterile regions, with rigorous climate, lying in the most distant corners of the world. There are also many European writers that point out the countries of South America and their great wealth, with their sunny skies and propitious climates, as the natural theatre where the great Powers with their arms and instruments prepared for conquest have yet in the course of this century to dispute dominion. . . . The act of coercion attempted against Venezuela seemed consequently to be the beginning of the hostilities predicted against America.

Writing about a year ago in the English Review of Reviews Señor A. de Manos-Albas calls Latin America "a tempting field for expansion," and frankly states the incentives which the American El Dorado offers to the avidity of the land-grabbing expansionists of Europe:

The territorial responsibilities of the Latin-American nations are greatly in excess of their respective populations. The seventeen republics from

Mexico to Cape Horn, with an area several times that of Central Europe, contain at best seventy million inhabitants, who could be comfortably housed in any one of the larger republics, leaving the immense remaining territory available for European expansion. Can Tripoli compare with the broad and fertile plains of Northern Venezuela, bordering on the Caribbean? Or Morocco with the Atlantic coast section of Colombia? Can the Congo compare favorably with the Amazon, or Madagascar or West Africa with the inner lands of Peru, of Bolivia, or of Ecuador?

The consideration of such possibilities implies no wanton spirit of alarmism. If Tripoli has been thought worth Italy's present effort, and Morocco France's recent venture, why should not the infinitely richer Caribbean coast fare likewise? No one in his senses, surely, would outrage the Powers by supposing that their abstention has been prompted by moral considerations; their reputation is too well established.

From the foregoing, which are but a few of many similar expressions of covetous desire towards the teeming possibilities of Latin America, may be better appreciated the significance of the avowal of Señor Álvarez when he frankly declares the reality of these fears and the only hope of salvation, saying: "The Monroe Doctrine, far from being a thing of the past, as some publicists pretend, is still of present importance in the sense that it denies the existence of territories '*nullius*' which could be acquired through occupation by European countries."

It is needful to consider briefly that "confusion of ideas" which associates the welcome and approved Monroe Doctrine with so-called "acts of hegemony and imperialism," of which complaint is made, and which are, rightly or mistakenly, the cause of existing suspicion and ill-will. Knowing the truth and justice, or otherwise, of these charges, we may better be able to make any proper *amende honorable* for the past by more considerate action in the future.

The writer who most formally makes these charges and formulates the specifications of grievance, is Señor Calderón, in his recent "Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique." He opens his chapter entitled "Le Péril Nord-Américain" with these ominous words:

In order to defend themselves against Yankee imperialism, the American democracies would almost accept a German alliance or the aid of Japanese arms; everywhere, the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles, in Central America, the hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders assumes the character of a Latin crusade.

It is well to examine for a moment his catalogue of grievances, which he reiterates as reasons for what he calls "an

accumulation of hates" against the United States, and because of which, he declares, "the statesmen of the South refuse to believe in the friendship of the Yankees." After citing the "incessant territorial expansion" of the United States, from the Louisiana purchase to the Panama Canal Zone, he concatenates every cause of complaint which he can conjure to his imagination, as follows:

Interventions become more frequent with the expansion of frontiers: in the territory of Acre, in order to found there a republic of rubber-hunters; in Panama, to develop a province and construct a canal; in Cuba, under the cover of the Platt amendment, to maintain internal order; in Santo Domingo, to supervise the customs; in Nicaragua, to sustain civilizing revolutions and overthrow tyrants; in Venezuela and in Central America, to impose on those nations, torn by intestine discords, the political and financial tutelage of the imperial democracy. In Guatemala, in Honduras, the loans closed with the monarchs of North American finance reduce the peoples to a new slavery. Supervision of customs, expeditions of pacificatory fleets which defend the interests of the North Saxon, forced tranquillity and peace, such are the means employed . . . The fortification of the Panama Canal, the possible acquisition of the Galápagos Islands in the Pacific, are new manifestations of this imperialistic progress.

A quite similar catalogue is set out in the open letter addressed recently to President Wilson by Señor Manuel Ugarte, the foremost apostle of the proposed Pan-Latin crusade against the "colossus of the North." True, neither Señor Calderón nor Señor Ugarte shows wherein Latin America is wronged by any of the acts recited; none of the acquisitions of territory, for over half a century, has been at the expense of any country of Latin America; and every "intervention" has been in signal benefit of the country concerned and of civilization. The United States has expanded, in obedience to its "manifest destiny," until it fills out its continental domain; that is an accomplished fact, and justified by national necessity and by civilization. However, and far from a spirit of recrimination, but in justice to the truth of history, which is now past, and never, it is to be hoped, to be repeated, must it be said, that if any of the events instanced have, indeed, tended to give occasion for the irritation attributed to them, the acts complained of have been abundantly provoked. The United States, in all conscience, has been far "more sinned against than sinning." The truth of this is witnessed by the Hon. James Bryce, who very justly says:

United States statesmen found themselves from time to time annoyed by

the perversity or shiftiness of military dictators ruling Spanish-American countries. The big nation has, however, generally borne such provocations with patience, abusing its strength less than the rulers of the little ones abuse their weakness.

One further citation of complaint from Señor Calderón. He quotes the eloquent and earnest words of Secretary Root, at the Third Pan-American Conference, where, "before assembled America the lay preacher of the new evangel" said: "We wish for no victories except those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic." Over against these golden words, which Señor Calderón calls "the solemn declarations of a Puritan politician," he sets, misquoted and out of its context, the language of Secretary Olney to Lord Salisbury, in defense of Venezuela against Great Britain, to the effect that "the United States is practically sovereign on the American continent"; and Señor Calderón asks "Where is the truth, in the imperialistic declaration of Mr. Olney or in the idealism of Mr. Root?" I cannot stop to demonstrate the fallacy of this mis-quotation, as I have done in my book on this subject; I will only say that these words, well qualified, were used in a "defi" to Great Britain, and to define the attitude of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine as towards Europe, and not as respects Latin America, as a reading of his note shows. And in 1907, before the American Society of International Law, Mr. Olney himself clearly defined the relations of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin America, declaring:

The United States under the Monroe Doctrine assumes no protectorate over any other American state; attempts no interference with the external any more than with the internal affairs of such a state; asserts no right to dictate the domestic or foreign policy of such a state; and claims no right to use force in the affairs of such a state except as against its enemies and to aid it in defending its political and territorial integrity as against any European aggression.

To persist, after reading the foregoing words of Mr. Olney, in appealing to his "practical sovereign" talk to Lord Salisbury, either to bolster up baseless attacks or to create prejudice,

would savor much of the trick of a shyster lawyer in citing to a court an *obiter dictum* from a case which he knows to have been overruled. All fears of imperialistic expansion of the United States, at the expense of Latin America, should be considered as foreclosed by the emphatic and official utterances of President Wilson, at Mobile:—"The United States will never seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." Further more, whatever may have been the modicum of justified complaint in the past, the present is very pregnant with roseate prospects for a happier era of good feeling and better relations for the future. In this regard the earnest words of President Wilson in his Mobile address to Latin America are of propitious augury, and should find hearty response with every good American:

The future is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past. These states lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors, will now be drawn closer to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of common understanding of each other. . . . It is a spiritual union which we seek.

While the Monroe Doctrine protects Latin America from Europe, some of our neighbors cherish the fear that it is not a sufficient guaranty of protection against its own champions. *Quis custodiet custodem?* queries Señor Calderón. And while Señor de Manos-Albas says that the Monroe Doctrine was like a gift in the cradle of the nascent nationalities, the latter have acquired the classic superstition expressed in *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*. A remedy to remove such fears, and to realize the auspicious avowal that "the future is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past," I feel will be very welcome.

To broaden the Monroe Doctrine from a North American policy into a genuine Pan-American principle is the easy and welcome solution. Happily this is one of the most manifest tendencies of the times, as is witnessed by many authoritative acts and utterances in North and South America. As early as 1862, in a note addressed by the foreign minister of Costa Rica to the Colombian government, this "old, old story but yet forever new," of fears of the United States, is recited, together with some suggestions of current significance:

If our republics could have the guaranty that they had nothing to fear

from the United States of North America, it is indubitable that no other nation could be more useful and favorable to us. . . . The idea has occurred to my government that a new compact might be drafted by which the United States should bind themselves solemnly to respect, and cause others to respect, the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the sister republics of this continent. . . . Resting upon a treaty of this kind, our republics would admit without diffidence, and without preoccupations in regard to the future, the idea of an intimate alliance with the North American people; they would feel as if they had entered into a new life, and be possessed of greater strength; they would get rid of the serious and just fears which our race has felt; they would march together with a firm step towards such a unity of institutions and interests as would change the face of the American nations, and lay the strongest foundation of our great continental alliance.

Señor Manos-Albas, writing on this subject in the English *Review of Reviews*, stated his plea for "a new declaration of Pan-American policy" in very earnest words, from which I briefly quote:

The means to accomplish unity of sentiment and to dispel the misgivings between the United States and the Latin-American republics is not far to seek. It is only required to amplify the Monroe declaration to the full extent of its logical development. . . . If the United States should declare that the era of conquest on the American continent has been closed to all and forever, beginning with themselves, the brooding storm of distrust will disappear from the Latin-American mind, and an international cordiality of incalculable possibilities will ensue, not only for the welfare of the American nations, but universally for the cause of freedom and democracy.

Commenting on this, which he calls "a masterly presentation of a plea for taking a forward step towards the world's peace," Mr. Stead says:

As there is not a citizen of the United States who desires to make any such conquest, the acceptance of such a formula by the Government at Washington would have as its first and immediate result the removal of the one great obstacle which hinders the extension of the influence and the interests of the United States in Latin America.

Practical recognition of the wisdom and desirability of a co-operative policy, and practical steps towards its realization, have been taken, and, as I have said, mark one of the most manifest tendencies of our international relations. In the first Pan-American Conference at Washington, in 1889, a resolution was unanimously adopted "That the principle of conquest shall not . . . be recognized as admissible under American public law." At the present time there is pending in Congress,

twice favorably reported by the House foreign affairs committee, a resolution of which Mr. Slayden, of Texas, is the author, reciting that "the peace and commercial development of the American continent would be more certainly and speedily assured if the various South, Central and North American governments were reasonably assured against the forced permanent loss of territory as the consequence of war or otherwise," and resolves, "that the President of the United States be requested to enter into negotiations for the making of a treaty that will forever quiet the territorial titles of the various American states." It is understood that the executive branch of the government heartily approves the principle of this resolution and is working towards the end suggested.

Another step, already begun, and the ideal of Pan-American confraternity is happily consummated. The republics of Latin America have long been silent partners, and indeed the chief beneficiaries of the North American doctrine; that they would welcome being invited into full partnership, sharing in both its benefits and responsibilities, is evidenced by many tokens. Taking as an instance a possible intervention to secure the establishment of peace and order in Mexico, Mr. Sherrill, late Minister to Argentina, well expresses the advantage of a sort of American concert of powers, suggesting that, rather than action by the United States alone, that Argentina, Brazil or some other American country be invited to join with us. The effect of such joint action he says, in the case instanced, as well as whenever "an occasion for armed intervention in this hemisphere arises," would

have two marked tendencies, both of which would be highly desirable. First, it would entirely remove any idea among our South American neighbors that our purpose was land-grabbing. . . . Furthermore it would be the best and most convincing form of invitation to Latin America to participate equally with us in the responsibilities and development of the Monroe Doctrine. The great Doctrine would at once become continental, and cease to be unilateral, which is today its one great defect.

Precedents for joint action, with the happiest results, may be cited. A signal example was the cooperation, in 1907, of the United States and Mexico in bringing order out of chaos in Central America, resulting in the notable series of treaties signed at Washington between the five republics. Later, in 1911,

the United States, Argentina, and Brazil by their joint representations, prevented the outbreak of war between Peru, Ecuador and Chile. These instances, as said by Dr. Blakeslee, "show that the United States has already made a beginning of working in unison with Latin-American states in enforcing the police power of the continent. It only remains," he justly remarks, "to extend this occasional cooperation into a definitely formulated and generally accepted policy. The new Monroe Doctrine," as he terms it, "would accomplish everything that the present Monroe Doctrine accomplishes, and much more. It would create a genuine Pan-Americanism."

The advantages of such an international *entente* for the welfare of a hemisphere, inestimable in making for peace, friendship and civilization in America, are admirably stated by ex-Secretary Olney in a recent public address:

That an American concert of purely American states would occupy a position in America practically equivalent to that of the European concert in Europe; that it would tend to avert wars between states as well as insurrections and revolutions within states; that it would do much to further trade and commerce and intercourse of all kinds between the various American states; and that the United States, as a leading member of the concert, might be counted upon as an agency for good even more potent than if acting in the invidious rôle of sole and supreme dictator, seem to be tolerably sure results.

In South America there exists a great league and confederation between its three leading powers, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, popularly known as "The A B C of South America." These great powers, among the most friendly to the United States, might readily be won into such a peace-making concert. These three great countries occupy much more than half the extent of the South American continent, and contain much more than half its population. The language of Secretary Blaine, in 1882, in reference to Brazil, is, *a fortiori*, much more significant if applied to the great A B C league:

Brazil holds, in the South, much the same relationship to the other countries that the United States does in the North. Her domanial extent, her commerce, and her advancement in the path of successful progress exerts a beneficial and lasting influence in South America. . . . All this tends to make that empire as necessary a factor in securing peace and harmony in America as the United States itself, while its interests in the great and humane results proposed are fully commensurate with our own. . . . What, then, is more natural than that these two great Powers

should earnestly unite in a movement which, it is hoped, will mark an historical epoch in South America, and exert its influence on countries beyond the seas, and on generations yet unborn.

Such an invitation to an American co-partnership, extended to the partners of the A B C league, together with several of the other stable republics, would, no doubt, be welcome and cordially accepted. The United States exchanges Ambassadors with Brazil and Mexico, thus recognizing them as equals on the highest plane of international society. A like exchange with Argentina and Chile would signalize our deserved respect for these potent nationalities and their welcome into the new American concert; a congress of these American ambassadors could readily consummate the "spiritual union" which President Wilson assures that we seek with the nations of America. The basis of such a union would be recognized friendly equality, and would necessarily carry the pledge of respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, so much desired by our neighboring republics. As said by the well-known Argentine political writer, Señor Leopoldo Lugones, in the *Revue Sud-Américaine*:

Never has the realization of Pan-Americanism been more necessary in the New World than now. . . . But Pan-Americanism means nothing without the United States, which represents in America the realization of the right to independence and the triumph of democracy. The first formula of Pan-Americanism, limited to the needs of the policy of defence, is the Monroe Doctrine. Its declarations constitute the most significant and decisive act towards guaranteeing the independence of the Latin-American states. Thanks to the Monroe Doctrine our territorial integrity has been preserved—and that in itself is enough to insure the United States our everlasting gratitude. . . . If the Monroe Doctrine guarantees to these states the integrity of their territories and their institutions, Latin Americans have nothing to fear, . . . secure in the belief that the Monroe Doctrine, which yesterday assured our independence, will preserve it to us tomorrow.

I wish to close by quoting the eloquent words of Hon. John Barrett, Director General of the Pan-American Union, in a recent address which I heard him deliver in Washington:

I believe that the time has come when there can be evolved from the Monroe Doctrine itself as a principle, and there can be substituted for the "Monroe Doctrine" as a phrase, the principle and phrase of a "Pan-American policy." . . . The Pan-American policy would adopt, absorb and enlarge the Monroe Doctrine as an original policy of the United States

into a greater and "All-American" policy, where each nation would have the same rights of attitude, the same dignity of position, and the same sense of independence as the United States now has. . . . By the substitution of "Pan-American" for "Monroe", and thus including all the American nations as sponsors; and by the substitution of "policy" for "Doctrine," and thus removing the hard, unyielding, dictatorial and didactic suggestions of the word "doctrine," a long step will be taken towards a new era of Pan-American comity and confidence. . . . Then we will have achieved that ideal, unselfish and fraternal relationship of the American governments and peoples which will give a new, worthy and permanently accepted significance to Pan-American relationship, Pan-American accord and Pan American Union.

I have sought to present a consensus of American opinion as to the Monroe Doctrine, its past signal services, its present significance and its high potentiality to the future welfare of all America. I trust to see the early transmutation of the Monroe Doctrine into a Pan-American policy.

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Should the Monroe Doctrine Continue to Be a Policy of the
United States? George H. Blakeslee

During the past year there has been an epidemic of discussion regarding the Monroe Doctrine. This has been due probably to the dawning consciousness in the minds of the people of this country that there exist strong, stable nations in South America, which no longer need the protection of this traditional foreign policy, and which keenly resent its supposed spirit of guardianship. The problem whether it should be continued unchanged, or be modified or abandoned, has been a live issue in our newspapers and periodicals; it has been debated in schools, colleges and universities in all parts of the United States; it has frequently, at least in New England, been the topic at economic clubs; and, finally, it has been studied from nearly every aspect at three recent conferences of those especially interested in our foreign relations.

Yet there exists a certain feeling that this questioning of the infallibility of the Monroe Doctrine is merely a temporary fad, that it represents nothing substantial, and that it will soon be past, leaving the traditional American policy unchanged and un-

shaken. This view was expressed only the other day by the Honorable Champ Clark, who said, "Every now and then somebody rises up and solemnly informs us that the Monroe Doctrine is dead. I answer such people as those in the words of Grover Cleveland. . . . Cleveland said, 'We are sovereign on this continent.'" Mr. Clark added in a tone of absolute finality, "And we are." This idea that the Monroe Doctrine has still an unshakable hold on the American people is shown further by the recent words of a British essayist. "To the Americans," he says, "the Monroe Doctrine is like God or religion to a small child—something fearful, something to inspire awe, something, if necessary, to fight for." Is the keen British essayist correct? Is the Monroe Doctrine, after all, like God to the American people? Are we still content to accept as a matter of faith, without a question or a doubt, the inspiring and all-sufficient creed, "We are sovereign on this continent?"

In order to answer such queries as these it seemed very desirable to secure some definite evidence regarding the general attitude of thoughtful men in this country towards the Monroe Doctrine. But how might this attitude be discovered? Whose opinions should be asked? It was finally decided to obtain, first of all, if possible, the judgment of the lecturers on international law and American diplomacy in our colleges and universities, since these form almost the only body of men, all of whom as a class have given this subject professional study and whose opinions at the same time are almost entirely uninfluenced by political or party considerations. The writer therefore took the liberty of sending to each of these a set of questions. None were sent to any out of this class in order that no possible suspicion of personal bias in making the selection might affect the result of the canvass.

The questionnaire read:

I. Should the Monroe Doctrine, as now generally understood and interpreted in the United States and in Latin America, be continued without either modification or further definition?

II. Does it need clearer interpretation?

(a) For the people of the United States?

(b) For the people of Latin America?

III. Should the stable Latin-American states (at present

Argentina, Brazil and Chile) be regarded by the United States as supporters of the Monroe Doctrine?

(a) Should this support be limited to the defense of their own lands from European conquest; or

(b) Should they be invited to cooperate with the United States in interpreting and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine wherever it may apply on this hemisphere?

IV. Should it be abandoned?

(a) Entirely?

(b) Below the Equator? or

(c) Only so far as concerns the stable Latin-American states (Argentina, Brazil and Chile)?

V. Other views, comments and reasons, if any.

One hundred and forty-six replied, representing nearly all of our leading colleges and universities, and including seemingly the larger number of those best known as leaders in this field.

A study of these returns shows that certain general conclusions are agreed upon by a very large majority. These are: First, the present status of the Monroe Doctrine is unsatisfactory; of the total number who voted, only thirteen believe that it should be continued substantially as it now exists, that is, with its meaning somewhat indefinite and its interpretation and enforcement dependent upon this country alone. Second, it should nevertheless not be abandoned; only nine wish to give up the policy entirely. Third, it should be more clearly explained and decidedly modified in certain respects. The form of modification favored by a notably large majority is one which will recognize in some way the importance of at least such sister American republics as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and possibly Peru. It is held, five to one (104 to 20), that the United States should share with these stable republics the responsibility of enforcing the doctrine by adopting one of the three following policies, (1) complete cooperation with them, or (2) abandonment of the policy south of the Equator, or (3) abandonment so far as the stable states themselves are concerned. It is complete cooperation with them, however, which is generally favored; the large majority, eighty-five against thirty, believe that the stable Latin-American state should be invited to cooperate with the United States in both interpreting and enforcing the Monroe

Doctrine wherever it may apply on this hemisphere. This strong sentiment in favor of cooperation in its widest possible extent is the more surprising and the more significant in view of the fact that the doctrine has always been regarded as a policy to be interpreted and enforced by the United States alone.

These then are the views of a body of Americans who have made this subject a special study: the Monroe Doctrine should not be abandoned, but it should be more clearly explained, and it should be modified so as to rest upon a basis formed by the cooperation of all stable American republics.

In addition to this general summary, it will be valuable to consider the several propositions more in detail. First in importance is the question whether the Monroe Doctrine should be continued or abandoned. Typical comments from those who would renounce it entirely are as follows: "Not needed by United States; not desired by Latin America;" "The basis of the doctrine is gone, for we are in a world age and not a hemisphere age;" and "It is costly and dangerous; likely to embroil us in war; makes South America suspicious of our territorial cupidity and unfriendly. . . . It implies an insult to a spirited people who do not ask for it or acknowledge it." Others would abandon the name, but retain the principle. "The words 'Monroe Doctrine' and 'Monroeism,'" one writes, "have come to have such a disagreeable connotation among our neighbors that our policy towards Latin America ought to receive some other name."

Those who believe that the doctrine should be continued rest their contention, for the most part, so far as they have expressed their reasons, upon the belief that there is still danger of European or Asiatic acquisition of territory in this hemisphere. Some of the comments are: "No; it should not be abandoned, for the weaker states of South America would be seized and colonized by foreign Powers before half a decade;" "We should maintain the doctrine as it is, or strengthened, for another one hundred years, or until the danger of European invasion is past;" and "The greater danger after all lies rather in the possibility of a sale to some great Power by some South or Central American state. Therein lies the strongest argument for maintaining the general position of the doctrine." A particularly forceful statement of this view comes from a former diplomat, who says:

As one formerly engaged in the application of the Monroe Doctrine

. . . I am tremendously concerned over the present tendency to discredit the Doctrine as entirely useless. We are practically inviting trouble with Europe by such an attitude. We do not want another African scramble. . . . There are European nations which are allowing big indebtedness on the part of certain rich states of Spanish America to grow up, in order to have a greater reason for intervention when the opportune moment should arise. It would seem criminal for us to scuttle out at this time.

On this question, whether or not the Monroe Doctrine should be given up entirely, nine favor abandonment; 123 oppose it.

But if it is not to be abandoned, it should, it is believed, be more definitely explained. That a clearer interpretation is needed for the people of Latin America, is asserted by 107, only twenty dissenting; while an only slightly smaller majority (94 against 32) maintain that it is needed also for the people of the United States. "No one knows what it means," writes one. "The history of its applications," replies another, "would seem to indicate that it means what the existing administration would like to have it mean." Still another says, "it means anything and everything. It is a cry to stampede the people when there need be no real alarm. We are even trying to believe with Champ Clark that to repeal the Panama Canal toll bill is to abandon the Monroe Doctrine." For Latin America it is held that the doctrine should be interpreted in such a way as to exclude from it all idea of territorial covetousness and, if possible, all claim of political sovereignty and tutelage. This view is shown by the following comments: "It should be made clear that the Monroe Doctrine is no part of any policy of political aggrandizement by the United States;" "It should be further defined so as to make it apparent that the United States has no desire to interfere in Spanish-American affairs;" and "The Latin Americans consider it an unnecessary and at present indefinable assumption of superiority and of guardianship on the part of the United States."

One suggestion as to the modification of the Monroe Doctrine, urged by many, is that we should return to the simple, strictly defensive policy of President Monroe. The following replies explain this position: "Very important to rid the doctrine of some of the modern interpretations;" "There is grave danger of our being dragged into a policy of imperialism if we retain it as it is;" "We ought to return to the original construction.

. . . To assume the position taken by recent Presidents of a kind of guardianship over all South America, including Mexico and Central America, seems to be a piece of arrogance, and is productive of infinite future trouble;" and, "The original Monroe Doctrine was clearly justified. . . . The Polk-Frelinghuysen-Olney-Cleveland-Roosevelt-Lodge version of it is a constant source of irritation to the South American republics and is a menace to the peace of the world. . . . It is antiquated, worn out, and in its present form ought to be abandoned." How widely this view is held it is impossible to say, since no definite question was asked regarding it which would bring out a general expression of opinion.

Another suggestion as to the modification of the doctrine is that the United States should abandon it either south of the region marked in general by the Equator or the Orinoco, or else so far as the stable South American republics are concerned. Of those who hold this view some favor absolute and unqualified abandonment, as is shown in the following statement: "What transpires in Argentina is of no more concern to us than what happens in Africa." Others oppose absolute abandonment, but would give over the enforcement of the policy in lower South America to the stable republics and would remove from it, so far as this region is concerned, all idea of sovereignty, protection and guardianship. This is shown in the following replies: "Yes, it should be abandoned in so far as it implies a protectorate over them;" "Not abandoned, but suspended as long as the policy and conduct of these states show them to be supporters of the Doctrine;" and "The Monroe Doctrine should be abandoned with reference to Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, save to protect them from European conquest." The summary of opinions shows that nine would abandon the doctrine south of the Equator, while twenty-seven would abandon it in Argentina, Brazil and Chile; thus making thirty-six who favor giving up the policy for part of South America.

Whether or not the doctrine is thus abandoned locally, a very strong sentiment is shown that in any case a sharp distinction should be made by our government, in its application of the Monroe Doctrine, between the Panama Canal region, on the one hand (Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, Venezuela and Colombia), and, on the other, the region of the

stable republics of South America. This view is shown by such quotations as these: "Over the Caribbean state, Mexico to Venezuela, our position should be that of a protecting power, with treaty rights wherever possible, to support stable governments;" "The doctrine should be extended and made more positive for the Caribbean countries;" and "As to territory between the Rio Grande and the Panama Canal the United States must act alone and be practically paramount." Some-what more than forty of those who answered the questionnaire went out of their way to express their opinion in one form or another that there should be a marked difference, in the application of our policies, between these two sections.

The modification of the Monroe Doctrine which appeals most strongly to the body of men whose opinions we are discussing, is, as has been said, some form of cooperation. There are those who oppose cooperation, however, on the ground that, "We are sovereign on this hemisphere," and should play the part. Others oppose it from the fear that it would lead to a hard and fast alliance in which the United States might be out-voted in questions of vital concern, especially in the Panama region. As one of these critics writes, "If such a policy were adopted the Latin Powers would dominate the affairs of the new world."

Representative opinions of those favoring cooperation are as follows: "The Monroe Doctrine should take in all America and all America both North and South, should unite in upholding it;" "The Monroe Doctrine should be turned into a mutual association of equal states, supporting one another for the common welfare of the Americas and operating for the development and prosperity of each and all;" "Unless we can obtain their support the doctrine is futile;" "We should not excite the sensibilities of the Latin American states by claims of superiority and of sovereignty in this hemisphere, but join with the well behaved states in guiding the weak ones;" and "The trend, seems to me, is toward a world's concert of the great nations, but as long as there is a Concert of Europe, let us have an American concert of nations, the United States and the three more stable of the South American republics, and other American nations as fast as they prove their fitness."

If the writer might hazard a further explanation of the kind

of cooperation which is generally desired, he would suggest that it is in the nature of an understanding rather than of any definite alliance. While cooperation should take place in the sense of a mutual exchanging of views; joint agreements, so far as possible, upon questions of interpretation and defense; and occasionally joint military operations; yet, in the ordinary course, such stable states as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and possibly Peru would naturally take the lead in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine in their own section, and the United States would expect a like leadership in the region about the Caribbean Sea.

In one of the letters received in answer to the list of questions sent out, a university professor wrote: "Your summary will be most interesting. . . . Will it, however, represent the American people? There seems," he said, "a considerable disposition among those of us who fill academic positions to discard or deprecate the Doctrine." To anticipate such an implied criticism as this, it should be stated that no claim is made that this summary of the views of the lecturers upon international law represents the ordinary thought of "the man on the street." It is believed, however, that it is an excellent test of the attitude of the best informed and of the most advanced public opinion of the nation, as well as of the judgment towards which this country as a whole is rapidly tending.

But the writer wished also to gauge the feelings of "the American people," as the letter has expressed it, and so sent this same set of questions to a carefully selected list of newspapers and periodicals. From the replies received, and from a few recent editorials in which one or more phases of the doctrine are discussed, answers or opinions upon some or all of the questions submitted have been obtained from forty-seven leading publications.

The first impression is that the foremost newspapers and periodicals, instead of being enthusiastic supporters of the present Monroe Doctrine, as it was expected they would be, are somewhat hazy in their views regarding the various aspects of the policy. The editor of the Omaha Bee writes, "I doubt whether the sentiment of our general public is crystallized on the subject of the Monroe Doctrine," and he adds, "Speaking briefly of my own views, and which I think reflect the views of many

with whom I come in contact, I would say that the Monroe Doctrine needs redefinition."

But the important fact regarding the opinions of the press, so far as they have been obtained, is that they accord substantially with those of the college and university professors of international law and diplomacy. There is a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the Doctrine in its present form, a belief that it should be more clearly explained, and that it should be modified in certain respects. Only four publications definitely give full approval to the Doctrine as it was generally interpreted at the present time. One of these is the *Kansas City Star*, which states, "The *Kansas City Star* always upholds the President on matters of foreign policy, including his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine." Two of the others are the *Springfield Republican* and the *Brooklyn Eagle*.

On the other hand, there is a general conviction that the Doctrine should not be given up entirely. The *Louisville Courier Journal* seems to be the only paper to favor complete abandonment.

As to constructive changes, a large majority, thirty to seven, believe that the Doctrine needs clearer interpretation, especially for Latin America. The modification of the Doctrine which the press believe is needed, is the same suggested by such a large majority of the university world, cooperation with at least the stable American republics. So far as definite views have been expressed on this point, thirty favor cooperation of some form, while only six show that they are definitely opposed to it. Twenty-five believe in the most complete cooperation, that is, in joint action by the Stable Latin-American countries and the United States in both interpreting and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine wherever it may apply on this hemisphere.

A few direct quotations from various papers will show the general dissatisfaction with this policy in its present form. "The Monroe Doctrine is as elastic as India rubber and as comprehensive as all outdoors" (*New York Sun*); "That vague thing known as the Monroe Doctrine" (*New York Evening Post*); "The whole world would be grateful for some dependable definition" (*Detroit Free Press*); "The doctrine should be abandoned or emphatically restated" (*Harrisburg Telegraph*); "The time has clearly come for revaluing the Monroe Doctrine"

(Boston Herald); "The Monroe Doctrine, President-made in the first place, has been made over and over again until its own father wouldn't know his child" (The New York Press); "It means just what we wish it to mean, and is to be applied only when we think it wise. It has been modified to death." (The Nation.)

Some papers strongly favor a return to the original meaning of Monroe, as shown by the following comments: "It should be continued as stated by Monroe." (Omaha World-Herald); "In principle it should be continued. The interpretation of the Doctrine in late years is an unwarranted extension of the responsibility of the United States" (Wilkes-Barre Record); "The Monroe Doctrine should be construed strictly by the terms of its early formulation. The United States by adherence to it assumes no office of policing South and Central American countries" (The State, Columbia, S. C.); "As it is now interpreted here and elsewhere, the Monroe Doctrine becomes not only a menace to our peace and safety but fails utterly in its benevolent purpose as regards the southern republics" (New York World); the Monroe Doctrine "does not make us the guardian and wet-nurse of Latin American republics. . . . There is great need that the Latin American nations, European nations, and especially *this* nation should understand thoroughly what the Doctrine does mean and does not mean" (The Duluth Herald).

There is, further, a widely held conviction that the Monroe Doctrine should be changed from a unilateral to a Pan-American basis. Several of the publications gave their reasons for this belief and their comments, some of which are as follows: "It should mean that all stable republics should unite to prevent aggression or colonies representing European or Asiatic Powers" (The Philadelphia Public Ledger); "It is only through the frankest' cooperation . . . that the Monroe Doctrine can be prevented from becoming a source of offense between the United States and the other nations of the new world" (Detroit Free Press); "The remedy . . . is a complete abandonment of our pretensions to any special influence in the policies, government and destinies of any American nation except our own, and inviting all well established American governments to join with us in the formulation and enforcement of

a Pan American policy (San Francisco Chronicle); "We believe that thorough cooperation with South American republics, stable or unstable, will convince them of the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine. There is doubt if it should be enforced unless it has their thorough cooperation" (Tacoma Daily News); "The doctrine which Roosevelt is preaching in South America to the effect that the stable governments be invited to cooperate with the United States in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine wherever it may appear to be necessary hereafter, meets with my personal views on the matter" (Editor of The Los Angeles Express). Of the periodicals, The Outlook says: "We emphatically believe that whenever the United States has occasion to interpret and enforce the Monroe Doctrine, the United States should take for granted that it has the approval of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and in any instance which involves or may involve intervention, the United States ought to invite their cooperation." The Independent expresses a similar but slightly different view which is held by several, that there should be complete cooperation in South American matters but unilateral enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States in the Caribbean region, and adds, "In our concern for the well-being of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere, . . . we must be their partner, not their patron."

The majority of the press, then, agree with the majority of the experts, that the present status of the Monroe Doctrine is unsatisfactory, that the policy should be clarified by a clearer interpretation of its meaning and that it should be broadened and strengthened by being placed upon a Pan American foundation.

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Pan-American Policy: The Monroe Doctrine Modernized.
John Barrett

I sometimes feel that all this discussion of the Monroe Doctrine is entirely in vain, that there is nobody who is an ultimate court upon the subject—nobody who can decide just what is its interpretation or its meaning or its significance. I know that I would not for a moment pretend that any views which I have

upon the subject are final. I had at first decided I would not make any remarks, but I will briefly summarize some thoughts which I have been going over in my mind for many years in my association with Latin America. In my humble experience as minister in three American republics and during the seven years that I have had the honor of being the Director General of the Pan-American Union, I have striven earnestly to get what I call the Pan-American viewpoint of the Monroe Doctrine. Now I do not ask anyone to accept what I say as final, but perhaps I look at this subject from a viewpoint a little different from that of many persons, because I have the rather unique position and experience of being the only Pan-American officer in America—not only one who is an officer of the United States but who is in every respect equally an officer of the other Latin-American countries. Each day it is one of the duties of the members of my staff to lay before me the consensus of opinion of the newspapers of every important capital of the western hemisphere; and therefore while I am actually in this country, I am able to follow closely the views of the peoples of other lands upon this subject under discussion.

As one who has been intimately associated, officially and privately, for nearly fourteen years with Latin America and Latin Americans, I may be permitted to make a few humble suggestions, which, if followed, might affect the permanent status of the Monroe Doctrine among the American nations, and might not!

I believe the time is coming when there may be evolved from the Monroe Doctrine itself as a principle and phrase, and thereupon substituted for the Monroe Doctrine as a principle and phrase, the principle and phrase of a "Pan-American policy." (These ideas, to some extent, I developed last fall at a meeting in Washington of the Society for Judicial Settlement of International Questions. What I am saying here is really a sublimated form of what I said at that time.) By that I mean a Pan-American policy acceptable to and approved by not only the United States, but all the American republics, a policy belonging to each and all on the same basis of attitude and action, protecting alike the sovereignty and governments of each—which is, after all, the delicate point—without the offensive suggestion of preponderance, dictation or domination of one nation like the United

States. It is a common error among some of the statesmen and essayists of the United States, whenever they speak or write anything about the southern republics, to patronize them. This is a fatal error—always thus reminding them of the power and mightiness of the United States, as if the United States were both “papa” and “mamma,” and they a group of little children playing in the back yard. Coupled with this are the equally common errors: First, that of not recognizing the extraordinary greatness and progress of some of the republics, even if others are not so progressive; and secondly, of classing them all as having revolutionary tendencies, in spite of the fact that two-thirds of Latin America, in area and population, has known no serious revolution whatever in the last twenty-five years.

This Pan-American policy would adopt, absorb and enlarge the Monroe Doctrine as an original policy of the United States into a greater and all-American policy, where each nation would have the same rights of attitude, the same dignity of position and the same sense of independence as the United States now has. By eliminating the attitude of absolute dictation and centralized power, which the Monroe Doctrine has been interpreted in Latin America as applying to the relations of the nations of the western hemisphere, by the substitution of “Pan-American” for “Monroe”—thus including all the American nations as sponsors—and by the substitution of “policy” for “doctrine” and thus removing the hard, unyielding, dictatorial and didactic suggestion of the words “Monroe Doctrine,” about which every Latin American is a little sensitive, a long step will be taken towards a new era of Pan-American comity and Pan-American confidence.

It is not the Monroe Doctrine itself as a principle, but the *interpretation*—and mark my word—the *interpretation thereof*, as indicated in the recently published opinions of many prominent Latin Americans on this subject, that is not acceptable to the majority of Latin-American countries and statesmen. This is a point that has been clearly overlooked by the critics of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States. If its haphazard interpretation can be supplanted with responsible and reasonable judgment, the majority of arguments against the doctrine in Latin America, and also in the United States, in describing it as obsolete will fail absolutely in their purpose and logic.

A distinguished Yale professor, for whom I have profound

regard, leaving the safe fields of archæological study, and venturing into the complex relations of international politics, calls the Monroe Doctrine an "obsolete shibboleth." How in the world any one man can assume to pass that judgment upon a great policy or doctrine, I cannot possibly understand. I fear that in his academic viewpoint he has exaggerated the importance which the Latin-American countries attach to the Monroe Doctrine, and he has attributed to that much assailed and suffering Doctrine all kinds of faults which are due to entirely other and different causes, such as North American ignorance and lack of appreciation of South America.

In conclusion, the Monroe Doctrine in its final analysis, in my opinion, and, as I say, I do not for a minute state these things in a didactic way and my judgment may be entirely wrong, will continue to be a great *international* principle only to the degree that it is evolved into this greater Pan-American policy; and from a doctrine of the United States alone into a policy of all the American republics, and now, if you follow me, though it is a little complicated, to the degree that it is evolved from being *subjective* on the part of the United States alone towards all the other American republics as *objective*, to being *subjective* on the part of each towards each and all the others as *objective*. That is, making each and every American republic feel that it is part of its policy towards each and every other American republic, instead of being just the policy of the United States alone towards all these other countries. To be still clearer in my idea I would say that I mean to evolve the Monroe Doctrine from being *subjective* on the part of the United States towards the other American republics in an *objective* position, to being *subjective* on the part of each and all towards in turn each and all as *objective*.

Then we will have achieved, in my opinion, that ideal, unselfish, fraternal relationship of the American governments and peoples which will give a new worth and a permanent, acceptable significance to Pan-American relationship, Pan-American accord, and the status of the Pan-American Union.

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Monroe Doctrine: National or International? William I. Hull

The Monroe Doctrine has been, during the past twelve months, the subject of such animated and far-reaching debate that it may be well at this point to observe the example of Daniel Webster, who began his reply to Senator Hayne with the words:

Mr. President, When the mariner has been tossed for many days in thick weather, and on an unknown sea, he naturally avails himself of the first pause in the storm, the earliest glance of the sun, to take his latitude and ascertain how far the elements have driven him from his true course. Let us imitate this prudence and, before we float further on the waves of this debate, refer to the point from which we departed, that we at least may be able to conjecture where we now are.

We Americans in discussing the Monroe Doctrine appear to be concerned chiefly with the growth and present scope of the doctrine itself, and seldom if ever pause to consider the reasons why the United States undertook and continues to enforce it by its own unsupported sanction. It is the object of this contribution to the great debate to consider chiefly the major premise of the accepted conclusion, and to examine the *Monroe*, or national, sanction of the Doctrine, rather than the Doctrine itself. In other words, the writ of *quo warranto* having been issued against the United States, let us frankly respond to the summons to show why our country alone, rather than the family of nations as a whole, or several members of it, at the least, should be bearing the burden in our own and the world's behoof.

As a preliminary to this discussion, it is essential to state as concisely as possible the present status of the Doctrine. In the first place, its *terminus ad quem* has been changed or greatly broadened. Directed at first against Spain and the Holy Alliance it has become a warning to the governments of Europe, Asia, and Latin America as well,—for the whole world, indeed, to heed and obey.

From the territorial point of view, it began with an assertion of America's territorial integrity against European acquisitions either by force or by colonization; but it now prevents the voluntary transfers of American soil by old-world Powers to other

old-world Powers, by new-world Powers to old-world Powers, and doubtless, if the case should arise, by new-world Powers to other new-world Powers. In these days of large corporations, also, it has been made to forbid any foreign corporation subsidized or controlled by an old-world government to acquire land in the Americas which is so situated as to menace the safety or communications of the United States. At present, the interpretation or extension of the Doctrine in this direction has not gone far enough to exclude *all* foreign corporations from doing business on the soil of the Americas; but there is sufficient elasticity in such phraseology for indefinite expansion in the future, and already some foreigners are complaining that such is the logical outcome of President Wilson's Mobile declaration against Latin American "concessions."

From the point of view of American self-government, the Doctrine began with a declaration against the restoration to Latin America of the monarchical government of Spain. Its author condemned, however, any intervention on the part of the United States in favor of a republican form of government; and this condemnation was repeated by his successors, even including President Polk,—who in most matters far out-Monroed Monroe. But within the past two decades, our self-restraint in this particular has been cast to the winds. One of our most highly esteemed Secretaries of State,—intoxicated, possibly, by the exuberance of a temporary pugnacity,—declared that "the United States is practical sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition." Every administration since that time has made popular government of the fiat variety one of its specialties in dealing with Latin America.

In President McKinley's administration, the Platt Amendment was applied to Cuba to protect the new republic against any hankering on its part after the fleshpots of Spain or other European monarchies, by providing that Cuba should make no treaties with foreign governments tending to destroy its independence or territorial integrity and should contract no public debts disproportionate to its ordinary revenue, and that the United States should or might intervene to protect Cuban independence and to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.

In President Roosevelt's administration, we insisted that a province of Colombia should exercise the divine right of revolution, at the same time we prevented the mother country from exercising its right of coercion over its recalcitrant daughter, and we speedily recognized and permanently guaranteed, for a substantial *quid pro quo*, the independence of the new republic. In the same administration, also, the Big Stick was raised to conserve popular government in the Dominican Republic, this time by preventing revolutionists from looting the custom-houses for their sinews of war, and, after the rebellion was suppressed, by collecting and distributing the revenues so as to prevent other revolts and to forestall foreign Shylocks from demanding their pound of flesh in the form of Dominican lands.

In President Taft's administration, the Roosevelt policy in the Dominican Republic was continued, one revolt was suppressed and another prevented, one president was compelled to resign and his successor was sustained,—contrary to Napoleon's dictum,—on the points of American bayonets, while American appointees continued to collect and administer the customs. Nicaragua's popular government, also, was the recipient of President Taft's particular attention. One president was forced to resign; his successor, whom the people thought they had elected, was refused recognition, and a revolt against him was supported by 2,350 United States marines, who drove him into exile, placed a third president in the chair, captured five of the republic's towns, suppressed another revolt, distributed food supplies to the victims of the war, and left four hundred marines "on guard" in the republic's capital city. All this was justified on the plea of "the protection of the life and property of United States citizens and the influencing in all appropriate ways the restoration of lawful and orderly government."

In the present administration, a treaty is said to be pending between the United States and Nicaragua which, if ratified, would make the latter republic a veritable "protectorate" of our own and a base of naval operations, also, against domestic revolts, foreign land-grabbers, and European creditors in the other Central American republics. The enforcement of a fair trial of political offenders in Cuba, the "supervision" of Dominican elections, and the refusal to recognize Huerta, an enforced presidential election, and the rejection of the electoral returns,

in Mexico, are all too recent to need more than a mere mention. In view of such achievements as these by an administration only one year of age, we must all recognize grave significance in President Wilson's declaration in his first annual message that "we are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions."

Thus, not only in our own dependencies, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, but in our neighboring republics, which are nominally independent, our government has become the school-master in the science and art of popular government. Jefferson's and Monroe's confidence in democracy has grown into a determination that our neighbors in the western world shall enjoy for themselves, *nolens volens*, the blessings of constitutional government, even if we are obliged to blow these blessings upon them from the guns of super-dreadnoughts.

When it is suggested that this enterprise upon which we are engaged is a rather quixotic one, that it is in fact a superlatively and preposterously altruistic one for a mere government to be engaged in, the reply which has hitherto proved sufficient is, that popular government and financial solidity are essential to Latin America's political stability, that political stability is the *sine qua non* of its territorial integrity, and that its territorial integrity is imperatively demanded by the Monroe Doctrine for the safety and peace of the United States.

We Americans who have grown restive under the heavy burden of the Monroe Doctrine have sought for some means of evading or lessening our country's responsibility, and sundry alternatives have been suggested. Some have roundly denounced it as an "obsolete shibboleth" and demanded that the United States throw it overboard from its ship of state, leaving Latin America to shift for itself, on its own resources, or with such defensive alliances as it can make in the new world or the old. But in the present state of world politics, this policy of scuttle is rejected by the majority of Americans as fraught with certain peril to Latin America and to the United States as well. Not only is the specter of old world territorial aggrandizement in the new world,—with its military consequences to ourselves,—seen in this policy of relinquishment, but the hope of efficient popular government throughout Latin America would be relinquished with it. If left entirely to themselves, it appears

too optimistic to hope for most of these republics, as President Wilson said of Mexico in his first annual message: "And then, when the end comes [after civil war has ceased], we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions." Ambition, ignorance and lack of political training would long continue to retard the permanent adoption of constitutional government.

If, then, say other sincere critics, the United States must continue to bear the burden of the Monroe Doctrine, let us at least repress it within the straight-jacket of its modest original. The prevention of old world conquest or colonization, and the prevention of the restoration of monarchical government, in Latin America, are surely sufficient for the safety of the United States and are as much as Latin America can expect at our hands. But *nulla vestigia retrorsum* is the law here as elsewhere in national development; and in these days of complex civilization, conquest, colonization and monarchical government assume such subtle forms that eternal vigilance or constant watchful waiting on the part of the United States is held to be the price of America's freedom from them. Through the doorways of national bonds, of industrial concessions, of land companies, and of special privileges of many kinds, may come those old enemies of the Holy Alliance era whom Jefferson and Monroe so valiantly resisted.

Let us, then, say a third class of critics, bargain with those old-world Powers from whom, in our enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we are supposed to have most to fear,—Germany and Japan, for example,—and secure their formal recognition of the Doctrine, not as a mere national policy, but as genuine international law. We have secured partial and sporadic recognition of it by some of the European Powers; let us induce them, by giving them some suitable *quid pro quo*,—such as the Philippines, or tariff concession,—to yield it once for all their formal acceptance. But students of the history of our country need not be reminded that our chief national characteristics and instincts are opposed to such international bargaining; while students of the history of international law need not be reminded that so-called international law which is based on

such partial and selfish agreements is as unstable as the shifting sand of the desert or the shore.

Let us, then, say still other critics, make a direct alliance with the Great Powers of Europe,—Great Britain, Germany and France,—for the enforcement of the Doctrine. If we can not make it genuine international law, let us continue it as a national policy and make an alliance for its support with those European Powers which are most interested in it and which are best able to render support to it. The advocates of this plan are not Americans alone. A member of the British House of Commons who is travelling in our country at the present time has recently said: "We are one people and of one blood. Our King came from Germany; and I hope to see an alliance between England, Germany and the United States, with the *entente* with France maintained." These are friendly sentiments; but aside from the probable cost of such alliances as these, they run counter to our national antipathy, which has been firmly rooted ever since Washington's Farewell Address, to entangling alliances; and they run counter to that strong and ever increasing current of world-wide internationalism which is so marked a characteristic of our era, and which is opposed to partial alliances of every kind and degree.

Again, it is suggested with growing insistency that, if not with the strongest of the old-world Powers, then surely with the strongest and most stable of the new-world Powers, "the A. B. C.," for example, we can make an alliance for the enforcement of a distinctively American policy. This suggestion is a revival of President Jefferson's plan of 1808 to form, through General Wilkinson, an alliance between the United States, Spanish America, and Brazil. It is a revival under greatly changed and more favorable circumstances, of course; but it would be in this twentieth century an example of atavism, of reversion to the barbarous diplomacy of the Middle Ages. For the very reason that the Monroe Doctrine is a policy which vitally concerns *all* of the twenty-one American republics, its interpretation and enforcement may not justly be left to any partial "concert" of a few of them. The injustice to the weaker Powers, and the lack of harmony among the allied Powers themselves, which must be anticipated from any such "American

Concert," may be estimated from the history of the "Holy Alliance" and the "Concert of Europe." With the growth of the Latin American Powers, such a course would lead in time to the institution in this hemisphere of the precarious and portentous condition of affairs in the old world with its triple and dual alliances, and its *ententes* which are cordial only toward their own members and inimical and menacing toward all outsiders. Again, such a "Concert of America" would necessarily be on equal terms, or it would be dominated by the United States. If on equal terms, its object would be inevitably frustrated, by disagreement both as to what should be done and as to who should do it. The recognition of Maximilian's government in Mexico by Brazil, and Chile's impression of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States' collection of the Alsop claim, are two out of many illustrations of the inevitable disagreements which would ensue under any such quadruple alliance. If the "concert" be dominated by the United States, even though only for the sake of prompt decision and effective enforcement, the A. B. C. Powers would naturally regard it as only one more and the most galling of all the evidences of the "Yankee Peril" which the A. B. C. was formed primarily to combat.

Foreign nations would inevitably regard the alliance of the United States with a selected few of its Latin-American neighbors as an illustration of the lion and the lamb lying down together,—with the lamb inside,—and much to the detriment of the lion's digestion and prestige among the other beasts of the jungle. A distinguished London journalist, who is a representative of his paper in this country, has frankly declared that such a suggestion is rank cowardice, a confession of weakness which a great nation like ours has no right to make; and he assured his audience that Great Britain would never be dictated to by Latin Americans, even though allied with the United States.

The distinguished Director General of the Pan-American Union has broadened the A. B. C. suggestion to include *all* of Latin America and to substitute the "Pan-American," for the "Monroe," Doctrine. This is a revival of Bolivar's dream of a Pan-American amphictyonic council, sitting at Panama, and checking the nefarious designs of the Holy Alliance. Pan-Hellenism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism are thus to be fol-

lowed by Pan-Americanism. But if too much lamb might impair the lion's digestion, what might be expected from the addition of so many mice, and mice of a peculiarly tough and indigestible quality? The Latin Americans themselves would probably object to the achievement of such a meal: "But not on us," the oysters said (in response to the supper invitation of the walrus), "And they shed a salty tear." For the relations of our republic toward many of its neighbors in the past have partaken too much of that policy which has been graphically described as "a quick succession of kicks and kindness," to make such a proposal acceptable in entire confidence. Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Chile, even Haiti, might be suspicious of entering into an alliance on unequal terms with the American eagle, whose talons have been felt more than once on their soil; and to an alliance with them on equal terms,—it would seem better to throw the Monroe Doctrine overboard at once and invite Chaos to climb on board and thus avoid the long and poignant agony which would inevitably intervene before that goddess eventually took control.

What alternative, then, is left? If the Monroe Doctrine is not to be declared obsolete and to be utterly discarded, if it can not now, in face of the imperative demands of twentieth century civilization, be repressed within the straight-jacket of its modest original; if no attempt should be made to induce the great Powers of Europe to give their formal assent to the United States' enforcement of it, and if no alliance with them should be made to aid the United States in its enforcement; if an "American Concert," including the United States and the A. B. C. Powers, be impracticable and undesirable, and even more impracticable and undesirable a Pan-American Concert; what other refuge is there?

There are two alternatives left, namely, the strictly *national*, and the genuinely international, or what I have ventured elsewhere to call the *supranational*, sanction.

The advocates of the strictly national enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, of its enforcement by the United States alone, form very probably at present the great majority of our fellow-countrymen; but this majority is daily decreasing as the logic of accumulating events is brought irresistibly home to them. Of course, "we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got

the money too;" and if put to it we can still, doubtless, "lick all creation."

But the process of keeping constantly prepared for so animated a struggle is found to be increasingly expensive, and a resort to an income tax in a time of profound peace for the purpose of enabling us to expend two-thirds of the annual revenue on military objects is not greatly relished by the large and intelligent part of our citizenship upon whom the tax falls.

Our merchants and financiers who deal with Latin America are increasingly aware that the United States' individual responsibility for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine lies like a lion across the path of their future opportunities for doing an increasing business with our rapidly developing neighbors; and they find, too, that their old-world competitors in these fields are utilizing the unpopularity of our government's policy to secure the lion's share of railroad and other concessions and of the foreign commerce. The growing importance of a foreign market as a stimulus and outlet for our domestic industry is being appreciated so keenly by our chambers of commerce that they are making their voice heard in favor of the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption clause; the light of a similar experience may be expected to dawn upon them in no distant future from the problem of the Monroe Doctrine as well.

Meanwhile, the upper branch of our Congress, less sensitive at present to changes in public opinion than is the lower branch, advances the necessity of preserving sacred the Monroe Doctrine as a reason for rejecting any such policy of "truckling" to Great Britain and the other commercial nations of the old world as is discovered in the repeal of the tolls exemption clause. Still more menacing to our responsibility for the Monroe Doctrine were considered the general arbitration treaties of 1911 with Great Britain and France, and the Senate accordingly rejected them.

Unfortunately, the Senate's determination that no degree of arbitration,—not even the *compromise* clause in greatly restricted general treaties,—shall be permitted to infringe upon our monopoly of the Monroe Doctrine, persists side by side with, and is the prime cause of, the suspicion and ill-will which bursts forth from time to time between our country and such natural and traditional friends as Germany and Japan.

This sensitiveness as to the safety of the Monroe Doctrine has not brought with it a corresponding backwardness in claiming all the rights and privileges pertaining to it. For example, neither old-world Powers, nor other American republics, besides the one sole champion of the Monroe Doctrine, may be permitted to share in the building, ownership or control of any canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The right of fortifying the Panama Canal has been followed by the assertion that we have also the right to discriminate in favor of our own ships passing through it,—the diplomatic history of seventy years and the existence of a precise treaty to the contrary notwithstanding. "A leetle country never misconstrues a treaty with a big one," says the Albany philosopher; "that is contrary to self-preservation and the law of nations. A leetle country allus construes a treaty with a big one jest the same from fust to last, strictly in accordance with its original meanin' an' intent; but a big nation ain't so gol blamed hide-bound ner bigoted, not by a long sight. If we ever want anything down in Guatemala that we can't git except with the aid of a handful o' blue-jackets an' a marine band; we'll discover a reason fer landin' 'em [and that will probably be the Monroe Doctrine]; we'll dig up a reserve clause in a peace protocol [or the Monroe Doctrine] that can only be interpreted one way in the light of human progress."

Since we insist on the exclusive possession of the *rights* entailed by the Doctrine, the old world naturally demands that we shall assume the corresponding duties. Its governments accordingly invoke our protection for the lives and property of their citizens in the not infrequent times of Latin-American revolt and disorder; its corporations make a similar demand; its merchants insist that we shall suppress civil warfare in the interest of neutral commerce; and its peoples assume that it is our duty to put an end to the inhumanity which may be discovered in the rubber-fields^o of Peru or Bolivia. The Latin-American governments, also, have kept us tolerably busy in defending their only available assets, namely, their custom-houses and territory, from the pressing claims of the old-world creditors; and even our own industrial corporations are demanding that our government shall intervene in their behalf against their old-world rivals, lest the latter should infringe upon the Monroe Doctrine by securing concessions from Latin American

governments which might place those governments under foreign control, or which might prevent valuable deposits of oil from finding their natural destiny in the tanks of United States war-ships, the chief object of which is to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, largely in Latin America's behalf. Thus runs the argument in its vicious circle.

So elastic has this Doctrine become under the strain of twentieth century cosmopolitanism that so good a friend of our country as the President of the Argentine Republic has characterized it as being made of gutta percha. So indefinite has it become in consequence of our country's attempt to make it apply to every new international emergency that no jurist or publicist outside of our own country can satisfactorily define it; and it is much to be doubted if we can do so ourselves. When it is finally laid to rest, its epitaph may well be: Here lies one whose name was writ in water.

From the point of view of our own republican form of government,—of our own constitution,—the assumption by our government of the exclusive enforcement of the Doctrine is open to serious question. The American Revolution was due to Great Britain's adoption of an exaggerated Monroe Doctrine in dealing with its colonies. The Declaration of Independence is opposed to the claim of one nation to coerce the political status of another. Senator Hoar declared in a memorable address: "I maintain that holding in subjection an alien people, governing them against their will for any fancied advantage to them, is not only not an end provided for by the Constitution, but it is an end prohibited therein." The Constitution established a government of, by, and for the people of the *United States*, and certainly did not provide for a paternalistic government of foreign peoples. Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution was never designed to read: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this *Hemisphere* a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), or even without such application, it shall protect them against domestic violence." Our first President's strict appeal for obedience to the Constitution was so far forgotten by a recent President that, as he himself admits: "I took the Canal Zone and left Congress to debate,

not the Canal, but me;" and again: "The Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo [to collect and administer that republic's revenues]; but the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect, and I continued its execution two years before the Senate acted.—The Senate adjourned without any action at all.—I went ahead and administered the proposed treaty anyhow, considering it a simple agreement on the part of the Executive which would be converted into a treaty whenever the Senate acted." Thus near the verge of imperialism, at home as well as abroad, has the Monroe Doctrine and our exclusive administration of it brought us. It is small wonder that the Senate should have struggled with the Executive so ardently under President Roosevelt's administration and that similar acts on the part of his successor caused the late Democratic chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations to introduce a resolution in the Senate forbidding the use of the United States' military forces in lands not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Such are the insuperable and increasing difficulties, the fundamental objections, to the strictly national, or the United States go-it-alone, policy of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. This solution of the problem is no longer tolerable, either in itself or in its consequences. The hand-writing on the wall, predicting its relinquishment, and the advancing shadow of its successor, are already to be seen. Not that the eternal principles of right and justice which underlie the doctrine are passing; but that the enforcement of these principles on the sole responsibility of a single one of the forty-six members of the family of nations is tottering to its fall. *Le roi est mort; vive le roi!* The preservation of the integrity of national territory and the maintenance of popular government can never be surrendered; but they can and must be placed under the ægis of the entire family of nations and of a truly international court of justice.

One splendid move was made by the United States itself in the direction of sharing with the rest of the family of nations a portion of the responsibility and burden of the Monroe Doctrine when it secured the adoption by the Second Hague Conference of that proposition to which the name of our own

General Porter has been given. This provides for the obligatory arbitration of contractual debts before a resort is had to force for their collection; and it was intended to apply especially to Latin American indebtedness to European creditors. But the collection of contractual indebtedness is only one of the multitudinous ways in which an attack on Latin-American territory or self-government may invoke the application of the Monroe Doctrine; and hence it represents only the first step in the journey which must be made. The neutralization of Latin America by the Third Hague Conference, or, better still, a guarantee by that Conference of the territorial integrity of *all* the members of the family of nations, would not only relieve our country of the burden of sustaining this principle of the Monroe Doctrine, but would apply that just and righteous principle to the entire world. The institution of the Court of Arbitral Justice would be greatly facilitated by such a measure; for the smaller members of the family of nations would be more willing to constitute the court on some one of the plans proposed, if they could be assured that this important element of their sovereignty could not be brought, before the bar of a court on which they may not have absolute equality of representation. The ratification of treaties of general and even universal arbitration would also be greatly facilitated, as was shown in the Senate's debate on the treaties of 1911, by this world-wide application of the first principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

The world-wide application of the second principle of the Doctrine, namely, the guarantee of a constitutional government, although more difficult, is not, in my humble judgment, impossible. With the triumphant march of constitutional government around the world, it represents already nine points of national law, and the burden of proof against it would be placed by any international court of our time upon the opposing party. National courts are daily grappling with far more difficult cases in equity than would be brought before the international court by, for example, the present political problem in Mexico.

Two precedents have already been created in this field of international law, and although they were set up on a relatively small and obscure part of the international stage, they were established under exceedingly difficult circumstances and were

wholly effective. These were, first, the arbitration of the revolutionary struggle between Presidents Bonilla and Davila, of Honduras, in 1911, which resulted in the resignation of the latter, the election of the former, and the end of the civil war; and, second, the issue of an interlocutory decree by the Central American Court of Justice, in 1909, which put an end to a revolutionary movement in Honduras by fixing the *status quo*, and by enjoining the neighboring republics of Guatemala and Salvador from giving aid and comfort to the rebellion.

The sanction back of such an award by the court of *all* the nations at The Hague, including as it would all the *vis maxima* of the twentieth century's diplomacy, commerce, finance, and international public opinion, not to mention, if necessary, an international police force, would be ample for its enforcement.

The crux of this problem, of course, is the getting of such cases into court. But, as the United States knows only too well, the modern world is bound too closely together, and is too much under the dominion of the ideals of civilization, to permit the indefinite running of an open sore in the body politic of any member of the international family. This fact would supply the motive force to bring such cases into the international court; while the medium through which it could be done might well be supplied by some such development of the international commissions of inquiry as is recommended by the Taft arbitration treaties, which development I have had the honor of discussing elsewhere under the name of "The International Grand Jury."

This, then, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, is the solution of the problem of the Monroe Doctrine which I venture to submit to you, believing as I do that it will be the final and wholly desirable solution of a problem which is already difficult and potentially impossible if left to the solution of the United States alone, or of any partial alliances between it and the other Powers, great or small.



AFFIRMATIVE DISCUSSION

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Real Monroe Doctrine. Elihu Root

It is undoubtedly true that the specific occasions for the declaration of Monroe no longer exist. The Holy Alliance long ago disappeared. The nations of Europe no longer contemplate the vindication of monarchical principles in the territory of the new world. France, the most active of the Allies, is herself a republic. No nation longer asserts the right of colonization in America. The general establishment of diplomatic relations between the Powers of Europe and the American republics, if not already universal, became so when, pursuant to the formal assent of the Powers, all the American republics were received into the Second Conference at The Hague and joined in the conventions there made, upon the footing of equal sovereignty, entitled to have their territory and independence respected under that law of nations which formerly existed for Europe alone.

The declaration, however, did more than deal with the specific occasion which called it forth. It was intended to declare a general principle for the future, and this is plain not merely from the generality of the terms used, but from the discussions out of which they arose and from the understanding of the men who took part in the making and of their successors.

When Jefferson was consulted by President Monroe before the message was sent he replied:

The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs.

Three years later Daniel Webster declared that the Doctrine

involved the honor of the country. He said in the House of Representatives:

I look upon it as a part of its treasures of reputation; and, for one, I intend to guard it. . . . I will neither help to erase it nor tear it out; nor shall it be, by any act of mine, blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and will not diminish that honor.

Mr. Cleveland said in his Message of December 17, 1895:

The doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures.

As the particular occasions which called it forth have slipped back into history, the Declaration itself, instead of being handed over to the historian, has grown continually a more vital and insistent rule of conduct for each succeeding generation of Americans. Never for a moment have the responsible and instructed statesmen in charge of the foreign affairs of the United States failed to consider themselves bound to insist upon its policy. Never once has the public opinion of the people of the United States failed to support every just application of it as new occasion has arisen. Almost every President and Secretary of State has restated the Doctrine with vigor and emphasis in the discussion of the diplomatic affairs of his day. The Governments of Europe have gradually come to realize that the existence of the policy which Monroe declared is a stubborn and continuing fact to be recognized in their controversies with American countries. We have seen Spain, France, England, Germany, with admirable good sense and good temper, explaining beforehand to the United States that they intended no permanent occupation of territory, in the controversy with Mexico forty years after the Declaration, and in the controversy with Venezuela eighty years after. In 1903 the Duke of Devonshire declared "Great Britain accepts the Monroe Doctrine unreservedly." Mr. Hay coupled the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule as cardinal guides of American diplomacy. Twice within very recent years the whole treaty-making power of the United States has given its formal approval to the policy by the reservations in the signature and in the ratification of the Arbitration Conventions of

The Hague Conferences, expressed in these words by the Senate resolution agreeing to ratification of the Convention of 1907:

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state, nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions.

It seems fair to assume that a policy with such a history as this has some continuing and substantial reason underlying it; that it is not outworn or meaningless or a purely formal relic of the past, and it seems worth while to consider carefully what the Doctrine is and what it is not.

No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a rule of international law or that the Doctrine which he declared has become international law. It is a declaration of the United States that certain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States, and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly. The Declaration does not say what the course of the United States will be in case such acts are done. That is left to be determined in each particular instance. Mr. Calhoun said, in the Senate debate on the Yucatan Bill, in 1848:

Whether you will resist or not and the measure of your resistance—whether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or some intermediate measure or by a resort to arms; all this must be determined and decided on the merits of the question itself. This is the only wise course. . . . There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the hazard of war with all its calamities. Am I asked for one? I will answer. I designate the case of Cuba.

In particular instances, indeed, the course which the United States would follow has been very distinctly declared, as when Mr. Seward said, in 1865:

It has been the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed upon two points: namely, first, that the United States earnestly desires to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France. Secondly, that this policy would be brought in imminent jeopardy unless France could deem it consistent with her honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country.

So Secretary Buchanan said, in 1848:

The highest and first duty of every independent nation is to provide for its own safety; and acting upon this principle, we should be compelled to resist the acquisition of Cuba by any powerful maritime State, with all means which Providence has placed at our command.

And Secretary Clayton said, in 1849:

The news of the cession of Cuba to any foreign Power would in the United States be the instant signal for war. No foreign Power would attempt to take it that did not expect a hostile collision with us as an inevitable consequence.

The Doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of self-protection, and that right is recognized by international law. The right is a necessary corollary of independent sovereignty. It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the State exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilization of an army by another power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other power may be within its own territory. Yet the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war. The most common exercise of the right of self-protection outside of a state's own territory and in time of peace is the interposition of objection to the occupation of territory, of points of strategic military or maritime advantage, or to indirect accomplishment of this effect by dynastic arrangement. For example, the objection of England in 1911 to the occupation of a naval station by Germany on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco; the objection of the European Powers generally to the vast force of Russia extending its territory to the Mediterranean; the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Treaty of Berlin; the establishment of buffer states; the objection to the succession of a German prince to the throne of Spain; the many forms of the Eastern Question; the centuries of struggle to preserve the balance of power in Europe—all depend upon the very same principle which underlies the Monroe Doctrine; that is to say, upon the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself. Of course each state must judge for itself when a threatened act will create such a situation. If any state objects to a threatened act and

the reasonableness of its objection is not assented to, the efficacy of the objection will depend upon the power behind it.

It is doubtless true that in the adherence of the American people to the original Declaration there was a great element of sentiment and of sympathy for the people of South America who were struggling for freedom, and it has been a source of great satisfaction to the United States that the course which it took in 1823 concurrently with the action of Great Britain played so great a part in assuring the right of self-government to the countries of South America. Yet it is to be observed that in reference to the South-American governments as in all other respects, the international right upon which the Declaration expressly rests is not sentiment or sympathy or a claim to dictate what kind of government any other country shall have, but the safety of the United States. It is because the new governments cannot be overthrown by the allied Powers "without endangering our peace and happiness"; that "the United States cannot behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

We frequently see statements that the Doctrine has been changed or enlarged; that there is a new or different Doctrine since Monroe's time. They are mistaken. There has been no change. One apparent extension of the statement of Monroe was made by President Polk in his messages of 1845 and 1848, when he included the acquisition of territory by a European Power through cession as dangerous to the safety of the United States. It was really but stating a corollary to the Doctrine of 1823 and asserting the same right of self-protection against the other American states as well as against Europe.

This corollary has been so long and uniformly agreed to by the Government and the people of the United States that it may fairly be regarded as being now a part of the Doctrine.

But, all assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, there has been no other change or enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine since it was first promulgated. It must be remembered that not everything said or written by Secretaries of State or even by Presidents constitutes a national policy or can enlarge or modify or diminish a national policy.

It is the substance of the thing to which the nation holds, and that is and always has been that the safety of the United States demands that American territory shall remain American.

The Monroe Doctrine does not assert or imply or involve any right on the part of the United States to impair or control the independent sovereignty of any American state. In the lives of nations, as of individuals, there are many rights unquestioned and universally conceded. The assertion of any particular right must be considered, not as excluding all others, but as coincident with all others which are not inconsistent. The fundamental principle of international law is the principle of independent sovereignty. Upon that all other rules of international law rest. That is the chief and necessary protection of the weak against the power of the strong. Observance of that is the necessary condition to the peace and order of the civilized world. By the declaration of that principle the common judgment of civilization awards to the smallest and weakest state the liberty to control its own affairs without interference from any other power, however great.

The Monroe Doctrine does not infringe upon that right. It asserts the right. The declaration of Monroe was that the rights and interests of the United States were involved in maintaining a condition, and the condition to be maintained was the independence of all the American countries. It is "the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained" which is declared to render them not subject to future colonization. It is "the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged" that are not to be interfered with. When Mr. Canning's proposals for a joint declaration were under consideration by the Cabinet in the months before the famous message was sent, John Quincy Adams, who played the major part in forming the policy, declared the basis of it in these words:

Considering the South Americans as independent nations, they themselves and no other nation had the right to dispose of their condition. We have no right to dispose of them either alone or in conjunction with other nations. Neither have any other nations the right of disposing of them without their consent.

In the most critical and momentous application of the Doctrine Mr. Seward wrote to the French Minister:

France need not for a moment delay her promised withdrawal of military forces from Mexico and her putting the principle of non-intervention

into full and complete practice in regard to Mexico through any apprehension that the United States will prove unfaithful to the principles and policy in that respect which on their behalf it has been my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened correspondence. The practice of this government from its beginning is a guarantee to all nations of the respect of the American people for the free sovereignty of the people in every other state. We received the instructions from Washington. We applied it sternly in our early intercourse even with France. The same principle and practice have been uniformly inculcated by all our statesmen, interpreted by all our jurists, maintained by all our Congresses, and acquiesced in without practical dissent on all occasions by the American people. It is in reality the chief element of foreign intercourse in our history.

In his message to Congress of December 3, 1906, President Roosevelt said:

In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States toward the other American republics. An idea had become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied or carried with it an assumption of superiority and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that Doctrine applies. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

He quoted the words of the Secretary of State then in office to the recent Pan-American Conference at Rio Janeiro:

We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic.

And the President then proceeded to say of these statements:

They have my hearty approval, as I am sure they will have yours, and I cannot be wrong in the conviction that they correctly represent the sentiments of the whole American people. I cannot better characterize the true attitude of the United States in its assertion of the Monroe Doctrine than in the words of the distinguished former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Doctor Drago, " . . . the traditional policy of the United States, without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance, condemned the oppression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great Powers of Europe."

Curiously enough, many incidents and consequences of that independent condition itself which the United States asserted in the Monroe Doctrine have been regarded in some quarters as

infringements upon independence resulting from the Monroe Doctrine. Just as the personal rights of each individual free citizen in the state are limited by the equal rights of every other free individual in the same state, so the sovereign rights of each independent state are limited by the equal sovereign rights of every other independent state. These limitations are not impairments of independent sovereignty. They are the necessary conditions to the existence of independent sovereignty. If the Monroe Doctrine had never been declared or thought of, the sovereign rights of each American republic would have been limited by the equal sovereign rights of every other American republic, including the United States. The United States would have had a right to demand from every other American state observance of treaty obligations and of the rules of international law. It would have had the right to insist upon due protection for the lives and property of its citizens within the territory of every other American state, and upon the treatment of its citizens in that territory according to the rules of international law. The United States would have had the right as against every other American state to object to acts which the United States might deem injurious to its peace and safety, just as it had the right to object to such acts as against any European Power, and just as all European and American Powers have the right to object to such acts as against one another. All these rights which the United States would have had as against other American states it has now. They are not in the slightest degree affected by the Monroe Doctrine. They exist now just as they would have existed if there had been no Monroe Doctrine. They are neither greater nor less because of that Doctrine. They are not rights of superiority; they are rights of equality. They are the rights which all equal independent states have as against one another. And they cover the whole range of peace and war.

It happens, however, that the United States is very much bigger and more powerful than most of the other American republics. And when a very great and powerful state makes demands upon a very small and weak state it is difficult to avoid a feeling that there is an assumption of superior authority involved in the assertion of superior power, even though the demand be based solely upon the right of equal against equal. An examination of the various controversies which the United

States has had with other American Powers will disclose the fact that in every case the rights asserted were rights not of superiority, but of equality. Of course, it cannot be claimed that great and powerful states shall forego their just rights against smaller and less powerful states. The responsibilities of sovereignty attach to the weak as well as to the strong, and a claim to exemption from those responsibilities would imply not equality, but inferiority. The most that can be said concerning a question between a powerful state and a weak one is that the great state ought to be especially considerate and gentle in the assertion and maintenance of its position; ought always to base its acts not upon a superiority of force, but upon reason and law; and ought to assert no rights against a small state because of its weakness which it would not assert against a great state notwithstanding its power. But in all this the Monroe Doctrine is not concerned at all.

The scope of the Doctrine is strictly limited. It concerns itself only with the occupation of territory in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a pre-existing American government. It has not otherwise any relation to the affairs of either American or European states. In good conduct or bad, observance of rights or violations of them, agreement or controversy, injury or reprisal, coercion or war, the United States finds no warrant in the Monroe Doctrine for interference. So Secretary Cass wrote, in 1858:

With respect to the causes of war between Spain and Mexico the United States have no concern, and do not undertake to judge them. Nor do they claim to interpose in any hostilities which may take place. Their policy of observation and interference is limited to the permanent subjugation of any portion of the territory of Mexico, or of any other American state, to any European Power whatever.

So Mr. Seward wrote, in 1861, concerning the allied operations against Mexico:

As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor to inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the President does not feel at liberty to question, and does not question, that the sovereigns represented have undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy the war severally or jointly.

So when Germany, Great Britain, and Italy united to compel by naval force a response to their demands on the part of Ven-

ezeuela, and the German Government advised the United States that it proposed to take coercive measures to enforce its claims for damages and for money against Venezuela, adding, "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory," Mr. Hay replied:

That the Government of the United States, although it regretted that European Powers should use force against Central and South American countries, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated.

Quite independently of the Monroe Doctrine, however, there is a rule of conduct among nations under which each nation is deemed bound to render the good offices of friendship to the others when they are in trouble. The rule has been crystallized in the provisions of The Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Under the head of "The Maintenance of General Peace" in that Convention substantially all the Powers of the world have agreed:

With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between states, the Contracting Powers agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences.

In case of serious disagreement or dispute, before an appeal to arms, the Contracting Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers.

Independently of this recourse, the Contracting Powers deem it expedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance. . . . The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act.

The part of the mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the states at variance.

The United States has frequently performed this duty in controversies between American republics among themselves and between American republics and European states. So in the controversy last referred to, the United States used her good offices to bring about a series of arbitrations which superseded the resort to force determined upon by the allied Powers against Venezuela. She did this upon the request of Venezuela. She did it in the performance of no duty and the exercise of no right

whatever except the duty and the right of friendship between equal sovereign states. The Monroe Doctrine has nothing whatever to do with acts of this description; yet many times censorious critics, unfamiliar with the facts and uninstructed in the customs and rules of action of the international world, have accused the United States in such cases of playing the rôle of schoolmaster, of assuming the superiority of guardianship, of aiming at a protectorate.

As the Monroe Doctrine neither asserts nor involves any right of control by the United States over any American nation, it imposes upon the United States no duty toward European Powers to exercise such a control. It does not call upon the United States to collect debts or coerce conduct or redress wrongs or revenge injuries. If matters ever come to a point where in any American country the United States intervenes by force to prevent or end an occupation of territory to the subversion or exclusion of an American government, doubtless new rights and obligations will arise as a result of the acts done in the course of the intervention. Unless such a situation shall have arisen there can be no duty on the part of the United States beyond the exercise of good offices as between equal and independent nations.

There are, indeed, special reasons why the United States should perform that duty of equal friendship to the full limit of international custom and international ethics as declared in The Hague Convention, whenever occasion arises in controversy between American and European Powers. There is a motive for that in the special sympathy and friendship for the gradually developing republics of the South which the American people have always felt since the days of Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Richard Rush and Henry Clay. There is a motive in the strong desire of our Government that no controversy between a European and an American state shall ever come to the point where the United States may be obliged to assert by force the rule of national safety declared by Monroe. And there is a motive in the proper desire of the United States that no friendly nation of Europe or America shall be injured or hindered in the prosecution of its rights in any way or to any extent that can possibly be avoided because that nation respects the rule of safety which Mr. Monroe declared and we maintain. None of these

reasons for the exercise of the good offices of equality justifies, nor do all of them together justify, the United States in infringing upon the independence or ignoring the equal rights of the smallest American state.

Nor has the United States ever in any instance during the period of almost a century which has elapsed made the Monroe Doctrine or the motives which lead us to support it the ground or excuse for overstepping the limits which the rights of equal sovereignty set between equal sovereign states.

Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American states or any number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil were to contribute the weight of her influence toward a similar end, the right upon which that nation would rest its declaration would be its own safety, not the safety of the United States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the safety of Chile. Argentina would declare what was necessary for the safety of Argentina. Brazil, what was necessary for the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself and in its own right, and it would be impossible to go beyond that except by more or less offensive and defensive alliances. Of course, such alliances are not to be considered.

It is plain that the building of the Panama Canal greatly accentuates the practical necessity of the Monroe Doctrine as it applies to all the territory surrounding the Caribbean or near the Bay of Panama. The plainest lessons of history and the universal judgment of all responsible students of the subject concur in teaching that the potential command of the route to and from the Canal must rest with the United States, and that the vital interests of the nation forbid that such command shall pass into other hands. Certainly no nation which has acquiesced in the British occupation of Egypt will dispute this proposition. Undoubtedly, as one passes to the south and the distance from the Caribbean increases the necessity of maintaining the rule of Monroe becomes less immediate and apparent. But who is competent to draw the line? Who will say, "To this point the rule of Monroe should apply; beyond this point, it should not"? Who will say that a new national force created

beyond any line that he can draw will stay beyond it and will not in the long course of time extend itself indefinitely?

The danger to be apprehended from the immediate proximity of hostile forces was not the sole consideration leading to the Declaration. The need to separate the influences determining the development and relation of states in the New World from the influences operating in Europe played an even greater part. The familiar paragraphs of Washington's Farewell Address upon this subject were not rhetoric. They were intensely practical rules of conduct for the future guidance of the country.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

It was the same instinct which led Jefferson, in the letter to Monroe already quoted, to say:

Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs.

The concurrence of Washington and Hamilton and Jefferson in the declaration of this principle of action entitles it to great respect. They recalled the long period during which every war waged in Europe between European Powers and arising from European causes of quarrel was waged also in the new world. English and French and Spanish and Dutch killed and harried one another in America, not because of quarrels between the settlers in America, but because of quarrels between the European Powers having dominion over them. Separation of influences as absolute and complete as possible was the remedy which the wisest of Americans agreed upon. It was one of the primary purposes of Monroe's Declaration to insist upon this separation, and to accomplish it he drew the line at the water's edge. The problem of national protection in the distant future is one not to be solved by the first impressions of the casual observer, but only by profound study of the forces which, in the long life of nations, work out results. In this case the results of such a

study by the best men of the formative period of the United States are supported by the instincts of the American democracy holding steadily in one direction for almost a century. The problem has not changed essentially. If the Declaration of Monroe was right when the message was sent, it is right now. South America is no more distant to-day than it was then. The tremendous armaments and international jealousies of Europe afford little assurance to those who think we may now abandon the separatist policy of Washington. That South American states have become too strong for colonization or occupation is cause for satisfaction. That Europe has no purpose or wish to colonize American territory is most gratifying. These facts may make it improbable that it will be necessary to apply the Monroe Doctrine in the southern parts of South America; but they furnish no reason whatever for retracting or denying or abandoning a declaration of public policy, just and reasonable when it was made, and which, if occasion for its application shall arise in the future, will still be just and reasonable.

A false conception of what the Monroe Doctrine is, of what it demands and what it justifies, of its scope and of its limits, has invaded the public press and affected public opinion within the past few years. Grandiose schemes of national expansion invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Interested motives to compel Central or South American countries to do or refrain from doing something by which individual Americans may profit invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Clamors for national glory from minds too shallow to grasp at the same time a sense of national duty invoke the Monroe Doctrine. The intolerance which demands that control over the conduct and the opinions of other peoples which is the essence of tyranny invokes the Monroe Doctrine. Thoughtless people who see no difference between lawful right and physical power assume that the Monroe Doctrine is a warrant for interference in the internal affairs of all weaker nations in the New World. Against this supposititious doctrine many protests both in the United States and in South America have been made, and justly made. To the real Monroe Doctrine these protests have no application.

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Monroe Doctrine: Its Limitations and Implications.

William H. Taft

It Has Made for Peace

The original declaration of the Monroe Doctrine was prompted by England's wish, when Canning was Foreign Minister, that England and the United States should make a joint declaration of such a policy. Since its announcement by President Monroe there have been frequent intimations by English statesmen while in office that they do not object to its maintenance. Whether the other governments of Europe have acquiesced in it or not, it is certain that none of them have insisted upon violating it when the matter was called to their attention by the United States. Every one admits that its maintenance until recently has made for the peace of the world, has kept European governments from intermeddling in the politics of this hemisphere, and has enabled all the various Latin-American republics that were offshoots from Spain to maintain their own governments and their independence. While it may be truly said that it has not made for peace between them, still that was not within the scope of its purpose. It has, however, restrained the land hunger and the growing disposition for colonization by some European governments, which otherwise would certainly have carried them into this hemisphere. The very revolutions and instabilities of many of the Latin-American republics would have offered frequent excuse and opportunity for intervention by European governments which they would have promptly improved.

It Does not Forbid War

The second great limitation of the Monroe Doctrine is that it does not contemplate any interference on our part with the right of an European government to declare and make war upon any American government, or to pursue such course in the vindication of its national rights as would be a proper method under the rules of international law. This was expressly declared to be a proper term in the statement of the Doctrine by Mr. Seward during our Civil War, when Spain made war against Chile. He

announced our intention to observe neutrality between the two nations and he laid down the proposition that the Doctrine did not require the United States, in a consistent pursuit of it, to protect any government in this hemisphere, either by a defensive alliance against the attacking European Power or by interfering to prevent such punishment as it might inflict, provided only that in the end the conquering power did not force its own government upon the conquered people, or compel a permanent transfer to it of their territory, or resort to any other unjustly oppressive measures against them. And Mr. Roosevelt in his communications to Congress has again and again asserted that maintenance of the Doctrine does not require our Government to object to armed measures on the part of European governments to collect their debts and the debts of their nationals against governments in this continent that are in default of their just obligations, provided only that they do not attempt to satisfy those obligations by taking over to themselves ownership and possession of the territory of the debtor governments, or by other oppressive measures. It may be conceded that Mr. Olney used language that was unfortunate in describing the effect of the Monroe Doctrine upon the position of the United States in this hemisphere. It is not remarkable that it has been construed to be the claim of suzerainty over the territory of the two American continents. Our fiat is not law to control the domestic concerns or indeed the internal policies, or the foreign policies of the Latin-American republics, or of other American governments, nor do we exercise substantial sovereignty over them. We are concerned that their governments shall not be interfered with by European governments; we are concerned that this hemisphere shall not be a field for land aggrandizement and the chase for increased political power by European governments, such as we have witnessed in Africa and in China and Manchuria, and we believe that such a condition would be inimical to our safety and interests. More than this, where a controversy between an European government and a Latin-American republic is of such a character that it is likely to lead to war, we feel that our earnest desire to escape the possible result against which the Monroe Doctrine is aimed, is sufficient to justify our mediating between the European Power and the Latin-American republic, and bringing about by negotiation, if possible, a peaceable settlement of the difference. This

is what Mr. Roosevelt did in Venezuela and in Santo Domingo. It was not that the use of force or threatened force to collect their debts by the European Powers constituted a violation of the Monroe Doctrine that induced Mr. Roosevelt to act, but only a general desire to promote peace and also a wish to avoid circumstances in which an invasion of the Monroe Doctrine might easily follow.

"A National Asset"

It is said—and this is what frightened peace advocates from the Monroe Doctrine—that it rests on force, and ultimately on the strength of our army and our navy. That is true, if its enforcement is resisted. Its ultimate sanction and vindication are in our ability to maintain it; but our constant upholding and assertion of the Doctrine have enabled us, with the conflicting interests of European Powers and the support of some and the acquiescence of others, to give effect to that Doctrine for now nearly a century, and that without the firing of a single shot. This has given the Doctrine a traditional weight that assertion of a new policy by the United States never could have. It is a national asset, and, indeed, an asset of the highest value for those who would promote the peace of the world. The mere fact that the further successful maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine in the improbable event that any European Power shall deliberately violate it will require the exercise of force upon our part, is certainly not a reason for the most sincere advocate of peace to insist upon sacrificing its beneficent influence and prestige as an instrument of peace to prevent European intermeddling in this hemisphere which a century of successful insistence without actual use of force has given it.

Much as the Doctrine may be criticized by the Continental press of Europe, it is an institution of one hundred years' standing, it is something that its age is bound to make Europe respect. It was advanced at a time when we were but a small nation with little power, and it has acquired additional force and prestige as our nation has grown to the size and strength and international influence that it now has.

Were we to abandon the Doctrine and thus in effect notify the European governments that so far as our remonstrance or interposition was concerned, they might take possession of Santo

Domingo, of Haiti, or of any of the Central American republics, or of any South American republics that might be disturbed by revolution, and that might give them some international excuse for intervention, it would be but a very short time before we would be forced into controversies that would be much more dangerous to the peace of this hemisphere than our continued assertion of the Doctrine properly understood and limited.

Should We Invite Their Cooperation?

But it is said that we ought to invite in these so-called A. B. C. powers of South America to assist us in upholding the Doctrine and also in doing what the Doctrine, as well as neighborhood interests, may lead us to do with nearby countries around the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and that we ought to establish some sort of relationship with these great powers as members of a kind of hegemony to decide upon Latin-American questions and participate in intervention to help along the smaller countries, and thus put such powers on an equality with us in our American policy and give assurance of our disinterestedness. If we could do this, I would be glad to have it done, because it would relieve us of part of a burden and would give greater weight to the declaration of the policy. I would be glad to have an effort tactfully made to this end and I don't want to discourage it; but I fear we should find that these powers would be loath to assume responsibility or burden in the matter of the welfare of a government like one of the Central American republics, or Haiti or Santo Domingo so remote from them and so near to us. We attempted in case of disturbance in the Central American governments once or twice to interest Mexico, when Mexico had a responsible government and was very near at hand, but President Diaz was loath to take any part with the United States in such an arrangement, and we found that whatever had to be done had to be done largely on the responsibility of the United States.

If action in respect of any republic of South America were necessary under the Monroe Doctrine, the joining of the A. B. C. powers with the United States might involve suspicion and jealousy on the part of other South American republics not quite so prosperous or so stable as the A. B. C. powers. Thus, instead of helping the situation, the participation of part of the South

American governments might only complicate it. I know something about the character of those countries myself, not from personal observation, but from a study of the character of Spanish descended civilizations and societies, and I venture to say that sensitive as they all may be in respect to suspected encroachments of the United States, they are even more sensitive as between themselves and their respective ambitions. During my Administration, Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, tendered the good offices of the United States as between South American governments who were bitter against each other over boundaries and other disputes, and successfully brought them to a peaceful solution, but in those controversies it was quite apparent that whatever then might be the general feeling against the United States, their suspicions of each other, when their interests were at variance, were quite as intense. Indeed it is not too much to say that the fear in the hearts of the less powerful peoples of South America of a South American hegemony is more real than any genuine fear they may have of the actual suzerainty of our Government. My belief, therefore, is that unless we could organize a union of all the countries of two continents, which would be so clumsy as to be entirely impracticable, the influence of the United States can probably be exerted in support of the Monroe Doctrine more effectively and much less invidiously alone than by an attempt to unite certain of the South American Powers in an effort to preserve its successful maintenance. I hope my fear in this respect will prove to be unfounded and that the plan suggested may be successful.

Craftsman. 25:311-4. January, 1914

Vitality of the Monroe Doctrine. W. Carman Roberts

This doctrine which for ninety years has been a cardinal principle of our foreign policy has not merely held its own during this period, but has proved its vitality by gradually extending its scope under succeeding administrations. Thus under President Cleveland it was interpreted to mean that any European Power owning land in the Western Hemisphere must arbitrate its boundary disputes with its neighbors. President Roosevelt went further than his predecessors in accepting for Uncle Sam

under the Monroe Doctrine the rôle of benevolent policeman, "the big brother with a stick," who, as Professor Hiram Bingham of Yale puts it, "would keep intruders from annoying the little fellows, and who would also see to it that the little fellow did not annoy the neighbors." Under President Taft the Lodge resolution, passed by the Senate but not signed by the President, undertook to carry Monroeism still further by denying the right of American republics to sell harbor rights to foreign corporations.

But the most remarkable development of the Monroe Doctrine is that formulated by President Wilson within very recent weeks and involving the proposition that the United States will not countenance the establishment of any foreign financial control over the weaker Latin-American countries of a sort that would in effect control their government. Speaking at Mobile recently the President said: "States that are obliged to grant concessions are in this condition—that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these states are going to see is an emancipation from this subordination which has been inevitable to foreign enterprises. The United States must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity." This was prefaced by an emphatic statement that never again would the United States acquire a foot of territory by conquest. An almost immediate sequel to this warning to the foreign concessionaires was the abandonment by a powerful British syndicate of gigantic oil project in Colombia and Ecuador. These projects, if consummated, would have put certain ports in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal practically under British control—a situation in direct conflict with the Monroe Doctrine as elaborated in the Lodge resolution. Moreover, since oil is likely to supersede coal as naval fuel, an oil port is virtually the equivalent of a coaling station.

Thus, despite repeated assertions that it is dead or obsolete, the Monroe Doctrine not only remains a controlling factor in our foreign relations, but is proving its vitality by constant growth in meaning and scope. Moreover, it is and always has been a popular doctrine with the American people. Even the weaker of the Latin-American nations are now beginning to

understand that it does not mean "the Americas for the United States," but, "the Americas for the Americans." They begin to see that if the "big brother" has sometimes been "bossy," his motive has not been one of arrogance but of helpfulness. And as an aid to this understanding they have the assurance of President Wilson that "we are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty."

Journal of Race Development. 4: 359-69. January, 1914

Modern Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. J. M. Callahan

It is unfair to say that the Monroe Doctrine was a mere *pronunciamento* based on provincialism and selfishness, and that it has never served any useful purpose.

True, one of its earlier basic ideas was the natural separation between the old and the new world—an idea of two separate spheres which was unwarranted however much it may have seemed desirable to Jefferson in the Napoleonic period of "eternal war" in Europe. This idea of isolation was never a vital principle of the doctrine. The United States was a world power from the beginning and early felt the need of naval bases in the Mediterranean. As a world power it has rights in Europe, Africa and Asia.

True, the Doctrine was largely due to self interest, together with the feeling that the United States was logically the political leader among the American powers. Secretary Adams in his instructions to Rush, on November 29, 1823, said: "American affairs, whether of the northern or southern continent, can henceforth not be excluded from the interference of the United States. All questions of policy relating to them have a bearing so direct upon the rights and interests of the United States that they cannot be left to the disposal of European Powers animated and directed exclusively by European principles and interests."

The United States, beginning with the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France in 1801 and the apprehended transfer of Florida from Spain to some other European Power in 1811, has

steadily opposed any European acquisition of American territory which as a European colony might prove dangerous to American peace and security. The Monroe Doctrine, based upon this principle, has been preeminently a doctrine of peace—especially secured by freeing the Americans from the contests of European diplomacy and politics. In 1905, President Roosevelt said the doctrine as gradually developed and applied to meet changing needs and conditions, and as accepted by other nations, was one of the most effective instruments for peace in the western hemisphere.

Although its policy was based on self interest, the American government under Monroe gave proper consideration to the interests of Latin America. Although in recognizing the independence of Spanish American countries, it had issued a declaration of neutrality, Secretary Adams later (October, 1823), informed the Russian minister that this declaration "had been made under the observance of like neutrality by all the European Powers" and might be changed by change of circumstances. The Monroe Doctrine which followed was directly caused by the belief in the right of free peoples to determine their destinies—and by it the United States, with unusual courage, became a protector of liberty and self government in the western hemisphere. Its high purpose and convenient usefulness was properly recognized at the time by the weak Latin-American republics. It was the outgrowth of the sympathy felt for Latin-American peoples who were struggling to free themselves from conditions imposed by European politics and who had been recognized as independent nations by the United States. Monroe, who previously as secretary of state was familiar with Latin-American conditions, at first contemplated a bold stand to prevent European interference in Spain itself. After the decision to limit the scope of active opposition to the threatened European intervention in American affairs, he appointed a special secret representative to visit Europe, to watch the operations of European congresses and to furnish reports as a basis of determination of American policy. Luckily he was successful in blocking intervention without resort to more active measures.

The Doctrine has prevented the partition of Latin America, and without any request of remuneration for the service rendered. Its unselfish purpose and unusual daring, in face of what seemed

a serious peril, gave it a well deserved popularity in the United States and in Latin-American countries—many of which have in many instances since endeavored to secure treaty stipulations based upon its principles, or have invited the United States actively to intervene to protect them from the apprehended intervention of European Powers or from despots who might prepare the way for European intervention.

In spite of apparent lapses of consistency, illustrated in the case of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (which was supported as a measure which was expected to free an important part of the continent from European intervention), the basic principles of the Doctrine, interpreted with proper elasticity to meet changing conditions, were asserted with success in other later cases. The most notable cases were the termination of French intervention in Mexico in 1867, and the settlement of the Venezuelan boundary dispute with England in 1895-96—after the famous Cleveland-Olney interpretation which resulted in a triumph of the American demand for arbitration, awakened the entire world to the modern meaning of the “menaces of Monroe,” and caused someone to regard the Doctrine as an international impertinence. Although originally a mere declaration of Monroe, nobody since the action of the United States in the Venezuelan affair can surely say it has never had the sanction of Congress.

The Doctrine, although based primarily upon the right of Latin American states to govern themselves, has been sometimes erroneously regarded as a doctrine of American expansion. It is not based on territorial conquest—although over half a century ago it was sometimes associated with that idea. It expresses a duty and a sympathy toward Latin America and not a desire for territory. Americans, who logically in their early history established their boundaries on the gulf, for a half century have not been inclined to encroach upon the territories of their neighbors.

It is true that much Latin-American suspicion of American territorial designs was justified in the decade before the American Civil War, when under the influence of American leaders of the southern states, the shibboleth of “Manifest Destiny” was added to the doctrine of national security. In January, 1855, Marcoleta of the Nicaragua legation protested against the projects of the self-styled “Central American Land and Mining Company” to

encourage immigration to Central America, and especially against the nature of the "schemes devised against Central America by these modern Phoenicians who assume military titles . . . and grasp the sword and musket instead of the ploughshare and ax and shepherd's crook, thinking to make conquest of the golden fleece which they believe to be hung and secreted amidst the briars, forests, thickets and swamps . . . under the by no means attractive and seductive influence of a pestiferous and fever-giving atmosphere." Suspicion was doubtless increased in 1856 by plans for an American protectorate over the Isthmus of Panama, formulated in a treaty (between the United States and New Granada) whose ratification was prevented by a change of administration in the United States and a revolution in New Granada. These suspicions were prominent in producing the project of a Latin-American Confederacy of 1856—a proposed alliance which was regarded as antagonistic to the United States, and which caused Dana, the American minister to Bolivia, to propose to the Buchanan administration early in 1857 a clear statement of American foreign policy based upon the Monroe Doctrine, non-expansion in Latin America, and treaties of alliance with the Latin-American states, in order to sustain self-government in both Americas. In 1858, in connection with the policy of the American government to secure a neutral transit route across Central America, Nicaragua issued a manifesto against apprehended filibustering expeditions from the United States, and by demanding a European protectorate indicated a line of policy which Secretary Cass promptly warned her that the United States had long opposed and would resist by all means in her power, for reasons "founded on the political circumstances of the American continent which has interests of its own."

It is true that, after the Gadsden purchase, persistent efforts were made under the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, not only to extend American influence and domain in the West Indies, but also to solve the Mexican problem by additional reduction of Mexican territory—or by the establishment of an American protectorate which was expected to result in new acquisitions to the stronger country. These efforts, largely based on the danger of European influence and apprehended European intervention in Mexico, closed with the beginning of the Ameri-

can Civil War and with the arrival of the long-predicted European intervention in Mexico.

Under Seward, the American government sought only to preserve Mexico from the Confederates and from permanent European occupation, and the American senate refused to enter into any arrangement by which a proposed mortgage on lands of Mexico might have resulted in new annexations. Later, although Mexico feared American expansion toward the southwest and hesitated to cooperate in the construction of railroads across the international boundary, the United States government remained true to the assurances of Seward in Mexico after the expulsion of Maximilian. It sought no acquisition of territory in Mexico; and much less did it desire territory in Latin America farther south, except in connection with the later projects for the construction of the interoceanic canal whose benefits would be shared by Latin America and the entire world.

The part taken by the United States in Cuba and in the Venezuelan controversy with the European allies has revealed to Latin America the true feeling of the government of the United States. It has shown them that the mother republic is sincerely and earnestly interested in the success of republican government throughout this hemisphere. It has shown that the purpose of the older republic in relations with Latin America is not one of conquest, but one of sympathy, cooperation, and assistance. The true policy of the American government since the Civil War was recently expressed by Secretary Root, and more recently by President Wilson in his Mobile speech.

The idea of an American interoceanic-isthmian canal, which possibly was considered as a minor factor in producing the original declaration of Monroe, was later a prominent factor in causing the United States government to assert a status of "paramount interest," which is now emphasized as a cardinal point of American foreign policy growing from the basic principle of the policy of Monroe and Adams. Seward steadily acting under the doctrine of the larger influence and interest of the United States in American affairs, in 1864 began to assert it in a series of negotiations and treaties with Central America and Colombia in regard to the proposed isthmian canal. His successor, under Grant's administration, hopefully expecting the future "voluntary de-

parture of European government from this continent and the adjacent islands," in 1870-77 favored the acquisition of San Domingo, as a measure of national protection to prevent the apprehended danger of its control as a possession or a protectorate of a European Power, and to secure a "just claim to a controlling influence" over the future commercial traffic across the isthmus. Later, he endeavored to negotiate with Colombia a treaty by which he sought for the United States a greater privileged status and more extensive rights of intervention on the isthmus—a treaty which Colombia refused to ratify. In 1880, Secretary Evarts asserted the doctrine of American "paramount interest" in projects of interoceanic canal communication across the isthmus, and the right to be a principal party to any political arrangements affecting this American question. This doctrine received new meaning in 1881 after the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain which already owned a controlling majority of the stock of the Suez Canal, and again after the events of the American intervention in Cuba which brought new opportunities, new duties and new responsibilities to the United States. The construction of the canal under American control was the logical conclusion of a long series of events; and the wisdom of the diplomacy and policy which seized opportunity by the forelock, and terminated the long period of discussion and delay, can safely be submitted to the test of time.

Although changed conditions in both hemispheres, and of motive power on the ocean, have modified the earlier meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, and may still further modify it, its main basic principle for America has not been abandoned. This principle is not obsolete. It has been retained on the broad ground of national welfare, in spite of the defects in Latin American governments so frequently resulting in troubles due to unpaid claims; and European Powers have recently shown a readiness to accept it at the Hague Conference and in connection with the Venezuelan debt question of 1902. The latter incident, according to leaders in England, gave the Monroe Doctrine an immensely increased authority. Mr. Balfour, approving the American policy, suggested that the United States should more actively enter into an arrangement by which constantly-occurring difficulties between European Powers and certain states in Latin America could be avoided.

Unless we have reached the conclusion that all Latin America might be better under European control, and that this control would not seriously threaten the peace and permanent interests of the United States, at least one important principle of the Doctrine should still be retained as a fundamental part of American foreign policy. Under whatever name, and however modified to suit the conditions and needs of American foreign policy, it is still a useful principle. It may fitly be called the doctrine of national defense, which in its results may be regarded also as a doctrine of Pan-American defense. In America the United States government has duties and responsibilities which can not be abandoned to the mercy of trans-oceanic powers, nor submitted to the decision of international conferences or tribunals. It must attend to the larger interests of the United States—without any unnecessary interference with the larger interests of other powers. Certainly, in Mexico at present, the United States has a larger interest than that of any European Power. She has a far greater interest than any other power in the restoration of peace and the establishment of a government that has proper basis or permanency in its method of selection and in its policies for adjustment of problems that press for solution. Peace in America, on the basis of good government, is more important to the United States than it is to Europe, and more important to the United States than peace in Europe.

The present basis of policy is the paramount interest of the United States in American affairs—a special interest which, especially in the Caribbean, can be shared with no other power, and perhaps would be questioned by no European Power. After the war for the relief of the Cuban situation in 1898—a war which made the United States an Asiatic power and brought it in contact with European politics in the far East—American paramount interests in the West Indies, and in the Caribbean, were greatly increased and especially found expression in the messages of President Roosevelt and in various acts of the American government—including the construction of the Panama Canal which has clearly increased the importance of maintaining around the Caribbean the American policy against the interference of European Powers. In this region the United States has duties and responsibilities which it may not willingly share with any European Power.

Farther south, the assertion and maintenance of the doctrine of non-intervention has been rendered less necessary by the growth of several more perfect, orderly and stable governments, which themselves are the best guarantors of the Doctrine. The larger Latin American republics, in which governments have reached sure bases of permanence, may properly be invited by the United States to cooperate or participate in the consideration of mutual larger interests in America, and to share the responsibilities incident to the American principle of defense of American nationalities. Doubtless by such a continental extension of the means of safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American neighbors through the sobering effect of actual responsibility would cease to misinterpret the motives of the mother republic in the Caribbean and on the Isthmus.

Whether we admit Olney's declaration that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent," it seems clear that as a result of its geographic situation it has a "paramount interest" in the western hemisphere which imposes certain rules of policy toward Latin-American neighbors—especially toward those in the Caribbean and round its shores. This doctrine was at the basis of the Cuban intervention, of the construction of the Panama canal under American control, of the declaration of policy to Germany in connection with the blockade of Venezuelan ports, of the policy in Santo Domingo, of the recent policy in Nicaragua, and of the present Mexican policy. The essential idea is to prevent the danger of European intervention which might result in the acquisition of territory.

North American Review. 176: 185-99. February, 1903

Monroe Doctrine—Its Origin and Import. William L. Scruggs

It has been said that the Monroe Doctrine, even as thus limited and understood, has never received the assent of Europe, nor even the sanction of our own Congress; consequently, that it has no legal validity. It seems to me that such an assumption, totally unsupported as it is by either fact or law, scarcely needs refutation. Even if the facts were as alleged, they would not warrant the conclusion drawn from them. But since the facts are not as alleged, the conclusion is doubly erroneous.

As a matter of fact, there has never been a formal protest against the Monroe Doctrine by any European Power. On the contrary, all have passively acquiesced in it for nearly a whole century, and passive acquiescence is tantamount to assent. And, whilst our national legislature has never specifically, and in so many words, reaffirmed it, that body has many times either taken its validity for granted or constructively affirmed it. Every resolution or other measure bearing upon it that has ever been introduced into either House of Congress, has been in support of it; never has there been one against it. That of 1824, by Mr. Clay, was never called up, because, under the change of circumstances which soon followed, the measure was deemed superfluous. That of 1864, which passed both Houses without a dissenting vote, took the validity of the Monroe Doctrine for granted, and resulted, as everybody knows, in the almost immediate evacuation of Mexico by the French. That of 1879 was never reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs—possibly because the occasion for it had already passed. That of 1880 was unanimously sustained by the Foreign Affairs Committee, but the session closed before it could be acted upon. That of 1895-6, in relation to the Anglo-Venezuelan question, passed both Houses without a dissenting voice, and led to the settlement of the dispute by arbitration.

The Resolution of 1826, relative to the proposed Panama Congress, constitutes no exception. In the first place, it was not germane to the case at all. Its passage turned upon totally different issues, as is manifest from the very words of the Resolution itself. It merely expressed the opinion that the United States ought not, under the then existing circumstances, to be represented in that particular conference "except in a purely diplomatic character;" that we ought not, at that particular time, to form "any alliance with all or any of the Spanish-American states," but be left free to act, in any crisis that might arise, in "such manner as our feelings of friendship towards our sister republics and our own honor and traditional policy may at the time dictate." In the next place, viewed at this distance of time, it is easy to see just why that Congress failed. Not the Monroe Doctrine, but Negro Slavery was the rock on which it was wrecked. One of the questions proposed for discussion by the Congress was "the consideration of means to be adopted for the

entire abolition of the African slave trade." Cuba and Porto Rico, then slave-holding provinces of Spain, were certain to be made subjects of discussion; Hayti, already a Negro republic, would be represented; and there were then over four millions of negro slaves in the United States, right of property in which was guaranteed by our fundamental law. Here, then, was an awkward dilemma to be avoided; and in avoiding it—in yielding to the necessity of preserving a class of vested interests in our slave-holding States—we lost the opportunity of giving permanent direction to the political and commercial connections of the newly enfranchised South-American republics, and the bulk of their trade passed into other hands. But the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were not, in any manner, abridged or modified thereby.

Again, it has been said that the so-called "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," of 1850, was a material modification, if not a virtual abandonment, of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. That that compact was a monumental diplomatic blunder, cannot be denied. Even British statesmen could not conceal their amazement at our short-sightedness in entering into such a one-sided agreement. It kept us on the stool of repentance for nearly half a century. But there were no circumstances connected with its negotiation, nor anything in the Treaty itself as ratified by the Senate, to warrant an inference that it contemplated the abandonment, or even a modification, of the Monroe Doctrine. The primary object was to obtain from Great Britain a solemn pledge never to attempt to colonize any alleged "unoccupied" portions of Central America. The secondary object was to stimulate investment of foreign capital in a great American enterprise, at a time when capital for such purposes was difficult to obtain. The blunder consisted in overlooking a covert (and perhaps doubtful) recognition of a British colony already illegally established in Central America. But aside from this, and the incautious "agreement to agree" (in Article VIII) relative to the control and management of some possible future isthmian canal, the Treaty could not be construed as, in any way, derogatory of the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, the Treaty itself, as finally proclaimed, was of very doubtful legality. It lacked the Senate's concurrence in Mr. Clayton's incautious assent to certain written constructions of it by the British Government, presented for the

first time at the exchange of ratifications, which materially altered its meaning as understood by the slender majority of Senators who had ratified it. It never had much real vitality, even before our Government formally denounced it in 1881; it had still less after England abandoned her pretended "Protectorate" in Nicaragua, fourteen years later; and it has now happily ceased to have even a nominal existence.

Strangely enough, the intervention by the United States in the Anglo-Venezuelan case, in 1895-6, already alluded to, has been cited as an instance in which we disregarded the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The contention is that, since the controversy was over a disputed divisional line between a long established and duly recognized European colony and a free American state, our interests were in nowise involved; and that our interposition, contrary to the expressed wish of one of the parties to the dispute, even with the laudable purpose of bringing it to friendly arbitration, was at once a violation of our traditional policy of neutrality and of our pledge not to interfere with European colonies "already established." But this is a total misconception of the facts in the case, as well as of the real principles involved. The important feature of that controversy was, England's assertion of right to extend the area of her colony in Guiana over adjacent "unoccupied territory;" for she claimed sovereignty in virtue of alleged "British settlements" made as late as 1881, and she furthermore claimed eminent domain, even beyond those "settlements," in virtue of alleged "treaties made with the native Indian tribes." It needs no argument to show that both of these contentions were wholly untenable—one being a palpable violation of a well settled principle of international law, the other being in open defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. If either of them were once conceded with respect to a particular region in South America, it would have to apply to others; and, if applied to South America in general, it would have to be admitted with respect to North America as well. It was precisely this covert, but ever present, feature of the case which gave it such international importance. Hence, so far from being a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, our interposition was directly and affirmatively in support of it.

Nor was that interposition an attempt to "expand" the Monroe Doctrine, as has been thoughtlessly charged. England had seized

and forfeited whole districts hitherto acknowledged to be Venezuelan territory. She had done this in defiance of repeated remonstrances and formal protests; and had persistently refused to evacuate those places, or to submit her claim of title to impartial arbitration. Under such circumstances, her acquisition involved either an act of war or an act of piracy; and, in either case, it was as much a violation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as if those districts had been seized by British troops or covered by British guns. The situation, therefore, presented one of two alternatives—either the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, or its total abandonment.

Finally, as every one knows, or is presumed to know, the great body of what we call international law, like that of the English common law, is made up of precedent sanctioned by usage. In its last analysis, it is, as Lord Chief-Justice Russell once aptly expressed it, "little more than crystallized public opinion." And I think it has been sufficiently shown that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are precedents as old as our Government itself. They have been sanctified by unbroken usage, and have given direction to our foreign policy for more than a century. Every one of our Presidents, from the first to the present, who has ever had occasion to refer to it, has specifically reaffirmed it. Every one of the Latin-American republics has, at one time or another, and in some form or other, affirmatively supported it. Not one of the European Powers has ever entered formal protest against it; on the contrary, all have acquiesced in it, and thus tacitly assented to it. It is, therefore, a valid part of the public law of this continent; and until abandoned by us, or until formally challenged by Europe, or until modified or abrogated by public treaty, it will continue to be recognized as part of the modern international code of the Christian world.

Outlook. 70: 371-4. February 8, 1902

Moral Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. Edward Stanwood

The Monroe Doctrine is the one political principle which has been and is accepted by American statesmen of every party. Every President in whose administrative term any question involving the principle has arisen has repeated, enforced, and if

necessary extended the Doctrine, and has been applauded by his political opponents for so doing. There seems at present no reason to anticipate a change of view on the part of any considerable number of influential public men. Nevertheless, the occasions for maintaining the Doctrine, and for making a semi-warlike demonstration in enforcing it have lately been frequent. To one who reasons from the occurrences in Africa and Asia to what may take place in South America, large possibilities loom up in the not distant future. Should it become necessary for this Government not only to make a display of force, but also to use force to uphold the Doctrine, we may be sure that timid and ultraconservative men will seek reasons for abandoning the time-honored principle. In the search they will be assisted by those who carry to the extreme logical limit the principles denominated by its adherents anti-imperialism. They hold—an anonymous writer lately published the opinions—that the Monroe Doctrine is a chip on the shoulder of a bully; that it has no foundation in international law or equity; that we are in no danger of foreign aggression; that our interference is unwelcome to those in whose behalf it is made; and that the Doctrine menaces seriously the peace and prosperity of the world.

It seems worth while to anticipate a discussion that is likely to arise, and to consider if objections of the class just noted are fair and sound; in other words, leaving out of sight altogether the question of the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to our National security, to examine the moral basis of the doctrine. We are not to inquire whether or not any vestige of the original reasons for promulgating the Doctrine still remains, nor whether or how far the Doctrine has been modified in the course of time. All that concerns us is to know if the Doctrine in its present form and in its modern application represents a policy that can be defended as one justifies his individual conduct toward his neighbors, a policy that makes for the peace of the world, a policy that conduces to the independence of the nations affected by it, a policy that is generous, humane, and benevolent on the part of the Government which maintains it—or the contrary.

One answer of these questions is furnished by history. This Government has upheld the Doctrine for eighty years, and has asserted it on many occasions. In one case of its application it frustrated the attempt of the Emperor of the French to wrest the

Government of Mexico from the inhabitants of the country, and to set up an empire as the next-door neighbor of the United States. On another occasion it protected Venezuela from a forcible annexation of territory by Great Britain, and secured for it a peaceable hearing before a duly constituted tribunal. When De Lesseps's scheme for constructing the Panama Canal was about to be put in force, so mildly disposed and peace-loving a President as Rutherford B. Hayes sent a message to the Senate in which he took the ground that the smallest measure of political control or protection of the proposed canal by "any European Power or any combination of European Powers" was inadmissible; and his Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, secured from the French Government a disclaimer of any attempt to give the enterprise support, either direct or indirect. Still later the action of the American navy in preventing a blockade of the port of Rio de Janeiro broke up a plot, to which the commanders of several European squadrons were consenting, to restore the imperial government of Brazil.

These are the most conspicuous, but by no means all, of the occasions when the United States has acted upon the Monroe Doctrine. In every case, not only in those mentioned but in every other, this Government has intervened not to destroy but to preserve the sovereignty of the weak members of the American family of republics. It has never exacted or claimed a penny of indemnity, nor has it ever asked or taken an inch of territory from any country whose sovereignty it has defended.

If all or any of the acts were acts of a bully among nations, then our dictionaries must be revised. The bully threatens and terrorizes those who are weaker than himself. Our Government in every case has taken the side of the weaker party against the stronger and has brought the schemes of the bully to naught. It has sometimes refused to interfere for the protection of the Spanish-American republics any further than it has lately signified its intention to do in the case of Venezuela. A debt is justly due to Germany; Venezuela ought to pay; this Government declines to ask more from Germany than that it refrain from exacting territorial indemnity. The present dictator of Venezuela is extremely unfriendly to the United States, and has taken especial pains to let his unfriendliness be known. Yet our Government not only overlooks his childish hostility, but seeks

and obtains from his powerful adversary an agreement not to overthrow the sovereignty nor to encroach on the territory of Venezuela.

We may answer our questions in another way quite as convincingly—although what would have happened in other circumstances can never be known so certainly as what has happened. During the last twenty years substantially the whole of the continent of Africa has been partitioned among the Powers of Europe. France picked a quarrel with Madagascar and took the whole of that island to redress its grievances. It found another cause of complaint, or rather a series of them, in southern Asia; and has Annam, Cochin-China, and Tonking as a reward of its activity in pressing its complaints. Germany, England, and Russia enjoy the possession of slices of China to soothe and heal the wounds inflicted by the warlike and aggressive Chinese. If there are any islands in the Pacific that have not been annexed by the colonizing countries of Europe, information regarding them will be thankfully received and suitably rewarded at London, Paris, or Berlin.

During the time all this appropriation of territory in every other part of the world has been going on, the continents of America have been wholly free from the exploits of European enterprise against native governments. Was it because Central and South America offer less enticing fields for such enterprises? By no means. There is not on the globe a region not already controlled by Great Britain of more importance to the Government which enjoys the sea-power of the world than the strip of territory between Mexico and Venezuela. The colonization of Germans in southern Brazil and northern Argentina—in a country abounding in resources and opportunities—is more than suggestive of aspirations that might be realized were there no other obstacle than native governments to be overcome. In the event of a beginning of the partition of South America, who can doubt that France and perhaps Italy would demand and receive a share of the territory?

But, says an objector at this point, the world, would be better and civilization would be advanced if we were to withdraw our pretensions and to allow Great Britain and Germany and the other countries to enter Central and South America and develop the country. Would it be right, then, for the European Powers

to brush aside the native governments and annex all that is worth annexing? Of course not, replies our objector; but it is not for us to say them nay. This position means that although we hold to the principle that the independent sovereignty of a nation and its right to self-government should be inviolable, we have a moral right to stand by, indifferent spectators, while both are being destroyed. The United States is the only country that can defend those countries from aggression, the only one that is disposed to do so. If the duty rests anywhere, it rests here.

Moreover, the suggestion that the progress of civilization which might—and might not—result from an abandonment of the republics to their fate excuses us from the duty of protecting them raises the question whether it would be excusable to remain passive if a government—say that of China, to put an extreme case—were to assail Mexico. Again, if Great Britain is to be justified in seizing Colombia on the ground that it would give the Isthmian republic better government, how can the acceptance of the Philippine Islands from Spain be regarded as criminal, unless it be held that this country is incapable of improving upon Spanish administration or Filipino self-government? Any argument founded upon the ability of European Governments to ameliorate the condition of the South American nations involves the person who uses it in inextricable difficulties and inconsistencies.

In point of fact, no such consideration can enter into the argument. It is not disputed by any one that the Governments of Central and South America are justly established. It is universally admitted that the people of those countries have a right to preserve or to modify or to overthrow their governments. The Monroe Doctrine forbids that right to foreign powers across the seas. It is not for us to decide that Great Britain or Germany might make the world better, or that Spain might make the world worse, by taking over one or more of the turbulent republics; and that we should interfere or not interfere, according to our judgments as to the respective merits of governments having designs upon them. Our policy must be a consistent one—of interference or of non-interference.

But has this country a right to constitute itself the guardian of these republics? and if so, how has it arisen? We may answer that, so far as it exists, it has arisen in the same way that

all civil government has been evolved from original chaos. It all rests ultimately upon an original usurpation. In the primitive community every individual enjoys absolute freedom, but only on condition that he is strong enough to maintain it. Cain kills Abel, and asks with all the candor when he is questioned about the matter, "Am I my brother's keeper?" In order to put an end to anarchy—a condition in which the rights of any individual are secure only so far as the individual is able to beat down the neighbor who covets his possessions—the strong man assumes power; he is gradually aided by others who adopt his view that anarchy should be replaced by order; civil government is organized, and the new situation is liberty regulated by law.

The primitive situation has prevailed and to a certain extent still prevails, in respect of national governments. International law, concert of powers, arbitration tribunals, and the like are much more difficult to establish than civil government over communities. But are we so sure of that? Who knows how many centuries of absolute lawlessness elapsed, after man appeared on the earth, before the beginning of civil government? We do know that two centuries have not passed since the first principles of international law began, not to be enunciated, but to be accepted, by so-called enlightened governments. Before that time each and every sovereign nation was a law unto itself. Out of the disorder and lawlessness a semblance of international government has been evolved. Nations recognize the binding force of certain rules, some of which have the sanction of general and formal agreement. In some cases—as, for example, in 1878, after the war between Russia and Turkey—two sovereign combatants have not been allowed to arrange terms of peace, but have been forced—morally, if not physically—to accept a settlement proposed by a council of powers. Thus, gradually, a system among nations corresponding to civil government is establishing itself. It, also, had its origin in usurpation; but as man becomes better, his international agreements have a deeper foundation in his moral nature; his international laws are more and more conceived with a view to securing the individual rights of nations great and small, and to preventing a resort to the *duello* method of settling disputes; and the authority of international opinion is strengthened.

Annals of the American Academy. 54:20-7. July, 1914**Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine. Colby N. Chester**

The Monroe Doctrine is the cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the United States. It has been so construed for nearly one hundred years of our national history, and it so remains to-day, in spite of some statements that have been made to the contrary. "It is," as Jefferson said, "the offspring of the American revolution and the most momentous question offered to my contemplation since the Independence." When promulgating the doctrine as the basis of our foreign policy, President Monroe said in his message to Congress, December 2, 1823:

It is impossible that the allied Powers (of Europe) should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

Two distinct and far reaching principles are laid down in the Monroe Doctrine. The first is the principle of "self-defense." Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and it is the first law of nations. In the case of the United States the national defense required, when the doctrine was enunciated, that the country should hold a protectorate throughout the entire western continent. The second principle is that South American republics, which followed our lead in declaring their independence, should have our protection in maintaining this doctrine for themselves. As Secretary Bayard once said: "The United States proclaimed themselves the protector of the western world in which she was the strongest Power," as "it was manifest," said his successor Mr. Olney, "that it was the only power on this hemisphere capable of enforcing the doctrine."

The first principle of the Monroe Doctrine—self-preservation—is axiomatic and immutable, and all other considerations must give way to it. The second principle, like the constitution of a country, is amenable to changes or amendments that will bring it into accord with new conditions that may arise in the country. The question now is, therefore, do the same conditions prevail

on the western continent today, that existed at the time President Monroe sent his message to Congress in 1823?

There have been so many different interpretations placed upon the Monroe Doctrine, by theorists and others, who know but little of its practical applications, that it is necessary to recall a little of its history in order to obtain a clear understanding of the subject. In the early twenties of the last century, the whole of Europe became alarmed at the unsettled political outlook caused by the American and French revolutions, which had shaken every throne on the continent, and bid fair to undermine monarchical government. Three of the Great Powers, Russia Prussia and France (once again a kingdom), then formed what is known as the "Holy Alliance," on account of their common religious affiliation, for the purpose of staying the tide of freedom which threatened to overwhelm them. They then prepared to recapture the South and Central American republics, which had recently severed their connection with Spain, and make them appendages to European monarchies. England was, at the time, the only constitutionally governed country in Europe, and fearing that the "balance of power" between the European states might again be disturbed by such a combination, she, with no desire to promote republican institutions, however, proposed an alliance with the United States. Naturally neither country could harmonize its views on such a matter, and no political combination was formed, but an understanding was reached that England would not interfere with any action that America might take in the matter, thus giving her quasi approval to the message sent to Congress by President Monroe. Had it become necessary for the United States to take any overt action, at that time, in support of the Monroe Doctrine, this country would have had the moral support at least of the British government; but we now could hope for no aid from that country, and it is doubtful, indeed, if we could count on the approval of the Latin Americans, for whom, more than for ourselves, the doctrine was established, unless we harmonize some of our conflicting interests with them.

We should not fail to remember that the South American republics were in their infancy at the time the Monroe Doctrine was declared, and were struggling for freedom against great odds. The United States proclaimed herself the protector of the

western world as a matter of necessity, for without her aid the newly formed republics were helpless to battle against the great odds opposing them. The declaration of the Monroe Doctrine constituted, therefore, the most significant and decisive act towards guaranteeing the independence of all the American states that could have been devised. It produced the prompt recognition of the infant republics of South America by the English in 1823, and performed a service for Great Britain herself, of which Canning, the secretary of British foreign affairs, said: "I have brought out a new world in order to reestablish the equilibrium of the old."

The question today, as far as our own national defense is concerned is, would it be a menace to interests centered so far away as the United States, if a European Power, whose political and even religious aspirations may be the same as our own should attempt to acquire territory in Argentina for instance? Such an assault would of course affect the interests of that country, but should the United States attempt to interfere in the matter unless asked by Argentina to aid her in throwing off the menace that assailed her? In case of assisting her we would become her ally, and probably one of many powers that might join with her in resisting the attack. It would seem, now that the continent is cut in twain by the construction of the Panama Canal neutralizing if not destroying the value of the old trade route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans via Cape Horn, that it would have no material effect on the "vital" interests of the United States, if a forcible attempt should be made by some European Power to take one of the Argentine islands, situated at the extreme end of the continent. It is such changed conditions in the political relations with our South American brethren as this, that call for some new arrangements concerning the application of the Monroe Doctrine.

The principle that the affected country had paramount importance in its own affairs, unless they related to interests of a combination of which she was a part, was admitted by President Cleveland, in his celebrated message sent to Congress in 1895, commonly known as the "Venezuela case." In this message he stated (with some logical defect, I think, as far as Venezuela is concerned, as I shall endeavor to show later on), that if that country wished to *sell* any portion of her territory to Great

Britain, she had a perfect right to do so, and the United States had no right to interfere in the matter. This principle might apply to Argentina, at the present time, but such an act of selling a portion of her territory to a European state would not have been tolerated by the United States in 1823, under any circumstances; for Mr. Monroe then said in no uncertain words, that, "any attempt on their part (Europeans) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere (would be) dangerous to our peace and safety."

On account of changed conditions in South America at the present time, there is a growing disposition on the part of some well informed Americans to limit the territorial extent to which the Monroe Doctrine should apply to the states that lie to the northward of the Amazon River; but such a limitation would be met with difficulties surpassing, in my opinion, those we should attempt to escape. By holding a protectorate over this restricted field only, we throw out of consideration all fellowship with the states to the southward of this line of demarcation, at once causing jealousies among the larger and more important of the South American republics, making them enemies of our defensive policy as selfish in its nature, and would most likely tend to add their moral support to our many commercial rivals and antagonists.

Leading statesmen of Brazil and other South American republics have declared that the Monroe Doctrine is discredited in the republics for whose benefit it was devised, not that they do not appreciate the good intentions of the United States, but they deny the right of this nation to appoint itself a guardian over their welfare. A doctrine founded upon the principle laid down by James Monroe, but giving the right of a protectorate to the powers in general and not to any country in particular, would be the ideal doctrine, in the belief of the people of Latin America.

As exemplifying the interests and aspirations of the South Americans in this connection I would relate the following:

On the 15th day of November, 1894, the fifth year of the foundation of the republic of Brazil, in the presence of the representatives of the principal American republics, including the United States, was laid in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the corner stone of a monument to American solidarity. Under this stone this official record lies: "The monument which will be erected on this spot in which this stone is laid, and which will symbolize the political union of the different nations of the continent of Columbus,

will be surmounted by the figure of James Monroe, author of the celebrated doctrine known by his name, which teaches that the nations of the new continent should unite for the purpose of preventing any undue interference of the nations of Europe in the internal affairs of America. Around the principal figure will be grouped the great national liberators of America, Washington, Jefferson, Juarez, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Bolivar, Jose Bonifacio and Benjamin Constant."

I give you this incident and picture to study in contrast with another view depicting the scowling faces of many South Americans, from whom we are just now seeking commercial advantages, who spurn the foreign policy of the United States as it now stands, shun its commercial policy and belittle its domestic policy.

No, it were better in my opinion, to maintain the original jurisdiction of the Monroe Doctrine, but to recognize the fact that many of the twenty other American republics are no longer the weaklings they were when the policy was formulated, unable to defend themselves, but are now strong enough to share in the common defense of the continent, and act in consonance with them in maintaining the political rights of all.

We cannot, however, with propriety form an "alliance," for that word has been tabooed by an unwritten law of the land; but we can engage in an "entente," as foreigners call it, with the republics of South America that will give them a share in the responsibility of maintaining a policy which looks to the general good of all parties concerned.

Let us form then, not an alliance, but a "concert of action" after the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, similar to that established in Europe for the support of the doctrine known, there, as "the balance of power," which will show that all the states interested hold the same opinion regarding this doctrine. The moral effect of such an "entente" will be sufficient to stay the hand of any European nation, which may seek political annexation of American territory.

Aside from all considerations of our own self-interests, should the United States arrogate to herself the right to dictate a policy to the Latin-American states, which concerns their vital interests quite as much as our own, and which they resent as "bossism," now so universally abhorred, and which is belittling to their self-respect? Should we not, on the other hand, urge such powerful nations as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and such others as may

be useful to the cause, whenever they may be able to maintain stable governments for a sufficient length of time to warrant it, to join with us in carrying out a general policy that is of mutual advantage to all republics on the continent? Call this part of our international policy by the name of the Monroe Doctrine, if you will, or by the term "America for the Americans," which will probably better please our confreres in the south, and at the same time be in accord with the general principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

Having made a compact with the South American republics as suggested the United States would be in a better position to devote attention to those matters which more especially affect her interests at home and in nearby states, where foreign aggression would jeopardize its vital interests.

There is a field, in which the interests of the United States as far as they relate to the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine—"self-preservation" are paramount, the protection of which cannot be shared with any other nation. This district comprises the countries lying contiguous or adjacent to our own, bordering on the Caribbean Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. The right of the United States to protect these countries from foreign aggression has been recognized in many ways by European countries, and the protection of "the father of republics" has been called for, and accepted so many times, as to establish this policy of the American government as an inalienable right. Notable instances were when the United States drove the French out of Mexico in 1865, and again when Spain was forced to give up her control in Cuba in 1898.

But aside from the fact that "self-protection," the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine, compels the United States to take cognizance of the political affairs of Mexico, the Central and South American countries bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, we have assumed an obligation here in behalf of the interests of the whole world, that makes it imperative that these countries and seas shall be under the supervision of the United States, and we have also by treaty stipulated that no other country shall share in this protectorate. By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, and the one recently made with Panama confirming its main features, the United States agrees, not only that the American "canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and

of war of all nations," but, guarantees that "the canal shall never be blockaded nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as shall be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder." This is a most sweeping assumption of responsibility, and the fact is the United States cannot protect the world's interests in the Panama Canal, without maintaining naval control of the seas that wash her shores on the south, as well as holding supervision of the foreign relations of the countries bordering on those seas.

The Caribbean Sea holds the base of the American fleet at Guantanamo, Cuba, and its advance base at Culebra, Porto Rico. In fact all the essentials for properly defending the canal lie in the region covered by its waters and those of the Gulf of Mexico. For all military purposes, therefore, these seas must be considered "The greater Panama Canal Zone," and the naval policy of the United States the only guide to perfect peace within their limits.

In defending the continental policy of "America for the Americans" the United States will have ample cause for keeping up an efficient navy, and to protect the seven thousand miles of coast line, including "the greater Panama Canal Zone," she will need every ship that our non-military people will authorize to be constructed.

It has been well said that the Monroe Doctrine is as strong as the navy of the United States, and in view of the fact that our countrymen insist on maintaining but a small navy as compared with those that might be brought against it in combination, our people should avoid creating enemies, who might be tempted, in order to protect their own interests, to form an alliance with more power than we could bring to bear against them. In this connection I would recall the visit of Senator Root to South America in 1906, which, at the time, produced a friendly feeling between the North and South Americans, that lately has been greatly augmented by the forceful presence of his then chief, President Roosevelt, in that country. The sojourn of these two greatest of American statesmen in the South, has done more to cement the ties of fellowship between the two sections of the continent than anything that has occurred in the political lives of its people in many years. Dr. Edward Everett Hale once said of

the first visit, that it was the most important event that had taken place in the history of the country during the first decade of the century, not excepting the peace of Portsmouth, and nothing has yet arisen in the second decade, which, I believe, will have greater influence in strengthening this feeling than the expedition of Colonel Roosevelt to South America. As this last occasion took place at a significantly opportune moment, just before the opening of the Panama Canal, when we are about to inaugurate a new departure in our foreign trade relations, its commercial value is very important.

Let the United States follow up these auspicious visits of our countrymen to the Southland, and, in the words of the Hon. John Barrett, director of the Pan-American Union, 'take advantage of the opening of the Panama Canal, to signalize formally, as it were, the beginning of a new Pan-American era in which the Monroe Doctrine, which represents the dictum of one government in the family of nations, shall evolve into a greater Pan-American doctrine, which shall represent the mutual interest and protection of all.'

It is better to make friends than to build guns.

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Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti.

William A. MacCorkle

A distinguished writer in advocating the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine speaks of it as if all danger to the South and Central American republics was over. Permit a little plain speaking on this subject, for it is sometimes helpful in the great as well as in the small affairs of the world. I believe if it had not been for the promulgation and the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine by this republic, there would not today be on the continent of South America or in Central America a government independent of European control. Let us look at the situation of today throughout the world, and ascertain if there is any change in the desires of the nations since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. The earth hunger of the European countries is fiercer than ever in its history. Their vastly increasing populations demand an enlargement of their national life, and the peoples of

the European governments demand more food and more labor than their countries can furnish. The great new markets of the world are South and Central America, China and some parts of Africa. China has been practically delimited into the spheres of influence by the European and the Japanese governments, and Mongolia has been raped from her bosom. The gaunt breast of Africa has been seized and marked out for their own by the European governments. The whitening bones of Italian, Arab and Turk in Tripoli, the fierce anger of France and Germany only last year over Morocco, the busy colonization plans of Europe in Northern Africa, the strife of the dying Moslem Empire, the seizure and occupation of Egypt by England, and the tremendous conflict between Russia and Japan, which in its last analysis was a conflict for territory, all attest that today the earth hunger is not satiated by the peoples of Europe. I say it solemnly and with all the earnestness with which I can express it, that I believe, were it not for the power of the Monroe Doctrine, within ten years, excepting Argentine, Brazil and Chili, there would not be a free and independent government in South America. Their marvelous natural wealth, their splendor of climate, their richness of flora and fauna, and their wealth of precious metals, would more surely provoke the desire of the European nations than the gaunt, fever stricken and the fierce sunburned wastes of Africa.

Those who feel that the Monroe Doctrine is outworn and that it should be abrogated evidently do not remember very modern history. My meaning is illustrated by one of the great A B C nations of the South American continent. Many of us remember the incident as of yesterday, when the revolution against the republic was inaugurated in Brazil. For the purpose of reestablishing the empire the navy of Brazil was in favor of the overturning of the republic and the restoration of the Braganza family to the head of an imperial Brazilian government. In the harbor of Rio Janeiro was congregated an assembly of the warships of the monarchies of Europe and the Republic of the United States. The commanders of the European squadrons were in sympathy with the revolutionists and unwilling to do anything which would interfere with the plans of the Imperialists. When the Imperialists attempted to establish a blockade, to carry out their plans of revolution, the American commander, acting under the Monroe Doctrine, by direction of our government at Washington, was the

only naval commander who objected, and he cleared for action and forced the admiral commanding the Imperial forces to desist from his purposes. It must be remembered that this was only in 1893, and happened to the great republican government of Brazil, our friend and neighbor.

Let us take another modern and well known application. So late as 1894, the British government attempted to force a situation with Venezuela, which would bring about British control of the Orinoco region and practically shut up in British hands the control of one of the greatest rivers of commerce, a region which has imperial potentialities of trade and commercial life. Had it not been for the strong hand of this government, acting through and under the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine, today an important field of commerce, a vast region of South America, a great portion of an independent republic, and the control of a mighty river would be in the grasp of the British empire.

The question of European interference today is not dead. To every one who reads, there arises the question of the settlement of the position of the great foreign colonies in South America. Every well informed student of public affairs and international matters is looking forward to the time when friction will develop between the home governments of these colonists and the republics within whose territories they live.

Secretary Olney says:

The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the relations of states to each other depend, not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their national life on the part of the Powers with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our civil war to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. They realize that had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the past and may be saved again in the future through the operation of the sure but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. To abandon it, on the other hand, disregarding both the logic of the situation and the facts of our past experience, would be to renounce a policy which has proved both an easy defense against foreign aggression and a prolific source of internal progress and prosperity.

We desire to go in peace and equity with the peoples of this hemisphere, to that consummation where all will be kindness and trust between this republic and our neighbors. Still, the great thought of this republic is that it is best for all to maintain the Monroe Doctrine in all its virility. With our President we expressly disclaim any desire of conquest, nor do we wish any suzerainty or control of the stable nations of this hemisphere. Here is where the correct differentiation is lost sight of in the Latin countries. It is idle to speak of the great nations, stable and orderly as they are, as standing on a level with disorderly, revolution-ridden despotisms, such as have been discussed and which in many instances obtain in Latin America. This great doctrine is fundamentally necessary to the existence of the peace and safety of this country, yet we wish the help and the assistance of the great and stable nations of South America to carry it to its great fruition.

The application of these propositions to the subject under consideration is plain. Whilst this government has no desire for conquest, yet the great advance in the world movement and in the vital commercial affairs of the globe, demands that the peace and safety of this hemisphere shall not be needlessly and wickedly broken, and that the peace, happiness and safety of this nation and the commerce of the world within the bounds of our governmental life shall not be imperiled in the future as they have been in the past. The tremendous impetus, which under the world movements of today, has been so potent and plain, demands order in all of the affairs and details of its life. The conditions of the times and the dependence of one part of the globe upon the other, brought about by the easy interchange between the nations, mean that no disorder in that great world commerce will be again lightly tolerated.

Under the plainest and fairest interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine it reaches easily the subject under discussion. Under its original application it will not allow a situation to obtain which will give the opportunity for foreign nations to interfere in the governmental life of countries of our hemisphere. Under the fundamental meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, it will imperil the peace, safety and happiness of this country if an island, lying at our doors, within touch of our daily life, athwart our greatest line of commerce, shall continue its life of disorder in the future

as it has in the past. This position of our country should breed no distrust among our self-respecting and stable neighbors on this hemisphere. We will go along with them, hand in hand, and with their assistance help the nations which are weak, and do what we can to place them on eternal foundations of freedom, prosperity and order, so that they may become part and parcel of this great free brotherhood on the western hemisphere. A great writer speaks of the abrogation of the doctrine, and voices the distrust and suspicion among the nations of the southern hemisphere. To this we reply with the pages of history, and ask under what government, people, or system, that has ever existed since history began to write its pages, have there been preserved, in their freedom and governmental life, so many weak nations as have existed on this hemisphere, side by side with this powerful republic? He has cited as cause of distrust California and Mexico. These were life movements, absolutely instinctive in their being, and demanded by the very existence of this nation.

Distinguished writers so frequently discuss the jealousy of the South American nations toward the United States by reason of the Monroe Doctrine. One has gone so far as to give in detail the size and strength of South American dreadnoughts, and to deal with immense particularity as to the amount of beef and wheat raised and shipped by these nations.

It is true that some jealousy does exist. That cannot be avoided. The thinking statesmen of the South American countries, however, do not believe in the unjust aggression of the United States. Those of them who know the situation and understand it do not fear the Monroe Doctrine or its consequences. There are professional politicians in South America who fan the embers of distrust for their own uprising and their own purposes, but the great trend of sentiment and thought on the part of the leaders in the great states of South America is not in this direction.

I quote the statement of Señor Zabellos of Argentina, as a fair indication of the thought of those of South America who know the real feeling of our country towards its southern neighbors:

What other countries of America have the same world problems as Panama and Mexico, the latter on the frontier of the United States, and the former the throat of the continent itself? They have nothing in common with the problems of the River Plata, or the shores of Brazil, or the coast of Chili. The Monroe Doctrine is necessary today to the United

States. The Caribbean Sea washes the coast of the richest part of the United States, and it is necessary that it be dominated by them, in order to guarantee the independence and security of the United States. Under these circumstances, when there is constant danger of European intervention, as in the case of Venezuela, the United States said to the Powers, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, "You can urge your claims in accordance with international procedure, but you cannot take territory, because if you do you will have to deal with the armed forces of the United States." The Powers thereupon became less aggressive and the matter was settled by arbitration. This action of the United States emphasized once more the doctrine that no European Power will be permitted to acquire territory on the continent of America.

Thoughtful men do not agree with the contention in 'some directions that the Monroe Doctrine should be enforced under an agreement with South American states. It seems that this would be impracticable. The Monroe Doctrine necessarily is an emergency doctrine. While it is fundamental the demand for its action is immediate and decisive. It is a doctrine which demands absolute and direct action to make it effective. Very many serious questions arise as to the practicability of the carrying out of any such agreement between the states of South America and the United States.

In the first place, the interests of this government are greater than the interests of any other government on this hemisphere. What relative power would this government have as against the other contracting powers? The Monroe Doctrine is a doctrine peculiarly applying to the United States. When this Doctrine is divided, so that it applies to other governments, necessarily the very essence of this Doctrine is done away with.

Again, it has been the history of international affairs, that agreements between nations, diverse in thought, life, sentiment, situation, and race, have never been successful. Here would be an agreement for the enforcement of the Doctrine between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin nations absolutely different in temperament, and also between nations whose whole financial and local situation is absolutely different from that of the United States.

Suppose, for instance, a question should arise between England and some of the South American states, and that the contracting powers for the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine would be the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Those who know the situation in Argentina would not suppose for a

moment that Argentina would oppose England in some controversy as to some minor state, which would be important to the United States, but relatively unimportant to Argentina. This illustration applies with equal force as to the other South American states. The money with which these great states are being developed, and the population which is largely engaged in developing them, come from Europe and Europe could injure these states financially if they opposed European interests in and about the enforcing of the Monroe Doctrine.

This is a mere illustration of the multitude of troubles which would come by an agreement that the Monroe Doctrine should be enforced by a joint action of South American states and the United States. The questions are so absolutely diverse as between the United States and these countries, that no unity of action could be brought about so as to make the enforcement of the doctrine effective. While this is true the Monroe Doctrine should not be enforced with a strong hand, but should be carried out in justice, in courtesy and in fairness between our country and the countries of South America. This honesty and respect obtain among nations just as among men and by the immutable laws of cause and effect, and the action of this government upon a high plane will surely obtain and hold the respect of the countries of South America.

The Monroe Doctrine within its very nature is a doctrine which is fundamental and peculiar to the United States. While it should be carried out in justice, the mode, the time, the place and the manner of its operation should be, and I believe will be, directed and controlled absolutely by the United States. To place it in other hands would be the destruction of the Doctrine, which has been vital to this country and to this hemisphere, and cause the weakening of the hands of this government in the direction where international trade and life will demand that our hands should be strong, and absolutely free to act decisively in the great international emergencies which arise so unexpectedly and which are fraught with such momentous consequences.

The doctrine of Monroe is a doctrine of help and peace. It is true that those who love our country believe that this Republic "looks hopefully to the time when by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and

the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American." Still these governments and their systems are here and are part of the life of this hemisphere. They will surely demand that we preserve order and conserve the safety of the commerce within our sphere. This means absolute order. To bring about this order this government will not hurt the self-respect or pride of any great and stable nations of our hemisphere. We will work with them along the lines of mutual respect and esteem. Touched by the new life, which is making them so vital and important a part of the world affairs of the day, they will understand that the conditions of other days cannot continue, and that the responsibilities brought about by present world conditions demand that our safety and peace, as well as theirs, compel the continued existence of the Monroe Doctrine in its full virility. When this is understood there will be no distrust. There will be the co-mingling of nations with the same governmental freedom. It will be a great brotherhood, and the only one, of free people and free nations marching onward hand in hand to the consummation of that blessed time when the strong will not oppose the weak, and when filled with mutual esteem, confidence and regard, and touched by the wondrous vitalizing life of freedom, the nations of this hemisphere, great and little, Latin and Anglo-Saxon, will show to the world the splendor of freedom in its highest and best development.

Bulletin Pan American Union. 34: 790-800. June, 1912

Notable Pan American Addresses

At the meeting of the American Society of International Law, held on the morning of April 26, Sr. Don Luis Anderson, former minister of foreign affairs of Costa Rica, read a paper dealing with the Monroe Doctrine and its relation to international law.

After briefly reviewing the circumstances which led to the famous declaration of President Monroe in 1823, and quoting the paragraph of his message which was later to constitute the Doctrine bearing his name, Sr. Anderson said: Such an important and solemn declaration, uttered at the most opportune time, was really the last stone to complete the edifice of Spanish-American independence; and until this day it has been the rock against

which have foundered all the different enterprises of reconquest and domination on the part of the countries of the old world. Before this statement the vast projects entertained at Verona by the monarchs united in the Holy Alliance had to hold themselves in check and remain reduced to nothing; and the same fate was later shared by the unfortunate adventures of Mexico, the Chincha Islands, the Dominican Republic, etc.

To avail myself of the happy expression of our illustrious colleague, Don Alejandro Alarez, "the message of President Monroe, although it was not its purpose to declare any principle, nor had anything in view beyond the immediate interests of the United States, yet it formulated with such a precision the international situation of the new world with respect to the old, and synthesized so exactly the aspirations and destinies of all America, that in a certain manner it came to be its gospel."

In fact, the declaration of President Monroe, made under trying circumstances and at the most proper occasion, was for the Iberian Republics of America the fundamental ground for their sovereignty and institutions; for America at large it was, and continues to be, the symbol of continental solidarity which united the English-speaking and the Spanish-speaking peoples, and places the territory and the institutions of every American country sheltered from violence and possible foreign intervention, assuring them their national life as organizations which shall never be disintegrated by any expansionist ambition.

The Monroe Doctrine, so considered and understood, constitutes the corner stone of our existence as political bodies and is in fact one of the cardinal principles of our international life. Proclaimed and maintained in the most energetic way by the United States, but sustained with no less decision and enthusiasm by the other Republics of the continent, each time that the independence and integrity of the Latin American nations have been menaced, the Monroe Doctrine has played an important rôle in the incident and has received a new consecration. Thus it is evident, among other instances, from the declaration of Secretary of State Buchanan in 1848 in regard to the expedition of Flores to Ecuador; the attitude of the United States in regard to the French intervention in Mexico in 1863-1866; the declaration of Secretary of State Seward in regard to the war of Spain with Chile and Peru; the protest of the United States against the

reincorporation by Spain of the island of Santo Domingo in 1881; the declaration of the Government of the United States in view of the conflict over the boundary of Guiana, between England and Venezuela, etc.

It is necessary, therefore, to admit that thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, maintained by the diplomacy of the United States with such ability, energy and constancy, the Latin-American continent has remained until now immune to the colonizing tendency which characterizes the policy of the Great Powers of Europe.

But will this policy of the United States Government be sufficient in coming years to prevent the weak nations of America from attempts at conquest by the strong nations? This is a problem with which we may, perhaps we shall, be confronted in the near future; and logic, as well as the most elementary precaution, teaches us all that we ought to foresee the events, and prepare ourselves to face them, seeking from now on satisfactory solutions to so delicate a situation.

This is not a pessimistic point of view. The social and political conditions of Europe are truly exceptional and critical. The powerful armaments by sea and by land, those great armies which of themselves are a heavy burden on the citizen, against his will turned from the home to serve in the ranks, make necessary the imposition of tremendous taxation, each day more burdensome and oppressive for every class; add to this an overcrowded population, poverty among the working class, together with the socialistic tendencies which advance everywhere with the onrush and persistence of the tides, and which are already beginning to shake the political and social structure, and you shall see how near is the realization of the prophecy of Lord Grey spoken before the House of Commons on the 13th of May of last year: "Rebellion will not come until the taxes oppress directly the classes of society for whom life, even in the better conditions, is a constant struggle. When hunger begins to come by reason of the taxes, and it will arrive sooner or later in every nation if the actual military expenses continue increasing as at present, then a rebellion will be near which will bring an end to this military expense. Such is the end to which the great nations to-day are sinking."

The Governments of the Great Powers of Europe believe they have found in territorial expansion the means, if not to prevent,

at least to delay the danger with which they are confronted; and thus, we have seen them, during the last few years, striving to enlarge at any cost their colonial empire, with a view to transfer beyond the seas their overflow of population without weakening the country by migration, but enlarging their frontiers and acquiring at the same time splendid advantages for their commerce. With no limitations other than those which they themselves have been willing to use against each other as a matter of compensation and equilibrium, the European Powers, while rejoicing at the peace the Continent has enjoyed since 1871, have been bringing war into the regions of Africa, Asia and the Pacific Islands, in order to raise here and there the flag of conqueror.

But this colonial policy has proved nothing more than a momentary remedy, as the disease still exists while the medicine is being used up; the territories appropriated are no longer sufficient, and the Old Continent offers no more land available for colonization. The danger as an ever increasing and threatening wave shows itself again, and the Governments, utterly astounded, realize that the colonial policy in which they expected to find their salvation was no more than a truce.

New fields for the colonizing and adventurous spirit would perhaps be the means of prolonging that truce, to set aside for a longer period the danger which is now imminent. But where are these new fields? It is not difficult to see that the answer should be found on this side of the Atlantic. I read in an important book, written not long ago by Dr. Albert Hale, what follows:

The nations of Europe are crowded and South America offers the only available land on earth into which the surplus can overflow. Who will occupy this virgin soil? When and how, by whom and under what influences, will its productive acres be used for the sustenance of man?

I think that the very Monroe Doctrine would be sufficient to meet the difficulty if only all the American countries, without looking at past events but with eyes cast upon their future destinies, would resolve to carry out the idea of President Monroe in all its logical developments and conclusions according to what the spirit of the times demands. If they unite to proclaim, as they should do, that "conquest shall be hereafter absolutely prescribed from the American continent, binding each and all neither to undertake nor to tolerate conquest of American terri-

tory," the Monroe Doctrine would thus attain its highest consecration, and the bonds uniting the sister republics of the world of Columbus would be made more binding and become real and actual ties of fraternal friendship. That should be the main point and the most important subject before the next Pan American Conference.

NEGATIVE DISCUSSION

Journal of Race Development. 4: 334-58. January, 1914

Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine? Hiram Bingham

"The Monroe Doctrine, or the doctrine of the dual political organization of the nations of the earth, is a barbaric stumbling-block in the way of enlightened international policy." So wrote the late William Graham Sumner, in an essay on "Earth Hunger," in 1897.

At that time, very little attention was paid to his remarks. Professor Sumner had a way of being many years ahead of public opinion in his attitude toward political and economic policies.

During the past few months the number of people who have come to take an unfriendly attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine has very greatly increased. True, this national shibboleth is still a plank in the platforms of our great national parties. In many quarters it is still a rallying cry. A great chain of newspapers, extending from San Francisco to Boston, edited by the most highly paid editorial writer of the day, constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine as something sacred and precious, like the Declaration of Independence. Other powerful newspapers, less popular in their appeal, but no less powerful in their influence, still resent any attack on what is considered by them the most essential feature of our foreign policy. And they continue to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same time they try to explain away its disagreeable features.

A recent editorial in a journal devoted to the interests of the Army and Navy, in vigorously denouncing the present attacks being made on the Monroe Doctrine, and calling loudly on patriotic Americans to see to it that no academic sentimentalists were allowed to weaken our national defenses, declared that without the Monroe Doctrine, we could not hold the Panama Canal!

It would have been just as logical to say that without the Monroe Doctrine we could not hold Hawaii, or Key West, or

Boston harbor. The Panama Canal is one of the possessions of the United States. Its defense is a national right and a national duty. In defending the Panama Canal as in defending Key West or Boston harbor, we have back of us the most universally accepted principles of international law. In upholding the Monroe Doctrine, on the other hand, we are merely upholding what has been believed for many years to be a useful foreign policy, but one that has no standing in international law, and is, in fact, neither law nor doctrine but merely a declaration of policy having to do with our relations with foreign nations.

Consequently, in considering the question as to whether we should abandon the Monroe Doctrine or not, we must first clear our minds of any idea that the maintenance or abandonment of this policy is in any way synonymous with the maintenance or abandonment of our national defenses, be they in Hawaii, Boston harbor, or the Panama Canal. Of course, it is perfectly true that to maintain a vigorous foreign policy and one that is at all unpopular, means the maintenance of an efficient Army and Navy. But without any vigorous foreign policy, we should, at the same time, need an Army and a Navy, and both ought to be efficient for the same reason that every city needs an efficient police force.

In considering the advisability of abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, let us attempt to get clearly in mind exactly what is meant by the Monroe Doctrine. We shall find that at different periods of our history, it has meant very different things. When it was promulgated by President Monroe in 1823, it meant that we were afraid that the rising wave of monarchy and despotism in Europe might overwhelm the struggling republics in the new world. We were, in a sense, in the position of the big brother on the edge of the swimming pool, who sees his little brothers swimming under the water and about to come to the surface; and who also sees a couple of bullies getting ready to duck them before they can get their breath. As a matter of fact, this was the only republic, at that time, that had come to the surface, scrambled on to the bank, and shown itself able to stand on its own legs. The little fellows in Spanish-America were swimming hard, but they had not got their heads above water. We believed it to be for our interests to see that they had a square deal and

were not interfered with as they came to the surface. We promulgated a high-minded, unselfish policy, without a thought of gaining prestige or power in Latin America. We bravely warned the nations of the continent of Europe not to attempt to inflict their system of government on any land in the western hemisphere, where a democratic or republican form of government had established itself.

From such a high-minded and altruistic position as this, it is a far cry to the connotation which goes with the Monroe Doctrine in the minds of many American citizens of today. Our people have been taught by jingoistic politicians, like the heelers of Tammany Hall, to believe that the Monroe Doctrine means that it is our duty to keep America in order; that it is our policy to allow Europe to have nothing to say about the American republics, and that it would be a national disgrace, almost unthinkable, for us to abandon this sacred shibboleth. It was a Tammany Hall orator, according to Professor Hart, who said, "Tammany Hall is a benevolent institution; Tammany Hall is a patriotic institution; Tammany Hall has the honor of being the first to propose that immortal Monroe Doctrine which blesses and revivifies the world."

And it was a former Tammany politician, who, on being questioned in regard to our present policy with Mexico, stated, a few days ago, that under the Monroe Doctrine it was our duty to go in and annex Mexico, and the sooner we did it, the better.

It is a far cry from the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to the Monroeism of our politicians and newspapers at the present day. In 1823, this declaration of foreign policy made a profound impression on Europe, and won us the gratitude and the eulogies of the Latin-American republics. At the present time, there is no question that the Monroe Doctrine is a cause of world-wide irritation and is almost universally hated throughout Latin America. In the words of a careful student of Pan-American affairs, who has lived many years in various parts of Spanish America, "the two principal results of the Monroe Doctrine are: intense hatred of the United States on the part of powerful and self-respecting South American nations, able and willing to meet their responsibilities to the countries to whom they are under obligations; and an attempt at evasion of these responsibilities

by other Latin-American countries, who, while using the Doctrine where they think they can for such a purpose, equally hate the originators of it."

Contrast this with that memorable sentence in Mr. Cleveland's message to Congress regarding the Venezuela boundary dispute, in which he said that the Monroe Doctrine "was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures."

This was quoted by the editor of the New York Times in a recent article in the Century, in which the part played by the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela dispute was carefully brought out. In a recent number of the Times, in an editorial discussion of the present writer's proposal to regard the Monroe Doctrine as obsolete, it was admitted that the Monroe Doctrine was, as a matter of fact, a purely selfish policy. These were the words used:

The Monroe Doctrine was declared by us with reference to our own interests, and is maintained for no other reason. It was not declared with direct regard or thought of the interests of the weaker republics of the continent, and it will be maintained—or abandoned—with more thought of our interests than of theirs.

If that is the ablest defence which can be made for the Doctrine in its present form, it is not surprising that we find so much opposition to it on the part of our southern neighbors. General Reyes, former president of the Republic of Colombia, said recently:

Having for many years closely followed, step by step, the development of the American republics and the convulsions of their ardent and vexed democracies, I am more than ever convinced that unity of action with the United States is necessary to initiate the advent of that glorious future to which they are so manifestly entitled. But that unity of action can only be accomplished by the removal of the causes which have led to the prevailing doubts, jealousies, and suspicions.

In my opinion, the Panama Canal will solve many of the difficulties which owe their existence to the present lack of intercourse between the people of the north and those of the south, but even that beneficial change of conditions will not serve by itself to eradicate the evils of the past. There must be a wider recognition of the fact that the relations of the United States with the Latin republics are those of a friendly, powerful neighbor, with no other objects than the advantages to be gained from the ties of sisterhood and the extension of commerce. There must be a saner propaganda as to the inalienable sovereign rights and complete independence of even the smallest of the Latin States. There must be no "big stick,"

and no such use of the Monroe Doctrine as to make it an instrument of terror to the smaller republics, and a subject for ridicule in the greater countries of the South.

The more advanced Latin nations appreciate and sympathize with the benevolent designs and objects of that doctrine, as is shown by the formulation of their own doctrine, intended to protect the smaller states against the employment of armed force by foreign nations for the collection of contractual debts. *But they resent the spirit of domination and tutelage which implies that they need the protection of the United States against foreign aggression.* (The italics are mine.)

It is easy to understand the cause of such remarks when one calls to mind the thoughtless jingoism of some of our newspapers and the more intelligent selfishness of some of our leading editorial writers.

It would be easy to multiply quotations from North American writers and newspapers which justify the fears and hatred of Latin America. And it would be equally easy to gather many paragraphs from Spanish and French authors to illustrate what forms this distrust and hatred take. I have already called attention to a number of these in the little book just referred to.

Why is it that it is so difficult for us to formulate an answer to the question as to what the Monroe Doctrine really means? Because there are probably no two words in American history which have been more variously interpreted, which have meant more things to more people, and which have been more highly praised by some and more bitterly condemned by others. What is the reason of this confusion?

I believe that the reason is that these two words "Monroe Doctrine" have come to be used by us in place of two other words that are less interesting and less significant, namely, "foreign policy." Our foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. Whatever our foreign policy happens to be for the moment, it is called the "Monroe Doctrine." Do we decide to intervene in Cuba, we do not say that we believe it to be for our best interests as a nation to overstep the bounds of international law and to carry our intervention into a neighboring territory. We wave a banner and call it the Monroe Doctrine. Are we too busy at home to intervene between Spain and Chile when they go to war and when Spain bombards the port of Valparaiso? We declare that the Monroe Doctrine does not mean that we shall interfere in any righteous war. Do we wish to take any part of

Spanish-American territory which we need or which is being badly governed? We refer our actions to the Monroe Doctrine. It is no wonder that Monroeism, as it is called in South America, has come to mean to the Latin-American mind interference, intervention, tutelage and patronizing insolence. This connotation does us infinite harm.

The truth is, instead of facing squarely the question of what is the best foreign policy for us to follow, we cloud our minds with this national shibboleth; we remember that it is nearly one hundred years old; we believe that it has done a great deal of good in keeping Europe from crushing the life out of incipient South American republics; we feel that it is a benevolent institution, and, therefore, we brand whatever selfish or unselfish policy we adopt for the moment with the words "Monroe Doctrine."

It would seem as though for the very sake of clarifying our own ideas and placing our foreign policy on a logical foundation, it would be well for us to abandon a combination of words which stands for so many different things to so many different people.

It can be fairly said that the United States has had as many ideals and has fought for as high ideals as any nation in history. The calm judgment of our foreign critics sometimes is willing to admit that we have been more idealistic than any modern nation. We once shed a vast amount of blood and treasure in order to suppress an economic institution called slavery, largely because it was not our ideal of the right way to progress toward higher things. We went to war with Spain largely for the sake of giving Cuba her freedom, and then, contrary to the belief of most of the world who were looking on, we did not keep Cuba, but gave her independence. Knowing this and other things of a similar nature, we sometimes flatter ourselves that our motives are always correct, and chiefly idealistic. And the worst of it is, we sometimes so blind ourselves with the dazzling spectacle of our unselfishness that we cannot see our selfishness. In the case of Cuba, for instance, we were so pleased with our unselfish sacrifices, that we shut our eyes to the fact that while we were giving Cuba freedom, we were taking Porto Rico and the Philippines and Guam, and a very useful naval base at the east end of Cuba, and putting them in our pockets. The world did not say that the Spanish-American war gave us no reward for our pains.

Before deciding whether we ought to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and considering what ought to be our policy for the future, let us review a few of the more striking features of our foreign policy since 1823.

For twenty years after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, we were regarded with extraordinary friendliness throughout Spanish-America. Our willingness to recognize the independence of the newly-fledged republics; our willingness to protect them from European aggression, and our generous non-interference with them in the time of their greatest weakness, earned us their gratitude. But in 1846 came the war with Mexico, one of those independent republics that we were going to protect. We had stated in the original Monroe Doctrine that it was the true policy of the United States to leave the new governments of Spanish-America to themselves, in the hope that other powers would pursue the same course. And yet, we did not hesitate, at the conclusion of the war with Mexico, to take away from her nearly one half her area. It did not help matters that a year or two later, gold was discovered in California. It did not increase our popularity in Spanish-America when it appeared that we were getting enormously wealthy out of the gold and silver mines in California and Nevada, which we had so recently taken by force from Mexico, even though we had paid \$15,000,000 for what we took. It may be replied that it was far better for California and Nevada that we should have taken them, and that we could afford to stand the unpopularity that this engendered in South America. Granting for the sake of argument that this is true, why not admit frankly that when we took California and Nevada, we went contrary to the principles laid down by President Monroe in his famous message of 1823.

In 1898, we went to war with Spain, and eventually took away all her American possessions. We believed ourselves justified in so doing. I hold no brief against the justification of that war. It was undoubtedly a good thing for Spain. Many Spaniards will admit this today. Their country has been stronger and their economic condition has improved since they lost their foreign possessions. But President Monroe had said that "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere." Is it not perfectly evident that in 1898 we regarded the Monroe Doctrine

as outgrown, and said to ourselves that we could afford to disregard one of the most positive sentences in the original declaration of President Monroe? Why should we still feel that there is something so sacred in this national shibboleth of ours that, although we have repeatedly gone contrary to it when it suited us to do so, we must still cling to it as a precious thing, without which our own independence would be in danger of being lost?

In 1906, Secretary Root made his well-known tour of South America. It has been said that this tour was made necessary owing to the fear of the United States aroused throughout South America, by some of President Roosevelt's message to Congress, in which he took pains to reassert the Monroe Doctrine, and in which he accepted, quite logically, the very great responsibilities which the maintenance of a policy of "America for the Americans" entailed upon us. He had said in 1905:

When we announce a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy, and those consequences from time to time alter. It is out of the question to claim a right and then to shirk the responsibility for its exercise. Not only we, but all American republics who are benefited by the existence of the Doctrine, must recognize the obligations each nation is under as regards foreign peoples no less than its duty to insist upon its own rights.

After the opening of the third session of the Fifty-Eighth Congress, Mr. Roosevelt had said:

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

These official utterances had greatly alarmed and annoyed the South American republics, and it was no small part of Secretary Root's visit to quiet their fears and assure them of the pacific quality of our intentions. So well did Mr. Root do this, so ably had he prepared himself by the study of South American history, so favorable an impression did he make by his dignified and

courteous bearing, and so profound a conviction did his words convey, coming as they did from the actual head of our department of foreign affairs, that great good was accomplished, and an era of friendship and good-will was ushered in.

The most striking effect of this was to be seen in Chile. Owing to a series of misunderstandings, including the blunders of an over-zealous diplomat, the wrong-headed ideas of many American newspapers, and the seeming interference of American warships during the great Chilean civil war of 1891, we had become extremely unpopular in that vigorous republic of the South Pacific. Then had followed the deplorable Baltimore incident, when a number of our sailors on shore leave in the port of Valparaiso, got into trouble with some of the rougher elements of the port, and a few were killed and several more wounded. We had lost our patience with what we termed Chilean dilatory conduct; we took the law into our own hands, and eventually we issued an ultimatum to Chile demanding financial redress. There was nothing for her to do but to grant our request. But the scar was long in healing, and it may fairly be said that we had less cordial friends in Chile than in any other American republic, with the possible exception of Colombia. Mr. Root's visit to South America and his able exposition of our foreign policy, changed the attitude of the Chileans to a very marked degree. They took the first opportunity of showing their change of heart.

The Fourth Latin-American Scientific Congress was due to be held in Santiago in December, 1908. Former congresses of this nature had been held in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The organization committee for the fourth congress was composed entirely of Chileans. They decided that in consequence of the new and friendly attitude of the United States, it would be an appropriate thing to make the Congress not Latin-American, but Pan-American, and to invite the participation of the American government, and of universities and other scientific bodies in the United States. Secretary Root saw the advantages that would accrue to the United States in properly accepting such an invitation. In accordance with his ideas, the United States congress passed a suitable appropriation to send ten delegates from this country to Chile. These delegates were received with the utmost courtesy and given the best of everything. It was with difficulty that they avoided offence in declining a few of the many honors

showered upon them. At the end of the month which they spent in Chile, it is safe to say that the relations between Chile and the United States were more cordial than they had ever been before. Washington was selected as the place of meeting for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress, and October, 1912, was designated as the proper time for it to meet.

It has not met yet. (November, 1913.)

The United States congress was asked by Secretary Knox for a small appropriation of \$50,000, about one-half of what Chile had appropriated for the Scientific Congress, when it had met in Santiago, to provide for the expenses of the Congress that should meet in Washington in October, 1912. Unfortunately, our Congress felt too poor to grant this request, and although the appropriations which were passed footed up somewhere in the neighborhood of one billion dollars, the item of \$50,000 for the Scientific Congress was struck out, and our national obligations to provide for returning the hospitality which we had received, were denied. As the result of a vigorous protest and of public sessions of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the next session of Congress the same amount was again requested and the appropriation of this amount was unanimously recommended by that committee. The passage of the appropriation, however, was lost on some flimsy technicality, and our national honor in regard to the obligations of hospitality still remains under a cloud. Apparently, it is part of our foreign policy to accept invitations to Pan-American congresses, but not to provide suitably for such congresses when they have to meet in this country. As the best-known term for our foreign policy throughout Latin-America is Monroeism, this appears to our neighbors to be one of the attributes of the Monroe Doctrine.

There was another sequel to our relations with Chile even more serious than not providing suitably for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress. By sending an ultimatum demanding the immediate settlement of the Alsop claim, Secretary Knox destroyed in three minutes what Secretary Root had taken three years to build up. The delicate edifice of good-will and friendship with Chile, which had arisen from the ashes of the Baltimore episode, was destroyed because a Secretary of State felt that the claim of a private citizen for \$1,000,000 had been left too long unsettled. This is not the place to go into the details of the

Also claim. Everyone knows that Chile inherited this debt from Bolivia. The claim was recognized, but there was postponement in its settlement. Chile avoided the dire effects of Secretary Knox's ultimatum by depositing \$1,000,000 in the Bank of England, and requesting that the ownership of this sum be decided by the Hague Tribunal. At least, so it was reported in the newspapers. Such matters are too recent to make it wise for the State Department to allow its records to be used as the basis of a thorough history of that episode. But there is no question about the results. The claimant eventually got his money, and we lost the cordial friendship of Chile. In the discussion which followed in the Chilean congress, a speech was made by the aged Senator Vincente Reyes on July 26, 1911. Said Senator Reyes:

It seems to me that no Chilean is to blame for what has taken place; everyone has endeavored, in the rôle that corresponded to him, to further the public interests in the most convenient manner. The fault, the real fault—and it is necessary to declare it publicly, and I can say it better than another because I have no intervention, either in the acts of the government, or in the active political life, from which I am removed by reason of my age, so that in pronouncing my opinion, my own exclusive opinion, I compromise nobody,—I shall say, then, that the fault of all this is owing to the intemperance of the United States government that has made an excessive use of its power, *treating us as barbarous tribes were treated in past times*, imposing on us an ultimatum and giving us ten days in which to perform what that government believed we ought to do.

In the following year, on August 2 of 1912, a resolution was introduced in the senate of the United States by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, which has been regarded throughout Latin-America as a still further extension and interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. It was known as the Magdalena Bay resolution.

This new phase of our foreign policy was, as might be suspected, treated even more vehemently, not only in Latin-America, but also in Europe. In *La Revista de America* for September, 1912, Sir José de Astorga, commented as follows (I give a free translation):

The Monroe Doctrine has just suffered a transformation for the benefit of Yankee imperialism, and for the detriment and diminution of the sovereignty of the Latin-American republics, in the adoption by the Senate at Washington of the Lodge Resolution. . . . This resolution, reduced to its simplest terms, says that in the future the governments of the Ibero-American republics are prohibited from negotiating with any foreign com-

panies for the cession of any lands for the purpose of merely commercial or industrial ends, without the previous consent of the White House. . . . Without entering into any discussion of the motives which, from the Yankee point of view, secured the adoption of the Lodge proposal by a nearly unanimous vote [54 to 4] of the North American Senate, it is perfectly evident that this proposal cannot lean upon the so-called Monroe Doctrine as originally declared, and that, furthermore, it involves a most odious and unwarranted offense against the sovereignty and the independence of the Latin republics of the continent. . . . If the republics which occupy the territory of America to the south of the United States are independent nations, in full enjoyment of their political sovereignty, and have the same title and the same capacity in the family of nations as North America has, then neither the Senate nor the government at Washington has the power to proclaim before the world, as a rule of international conduct applicable to the territories of foreign sovereigns, the Lodge proposal.

Anyhow, the importance of securing concerted movement and unanimity of action among the chancelleries of Latin-America in order to offset the imperialistic action of the United States, is urgent, and is of supreme importance. The protests of confraternity, of disinterestedness, and of respect for the political sovereignty and the commercial independence of Latin-America, which the government of the United States sets forth so freely on every occasion, are not able to counteract nor to lessen the eloquence of deeds, and these are the deeds: tutelage over Cuba; the abduction of Panama; the embargo on the custom houses of Santo Domingo; economic and military intervention in Central America; the "big stick;" dollar diplomacy, and the Lodge declaration.

Here we have the Latin-American judgment on the Monroe Doctrine in a nutshell. We can on occasion make charming speeches. We can claim that our foreign policy is idealistic, and we can point to the Monroe Doctrine as evidence of our willingness to protect the weaker against the stronger. Actions speak louder than words. The fruits of our foreign policy have been the acquisition of more territory and direct interference in the affairs of our neighbors.

One of the questions for us to decide is, whether it is worth while to pretend adherence to a shibboleth which has so often spelt intervention, and which means to our neighbors in the western hemisphere that we consider it our duty to intervene whenever sufficient occasion arises.

How much do we believe in intervention?

One of our most distinguished diplomats and statesmen, the late E. J. Phelps, delivered an address in the city of Brooklyn on March 30, 1896, which dealt with the Monroe Doctrine at a

time when we had been drawn dangerously near to a war with Great Britain over the Venezuela boundary. That distinguished publicist treated our right to interfere in the affairs of other nations in no uncertain terms. The fact that he was selected by President Cleveland as our minister at the Court of St. James, and that he filled that post with marked success, is sufficient excuse for quoting him at the present time, when once again we have a distinguished Democrat at the head of the nation. Said Mr. Phelps:

International law is international morality and justice, formulated by the general consent of civilized men. That is its basis and its sanction. The claim that Americans are in any respect above or beyond this law of the civilized world, or that we are invested with authority to interfere in the affairs of other nations in which we are in no way concerned, merely because the location of the dispute is in South America, are propositions that will find no favor among just or thoughtful men. We have no protectorate over South American nations, and do not assume any responsibility in their behalf. Our own rights there, as elsewhere, it is to be hoped, we shall never fail to maintain. But those rights have their foundation and their limit in the settled law to which we are subject as all other nations are, and which is as necessary to us as to them.

And when we undertake to assert that we are not bound by that law, and care nothing for the opinion of the world; that we are Americans and monarchs of all we survey; and that we are going to control the part of this hemisphere that does not belong to us, regardless of the rights of those to whom it does belong, merely for the sake of doing it, and because we think we are strong enough, we adopt the language of the bully, and shall certainly encounter, if that is persisted in, the bully's retribution.

Surely, with these words ringing in our ears, we do not wish to stand by a policy which can be so construed as as to spell interference and intervention.

It is difficult to exaggerate the present attitude of South America towards the Monroe Doctrine. As late as September 13, 1913, *La Presna*, one of the leading papers of Peru and the principal supporter of the present government, prints in the most conspicuous place in the paper a letter from a Chilean newspaper correspondent in New York. The headlines are as follows: "Studying the Situation in Mexico." The Chilean journalist, Montcalm, speaks from New York. He calls on Latin-America to "unite itself against Yankee imperialism." One of the paragraphs reads: "The United States today controls Cuba, Porto Rico, and Panama. Tomorrow it is going to control Central

America. It has commenced to control Mexico. Who says that it will not continue still further?" The article ends with a spirited plea to the Latin-American republics to help Mexico out of the hole into which she has got herself by her revolutionary civil war.

It its issue of September 15, 1913, in the same conspicuous position under the heading, "The Voice of a Mexican," *La Presna* reprints an article from *La Revista*, of Yucatan, signed by R. De Zayas Enriques, in which he criticises severely our attitude of mentor of the Latin-American republics, and our pretention of being the only arbiter of their fate. He refers to the increasing application of the Monroe Doctrine, which, he says, is already too ample, and refers to the fact that European Powers have always paid better respect to the Doctrine than the American peoples themselves. The whole trend of this two-column article is to arouse feeling against the United States.

Recent travelers in South America, and several of our recently returned diplomats, tell the same story. But perhaps no one has put the situation more clearly than the recent Ambassador from England to the United States. It can hardly be denied that the United States has no better friend than Mr. Bryce. In his "American Commonwealth," he has shown a depth of sympathy and a keenness of appreciation for our institutions which have never been surpassed. His residence in Washington as the British Ambassador increased his already great popularity in this country. His advice is worth heeding, if we heed the advice of our friends at all. In his recent book on South America, he says:

As regards the United States there is a balance between attraction and suspicion. The South Americans desire to be on good terms with her, and their wisest statesmen feel the value of her diplomatic action in trying to preserve peace between those of their republics whose smouldering enmities often threaten to burst into flame. More than once in recent years this value has been tested. On the other hand, as has already been observed, they are jealous of their own dignity, not at all disposed to be patronized, and quick to resent anything bordering on a threat, even when addressed not to themselves, but to some other republic. It is as the disinterested, the absolutely disinterested and unselfish, advocate of peace and good-will, that the United States will have most influence in the western hemisphere, and that influence, gently and tactfully used, may be of incalculable service to mankind.

Surely, this must be our ultimate aim. We do desire to

influence for good the western hemisphere. We are beginning to realize that there are several states in South America that are no longer infant republics. They have grown up. To return to our former metaphor—the little swimmers have got their heads well out of water, and have climbed out and are safely standing on their own legs. They naturally resent any implied assertion on our part that we will protect them from Europe.

If the Monroe Doctrine implies this we-will-protect-you-from-Europe attitude, if it is disagreeable and irritating to those whose friendship is most worth having in the western hemisphere, if, as a matter of fact, we have deliberately broken the Monroe Doctrine whenever it suited us to do so, why should we cling to it so tenderly and so tenaciously any longer? What possible good can it do us? We apparently have a great deal to lose by maintaining it. What have we to gain by pretending to stick to it?

The chief arguments in favor of retaining the Monroe Doctrine appear to be three:

The first is, that the good old Doctrine is ninety years of age; it has survived and flourished nearly a century, and there *must* be *something* in it to have given it such a long life! To such an argument as this, it is only necessary to reply that the same notion was used with even more telling effect against Copernicus, when he declared that the world revolved on its axis. Furthermore, it sounds suspiciously like the defence that we made of slavery in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is an argument that need not be treated seriously.

In the second place, it is claimed that the Monroe Doctrine should be maintained because we have more interests in America than has Europe. "We are remote from Europe; we are close to South America." Therefore, it is natural that we should have more interest than England or Germany in maintaining a benevolent protection over the fortunes of the Latin-American republics. This may be true of the countries in the vicinity of the Caribbean Sea, but it is far from true of the larger republics of South America. Their great cities are geographically nearer Europe than they are to the United States. Their population contains at least a million Italian immigrants, and many hundreds of thousands of Spanish, Portuguese, French, Germans and English. While there are probably fewer French than those of any other nationality, the French actually outnumber the citizens

of the United States who are living in the larger republics. Consequently, if there is any weight whatever in the fact that a nation has interests in a country where its citizens are employed, our interests are less than those of almost any one of the larger European countries. So far as investments are concerned, there is also no question whatever but that Europe has far more of a claim to be directly interested in the present state and future of the South American republics than has the United States. Compared to the hundreds of millions which England has invested in Argentina and Brazil, for instance, our own investments in those countries are ridiculously small. Consequently, this argument falls of its own weight, for to it we can reply that the larger and more important part of South America is nearer in miles, nearer in days of traveling, closer in ties of relationship, and more directly interested in commercial intercourse with Europe than with the United States.

The third argument is that the Monroe Doctrine has done South America a great deal of good in preventing her from being partitioned, as was Africa. Therefore, let us preserve it in all its pristine strength! It is quite true that the Monroe Doctrine undoubtedly protected South America against European aggression during a large part of the nineteenth century, when such aggression might have been fatal to the independence of several South American republics. But such a condition of affairs no longer exists, and if it should arise, that is to say if Germany should attempt to seize part of Brazil, for instance, or if Japan or China should attempt to coerce Peru into receiving undesirable immigrants, the best course for us to pursue would be, not to step forth single-handed as we did in 1823, but to join hands with the leading nations of South America in protecting the new world from the aggression of the old. It is replied by some that this is merely a modification of the Monroe Doctrine. In so far as it aims to accomplish certain results, that is true; in so far as it is promulgated in a different spirit and with a direct recognition of the actual state of our southern neighbors, it is different. Taking into account the extremely unpleasant connotation, in the ears of our southern neighbors, of the word *Monroeism*, we should be in a much stronger position if we would put that word aside, and adopt a new one, such as *Pan-American Defense*,

which shall have for its connotation America for Humanity, and not America for the North Americans.

Having considered the chief arguments for retaining the Monroe Doctrine, let us now briefly sum up the reasons why we should abandon it.* First, the original Monroe Doctrine has been disregarded in several historical instances, notably after our war with Mexico in 1847, after our war with Spain in 1898, and in our dealings with Colombia, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua. Second, owing to the constitutional changes that have taken place in the leading European nations since 1823, there is no danger that, in the words of President Monroe, the allied Powers will "extend their political system to any portion of either continent." The world has advanced since then and the European nations themselves would be the first to object to any one of their number seizing a Latin-American republic, or setting up a monarchy there. Third, several of the South American states, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, having attained their majority are no longer infants, do not need our protection and will make better friends and stronger allies if we cease to hold the Monroe Doctrine as one of the tenets of our political faith. Fourth, their friendship is worth having. They are already building super-dreadnoughts, and, with our more extended frontier, and our outlying ports, such as Panama and Honolulu, we need cordial friends in the western hemisphere, and cannot afford to treat them in such a way as to estrange their sentiments. Fifth, the later form of the Monroe Doctrine, sometimes known as the "Big stick policy," or the "American policeman idea," by which we say to Europe that we cannot allow her to take any active interest in the political affairs of the western hemisphere, and accept the corresponding responsibility to look after her people and her property in the less well established republics, is a policy likely to involve us in tremendous difficulties and possibly in costly wars. It is a policy from which we have nothing to gain, and in which we have everything to lose. It is a policy which is likely to cost us the friendship not only of our American neighbors but, what is really of more importance to us, our European neighbors. Sixth, we should give up the Monroe Doctrine because the premises on which it was founded, and on which it was justified, no longer exist.

Today Europe has more citizens in South America than we have. She has invested a far larger share of her capital in South America than we have. She is bound to South America, not only by these ties of brotherhood and of property, but also by the racial ties which bind together the Latin race.

Geographically, Europe is nearer the chief cities of South America than is the United States; racially, she is closer; practically, she has more business interests there, and more of her sons are living there; and, finally, Europe has no intention of enforcing arbitrary monarchy and despotism on American states any more than we have.

As the premises on which the Monroe Doctrine was based no longer exist, and as the maintenance of our adherence to those words is of harm rather than good to us, it must be evident that the time has arrived for us to abandon this national shibboleth, and to clear the way for a new and logical foreign policy.

If we abandon the Monroe Doctrine, what shall we adopt to take its place? The answer to this question is fairly simple if one is willing to admit that the words "Monroe Doctrine" simply stand for our foreign policy. Under President Monroe, we announced it as our foreign policy to have nothing to do with Europe, and to see to it that Europe had nothing to do with America. We had a kind of splendid isolation. We were separated from Europe by a stormy ocean, which could be crossed only by a painful journey on board small sailing vessels. We promulgated a doctrine intended to keep foreign complications out of our national life, and to enable us to avoid entangling alliances. Today, as was recently said in an editorial in the *World's Work*, this very Monroe Doctrine is the chief breeder of diplomatic negotiations. In other words, it is a trouble-maker. To take its place, let us adopt a more rational foreign policy. We have already begun to do so. President Wilson, in his *Mobile* declaration, stated clearly that the United States did not intend to take another foot of territory by conquest. He has declined to send an army into Mexico, although there have been loud clamors for intervention, and many of these clamors, particularly in the yellow journals, have been based upon the so-called "logic of the Monroe Doctrine." But we must go a few steps further if we would make our friends in South America

believe that we have really adopted a new foreign policy, and that we have outgrown Monroeism.

One of these steps was recommended by Prof. Theodore Woolsey in an able article in *Scribner's Magazine* in 1909, in which it was proposed that we invite the leading powers of Latin-America to unite with us whenever intervention became necessary. This principle of joint intervention attracted little attention at that time, but its practicability has been rapidly gaining force recently. In 1911, the present writer, in a book entitled "Across South America," suggested that the time had come to "amend our outgrown Monroe Doctrine, as has already been suggested by one of our writers on international law, so as to include in the police force of the western hemisphere, those who have shown themselves able to practice self-control." This suggestion was given favorable notice by Mr. Bryce in his book on South America just referred to. It was again called to public attention by the Hon. Charles Sherrill, recently our Minister to Argentina, and has since been referred to many times both in print and on the platform.

Some of those who have sanctioned it, feeling that it was necessary to stick to the words of our ancient shibboleth, have felt that the invitation to Argentina or Brazil to intervene with us in Mexico, should come under the cloak of the Monroe Doctrine; but it seems to me that this is a most unfortunate suggestion. It is to our interests,—it is in the interests of the peace and happiness of the western hemisphere, that we get as far away from these words "Monroe Doctrine" as possible, and that we build up a new foreign policy that is abreast of the times, that recognizes the greatness of several of the Latin-American states, that recognizes that some of them are weak, and need the protection of an international police, and that gives evidence to the world that our foreign policy is really unselfish and is based on high ideals. As a matter of fact, we are a peaceful nation. Our desire to be helpful to our neighbors is sincere. The present administration has given evidence of its intention to discount revolution and to give the aid of its formal recognition only to such governments as are constitutionally elected. We are not going to put a premium on revolution by promptly recognizing any government that comes to the top in the seething cauldron

of unstable conditions in any Latin-American country. This is a doctrine of high ideals. It has nothing whatever to do with the Monroe Doctrine.

Furthermore, there are several minor things of practical importance which we can do to show not only that we have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine, but that we have adopted a legitimate new foreign policy. In the first place, by offering to exchange ambassadors with Argentina and Chile, we can give them evidence that we realize their present position in the world today. There is no reason why we should have ambassadors in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, and none in Argentina and Chile.

In the second place, we can make a generous appropriation for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress. We can at least offer to treat our international guests as hospitably as Chile did. In fact, in order to make up for lost time and for the seeming insolence due to our negligence, we can afford to do better than they did. And we ought to do it promptly.

In the third place, we can show our personal interest in our neighbors by visiting them more frequently. There are no longer any serious handicaps in the way of visiting a number of the states of South America. By becoming intimately acquainted with the problems of Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, we can do more toward aiding in the formation of an intelligent foreign policy than might appear at first sight. It is ignorance that breeds insults.

Finally, let us stop using the words "Monroe Doctrine." It would be well if a formal resolution of Congress could be passed, but since Congress has never formally approved of the Monroe Doctrine in so many words, it is probable that it would be sufficient if our great parties in their next platforms should avoid the repetition of those phrases supporting the doctrine which have been customary for so many years.

For the immediate future, let us adopt a policy of Pan-American Defense. Let us invite to the round table of discussion all the American republics who can show clean records and economic stability. If we believe that any American republic, by reason of civil war or internal discord, is endangering the peace of its neighbors, if we believe that cause for interference in its affairs is arising, let the matter be considered at the round table. Let it meet in some one of the American capitals, not merely

to discuss, as Pan-American conferences have done, innocuous policies regarding Pan-American railway projects and international postal regulations, but the actual business in hand. In other words, let these Pan-American conferences not represent a formal exchange of pleasantries every so often, but let them be called for the definite object of settling definite and difficult problems. If there is to be any intervention, let it come as the result of a family gathering, and not as the decision of the American Department of State. Let us remember that it is "as the disinterested advocate of peace and good-will that we shall have most influence in the western hemisphere."

If Argentina, Brazil and Chile decline to meet us on these terms, then let us go to The Hague and call a council of all civilized nations, and ask for an expression of international opinion, and the appointment of international police. Here is an opportunity for a truly enlightened international policy.

Meanwhile let us not forget that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine involves an attitude of constant suspicion both at home and abroad, which raises barriers against the progress of international good-will and diminishes our influence both in Europe and America.

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Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine. Charles F. Dole

Among the magical words that hypnotize men's minds and keep them from asking intelligent questions, the Monroe Doctrine has a sovereign charm in American politics. Secretary Hay has coupled the mention of this Doctrine with the Golden Rule. Let us venture to ask a few straight questions, and not be afraid to go wherever the honest answer to our questions may carry us.

First, what was the substance of the original Monroe Doctrine in 1823, when it was promulgated? The Spanish-American colonies had then revolted, and we had recognized their independence. There was a boundary question between the United States and Russia. We were a young republic, trying a great experiment in the eyes of a critical and unfriendly world. A "Holy Alliance," organized at the instance of Russia, with a

really beautiful program for the good order of Europe, threatened to be turned into an instrument of mischief and oppression and even to help Spain recover her possessions in America. It is likely that, as in many other instances of human alarm, nothing dangerous would have happened. But our government naturally felt nervous, and raised its cry of warning in the form of the Monroe Doctrine. This was merely a declaration, made by the President in his message to Congress, to the effect that the United States would hold it unfriendly in the European Powers to take any aggressive action in this continent. Important as the subject now seems, it involved no vote in Congress, nor the careful discussion that an actual vote generally involves. It is doubtful whether many Americans who read Monroe's message gave serious thought to the passages which were destined to give his name prominence. But Americans would have generally agreed in their disinclination to see monarchies set up in the new world, or to suffer any kind of undemocratic system to be brought over here from Europe.

It is noteworthy that the bare statement of the attitude of the United States, without any show of force or preparation for war, was sufficient to secure respectful treatment from the European Powers. President Monroe did not feel called upon to ask appropriations for an increase in the navy in order to "back up" his doctrine. The United States did not possess a formidable navy till it had to build one in the period of the Civil War.

It should also be remarked that England, doubtless for commercial reasons, forwarded our government in its attitude in behalf of the independence of the South American republics. Few would have dreamed at that time that the Monroe Doctrine would ever be used as a menace against England.

See now what enormous political changes have come about within eighty years. Except Russia, there is not an autocratic government left of all the nations who composed the short-lived Holy Alliance. All the others, even Austria and Spain, have adopted constitutional methods. Their people have everywhere been given more or less democratic representation. Spain does not contemplate winning back her colonies. We possess by amicable purchase the very territory over which there was once risk of a boundary dispute with Russia. So far from fearing

the extension of autocratic and oppressive governments from Europe to America, the European governments are daily brought to face new demands on the part of the people in the direction of democratic experiments. Autocratic militarism all over the world stands on the defensive. It is becoming recognized as economically and politically intolerable. A great international court has been established on purpose to put an end to war between the nations. It has begun to be used and respected.

Meanwhile the world has become one in geography and international relations. We are practically nearer to the shores of Europe than we are to South America. We have larger and closer interests with China and Japan than we have with Chile and Guatemala.

Let us try now to find what European Power, if, any, threatens to bring the methods of oppression and tyranny to our continent, or in any way to menace the welfare of the United States. Russia, as we have observed, is out of the question, having voluntarily withdrawn from this continent. She allowed her proud flag to be hauled down in Alaska without the slightest loss of honor.

England is our best friend in all the world. Let us never admit jealousy or suspicion between us. For three thousand miles our territory and the Dominion of Canada march together. By mutual consent neither of us has a ship of war upon the Great Lakes. Let us see to it that we never put warships there. We are obviously safer without them. Like two strong men, dwelling on adjacent farms, we are mutually safeguarded, not by building suspicious fences against each other and purchasing weapons in view of the possibility of our wishing to fight, but rather by assuming that we shall never be so foolish as to injure each other. If we ever disagree, we do not purpose to degrade ourselves by fighting. So far as England is concerned, we may venture boldly to declare that the United States does not need a fort nor a battleship. We contemplate her time-honored naval station at Halifax as complacently as travelers views the collection of ancient armor in the Tower of London. Moreover, as regards the Monroe Doctrine, the last thing which England could possibly attempt, with her own popular constitution, would be to abridge the liberties of the Americans, either North or South.

Summon now the Republic of France, and interrogate her as to her designs and ambitions touching the affairs of America. Probably few Americans could name her cis-Atlantic possessions, so inconspicuous are they. They are costing the French treasury a steady outgo. No intelligent nation would take the gift of them, especially of Martinique, with its tempestuous volcanoes. France has had little experience with American colonies cheerful enough to stir her to desire the risk of a disagreement with the United States for the sake of gaining more territory. Nevertheless, we must admit that we had rather live under the rule of France than in most of the states of South or Central America. From no point of view does France threaten to establish a tyranny over any of the populations in the New World.

We hear of Italians in South America. They have emigrated to the Argentine Republic. Does this fact make the slightest demand upon the United States to build iron ships to guard against the friendly government of Victor Emmanuel? On the contrary, the more Italians in the Argentine Republic, the better we like it. They are more enterprising and industrious than either the Spaniards or the natives, and there is plenty of room for all who wish to go there. Is it conceivable that Italy, saddled with ruinous debt and with a fearful burden of European militarism, should undertake a war of conquest in South America? If this were conceivable, does any one suppose that Italian rule down there, supposing it to prevail, would be less enlightened, or less righteous, than Spanish-American rule has been under the delusive name of "republic"? The people of the United States cannot know Italy, or her political conditions, and feel the slightest apprehension that she is capable of extending to our continent methods of government inimical to our peace.

No other nation in Europe remains, about whose designs in our continent the American people have the need to lose a wink of sleep, except Germany. If the plain truth were told by the alarmists, Germany is very nearly the one power in Christendom on whose account we are called upon to pay a naval "insurance fund" of a hundred millions of dollars a year. The talk about a "German peril" would be laughable, if millions of poor people did not need the money which such incendiary talk costs

us; or, worse yet, if this ceaseless talk about possible war with a great nation were not irritating to every one concerned, and naturally provocative of ill feeling.

Why, indeed, should we imagine mischief from Germany? To hear certain speakers and writers, one would suppose that Germany—instead of being a land of arts and laws, of universities and free institutions, with a vast network of world-wide trade—was overrun, as of old, by barbarous hordes breathing violence and robbery. Germany, in fact, has no quarrel or enmity against the kindred people of the United States. Germany is richer every day by reason of the prosperity of our country. The export and import trade between the United States and Germany amounted in 1911 to over four hundred and fifty millions of dollars. The trade with all the countries of South and Central America for the same year was only about three hundred and ten millions. The trade with all Asia, including India and the British dependencies, was hardly three hundred millions. The boasted "open door" into the Chinese Empire only allowed the passage both ways of about fifty-four millions of dollars' worth of products,—less than one-eighth of our trade with Germany.* Does any one think that Germany would lightly quarrel with the source of so much bread and butter? For what possible use? She could not conquer and enslave us, nor does she wish to. We have no boundary lines on the planet to make friction between us. We may say again stoutly, as in the case of England, we are safer from any possible attack from Germany without a ship or a fort than we are with the largest navy that Admiral Mahan could desire. For in the one case we should be sure to avoid needless disputes, and should be more than willing on both sides to put any question that might ever arise between us to arbitration: whereas in the other case, standing with loaded guns as it were, some trifling explosion of an angry man's temper might involve the two nations in strife.

It may be asked whether there is not grave risk that Germany may endeavor to plant colonies in South America or to interfere in some way with the affairs of the South American people. We hardly need more than to repeat the paragraph

* The value of the total trade to and from the Philippine Islands in the same year (about thirty-seven millions) could not possibly have covered the military and naval cost of holding the Islands.

touching this kind of contingency on the part of Italy. Germans are doubtless coming in considerable numbers into the temperate countries of South America. They are a most desirable kind of immigrant. Wherever they go, a higher civilization goes with them. Life and property are safer. A more efficient type of government is demanded. All this is surely for the interest of the United States. We can only be glad for any influences which will tone up the character of the South and Central American states. If they were all Germanized, the whole world, including the United States, would be permanently richer. In fact, the ties of trade and friendship between us and a possible Germanized state in South America would normally tend to be closer than they seem likely to be with the Spanish-American peoples.

Neither is there the slightest evidence that Germany would ever threaten to introduce tyrannical forms of government into South America or to oppress the native peoples. Indeed, so far as it is good for the United States to govern the Philippine Islands for the betterment of their people, the same argument holds in favor of any reasonable method (for example, through purchase or by the final consent of the people) for the extension of German law and political institutions into ill-governed South American states. I do not care to press this argument, which is only valid for those Americans who believe in our colonial experiment. But the argument is far stronger for possible German colonies than it is for the United States, inasmuch as South America is a natural and legitimate field for German immigration, being largely a wilderness, while no large number of Americans will ever care to settle in the Philippine Islands. The time may naturally come when Germany would have the same kind of interest in the welfare of her people beyond the seas that England has in that of the Englishmen in South Africa. There can be no good reason why the United States should look upon such an interest with jealousy or suspicion. For we are unlikely to have any legitimate colonial interest in the southern half of our continent.

Meanwhile, the whole history of colonial settlements goes to show the futility of holding colonies with which the home government is not bound by the ties of good-will. Thus Canada and Australia uphold the British Empire, because they possess

practical freedom; while England has to spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year, badly needed by her own poor people, to maintain the armaments necessary to keep her hold over India and other dependencies reluctant to her rule. All precedents go to show that the Empire of Germany would only weaken herself in case she should endeavor to meddle in South America against the interests and the good-will of the people there.

Let us ask another question, hitherto too little considered. On what ground of right is the United States justified in continuing to assert the Monroe Doctrine? We may warn trespassers off our own land. Have we the right to bar our neighbors from lands to which we have no shadow of a title? Suppose that we may do this, as the stronger people, for the sake of humanity, to protect weaker people from oppression. It is surely a dangerous concession to permit a single state, however civilized it deems itself, to assume the right to become a knight-errant, to adjust wrongs in the world, and incidentally to be sheriff, judge and jury on its own motion. But grant this concession for a moment in favor of the United States. While it may have been true eighty years ago that the American people were filled with sympathy for the republics which revolted from Spain, it would be hypocrisy to claim today that our people are seriously concerned over the troubles of their South American neighbors. We are rather apt to say that they are unfit to govern themselves. The United States today holds eight millions of people on the other side of the globe, very like the South Americans, on the distinct ground that they are not yet fit for independence. Our own course, therefore, bars us from sensitiveness over the perils which South America suffers from the bare possibility of the interference of European states.

Moreover, we have shown that there is no state in Europe which has a mind to do any wrong to South America. So far as the promise of higher civilization goes, the planting of *bona fide* colonies in the vast areas of our southern continent signifies good to humanity.

We must fall back upon a totally different line of reasoning in order to find the only legitimate defense of our Monroe Doctrine. The argument is this: that a nation has the right

to safeguard herself against the menace of aggression. Concede that this might have been a sound argument when the Monroe Doctrine was first proclaimed. Our government saw a peril in the setting up of a European system of despotism on this continent. We have made it clear, however, that this peril which disturbed our fathers appears to have vanished forever. No one can show what actual danger to our liberties is threatened by any governmental system that European Powers can set up in South America. Let us not even imagine that we are in fear of such a chimerical peril. We have no fear that Germany wishes to harm us while she stays at home in Europe. We have no more ground for fear, if Germany were by some magic to fill South America as full of sturdy German people as Canada is now full of friendly English, Scotch and Frenchmen. The better civilized our neighbors are, the less peril do they threaten to our liberties. Let us then disabuse our minds of any fear of European aggression, to injure American liberties.

But it may be urged that the European governments, as was shown in the Venezuelan episode, may prove disagreeable in their efforts to collect debts due to their subjects or, on occasion, in safeguarding the rights of their colonists in the disorderly South American states. The condition of these states, it is urged, offers points of serious friction between us and our European neighbors. The class of issues here raised stands quite aside from the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine. Here is the need of new international law, of the services of the Hague Tribunal, very likely of the establishment of a permanent Congress of Nations. How far ought any nation to undertake by warships and armies to collect debts for venturesome subjects who have speculated in the tumultuous politics of semi-civilized peoples? How far is the real welfare of the world served by punitive expeditions dispatched in the name of missionaries, travelers, and traders, who have chosen to take their own lives in their hands in the wild regions of the world? There is no call for a Monroe Doctrine on these points. The issue is international, not American. The question is not so much whether France and England may send a fleet to take the customs duties of a dilapidated South American port as it is what course ought any government to take when wily promoters ask its assistance in carrying out their schemes in Bogota or Caracas or Peking; or,

again (an equally pertinent question), what remedy, if any, international law ought to give when one of our own cities or states defaults its bonds held in Paris or Berlin.

Grant that it would be uncomfortable to our traders in South America to see European sheriffs holding ports where we wish to do business. We evidently have no right to protest against other nations doing whatever we might do in like circumstances. If we can send armored ships to South America, all the others can do so. If we like to keep the perilous right to collect debts, we must concede it to the others. We may not like to see strangers, or even our own neighbors, taking liberties and quarreling in the next field to our own. But who gives us the right forcibly to drive them out of a field which we do not own? The rule here seems to be the same for the nation as for the individual.

Meanwhile there is one simple proposition the adoption of which could do nothing but good. The Drago doctrine, associated with the name of an eminent Argentine statesman, is in line with the general trend of civilization and with our own national spirit. A mild and tentative approach to it was made at the Second Hague Conference, under the lead of General Porter, one of our delegates. So far, however, the agreement only looks to the use of an obligation to arbitrate claims for debts, but leaves open the menace of possible war. What we need is a new and complete formulation of the idea of the Drago doctrine, in such terms that no nation should be permitted under any circumstances to go to war to collect her subjects' debts. It ought to be made infamous to kill innocent people merely because of a quarrel over the payment of debts, presumably incurred under dubious political conditions.

The fact is, whatever the Monroe Doctrine historically means, it no longer requires us to stand guard against any nation in Europe, with a show of force to maintain it. In its most critical form, when it meant a warning against despotism, it only needed to be proclaimed, and never to be defended by fighting ships. In the face of governments practically like our own, the time has come to inquire whether there remains any reasonable issue under the name of the Monroe Doctrine, over which the American people could have the least justification for a conflict of arms with a European government. The interests of the United States

in South America are not different from those of other powers, like England and Germany. They are substantially identical interests; they are all obviously involved together with the improvement of material, political and moral conditions in the South American states.

We have spoken so far as if the Monroe Doctrine had reference only to our relations with European nations. The last thing that any one dreamed of in the days of President Monroe was that the doctrine would ever be brought to bear against an Asiatic power! Japan is the one power which seems to cause certain nervous statesmen and builders of battleships a spasm of anxiety. What if Japan should establish a colony on our continent? Having reached our own hands into Asiatic waters to seize territory against the will of its inhabitants, we are now asked to contemplate the possibility that Japan likewise might reach many thousands of miles after American territory. Calmly considered, however, this seems to be a purely gratuitous cause of apprehension. Those who know Japan best assure us that she harbors no hostile intention against the United States. She is certainly much occupied with costly enterprises at home and in Korea and Manchuria. She has growingly valuable trade relations with us, which tend always to make peace. The worst source of mischief in sight between Japan and us is really what we are doing ourselves by way of making a Gibraltar in Hawaii. What is this but to show fear and suspicion, which in turn excite the like uncivilized passions. Let us even suppose that Japan desired to establish a colony in Mexico or some other state in America. How could she possibly do this, except by the goodwill and agreement of the people by whose side she settled? Does any one imagine that her experience in Formosa has been so cheap and easy as to lead her to seek a hornet's nest on the opposite side of the Pacific Ocean into which to put her hands! But suppose the most unlikely thing, that Mexico or Chile wished the Japanese colony. Can any one show what shadow of right the United States would have to forbid this?

We have sought so far such an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as may honorably go in company of the Golden Rule, or, in other words, of international justice. There remains, however, a possible new definition of the doctrine, which should be fairly faced. There is an idea in the air that the United States

holds a certain protectorate or suzerainty over the whole continent of America. A manifest destiny is thought to be working in favor of the dominion or suzerainty of a single power from the Arctic Ocean to Patagonia. Porto Rico is ours. Cuba is almost ours. Many believe that Canada will some time desire to be with us. No people to the south of us shows stable promise of what we call good government. The new canal at Panama affords additional reasons for our control of the continent. Boundless resources are yet to be developed in the virgin continent. We are the people who can provide the brains, the capital and the political security requisite for the exploitation of practically a seventh of the surface of the earth.

The new Monroe Doctrine comes thus to mean, frankly, that we want, or at least may some time want, all America for ourselves. We give due notice in advance of our claim of pre-emption. What else does the Monroe Doctrine mean, that there should be the pretense of a necessity to fight for it? What else did President Roosevelt mean by his note of repeated warning to the republics of South and Central America that they must "behave themselves"? Here and nowhere else looms up the need of new battleships and a hundred millions of dollars a year for the navy. It is in regard to South America, and for the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to a control over the continent, that we discover in the political horizon all manner of colossal foreign responsibilities and the possibilities of friction and war.

The new Monroe Doctrine may kindle the imagination and stir the ambition of thoughtless people; it may tempt some of them with a glamour of power and wealth. We may fancy that we would like to be the suzerain power on the continent, with United States officials in authority in every Spanish and Portuguese American capital. The stern ancient question presses: What right has the United States to assume a protectorate, and much less any form of sovereignty, over South America? The South American governments are as independent as our own; they are growing more stable and less revolutionary every year. There are no traditions common between us to constitute us an acknowledged Lord Protector over them. On the contrary, our conduct toward Colombia and the Philippines, and the extraordinary utterances of some of our public men seem to have

already produced a certain nervousness among our Spanish-American neighbors who naturally resent our patronage.

Neither does international law, which has never in the past given the Monroe Doctrine any clearly acknowledged footing, admit the right of the United States to mark off the American continent as its own preserve, and to stand, like a dog in the manger, to warn other friendly peoples from entering it. In short, so far as we are good friends of the South American peoples, so far as we are friends of our own kinsmen over the seas on the continent of Europe, so far as we desire permanent amicable relations with the people of Japan, so far as our intentions in South America are honestly humane and philanthropic, we have no need whatever of the Monroe Doctrine any longer. On the side of our common humanity all our interests are substantially identical. On the other hand, so far as we purpose to exploit the continent for our own selfish interests, so far as we aim at the extension of our power, so far as we purpose to force our forms of civilization and our government upon peoples whom we deem our "inferiors," our new Monroe Doctrine rests upon no grounds of justice or right, it has no place with the Golden Rule, it is not synonymous with human freedom: it depends upon might, and it doubtless tends to provoke jealousy, if not hostility and war.

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Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth. Hiram Bingham

Of the difficulties of establishing any kind of an alliance between ourselves and the South American Republics no one who has traveled in South America can be ignorant. As has been well said by a recent Peruvian writer: "Essential points of difference separate the two Americas—differences of language, and therefore of spirit; the difference between Spanish Catholicism and the multiform Protestantism of the Anglo-Saxons; between the Yankee individualism and the omnipotence of the state natural to the South. In their origin, as in their race, we find fundamental antagonisms. The evolution of the north is slow and obedient to the lessons of time, to the influences of custom;

the history of the southern peoples is full of revolution, rich with dreams of an unattainable perfection."

One of the things which make it, and will continue to make it, difficult for us to treat fairly with our southern neighbors is our racial prejudice against the half-breed. As Señor Calderon bluntly says, "Half-breeds and their descendants govern the Latin-American Republics"; and it is a well-known fact that this leads to contempt on the part of the average Anglo-Saxon. Such a state of affairs shows the difficulty of assuming that Pan-Americanism is axiomatic, and of basing the logical growth of the Monroe Doctrine on "natural sympathy."

In the third place, the new form of the Monroe Doctrine declared, in the words of Secretary Olney, that the "United States is practically sovereign on this continent." This at once aroused the antagonism and the fear of those very southern neighbors who, in another sentence, he had endeavored to prove were "friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States."

Less than three years after the enunciation of the new Monroe Doctrine we were at war with Spain. The progress of the war in Cuba and the Spanish colonies was followed in South America with the keenest interest. How profoundly it would have surprised the great American public to realize that while we were spending blood and treasure to secure the independence of another American republic, our neighbors in Buenos Aires were indulging in the most severe and caustic criticism of our motives! This attitude can be appreciated only by those who have compared the cartoons published week after week during the progress of the war in this country and in Argentina. In the one, Uncle Sam is pictured as a benevolent giant saving the poor maid Cuba from the jaws of the ferocious dragon, Gen. Weyler, and his cruel mistress in Spain. In the other, Uncle Sam, in the guise of a fat hog, is engaged in besmirching the fair garments of the Queen of Spain in his violent efforts to gobble up her few American possessions. Representations of our actions in the Philippines are in such disgusting form that it would not be desirable to attempt to describe some of the Argentine cartoons touching upon that subject.

Our neighbors felt that a decided change had come over the Monroe Doctrine! In 1823 we had declared that "with the ex-

isting colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, *and shall not interfere*" (so runs the original Monroe Doctrine). In 1898 we not only interfered, but actually took away all of Spain's colonies and dependencies, freeing Cuba and retaining for ourselves Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.

Without for a moment wishing to enter into a discussion of the wisdom of our actions, I desire to emphasize the tremendous difference between the old and the new Monroe Doctrine. This is not a case of theories and arguments, but of deeds. What are the facts?

In 1895 we declare that we are practically sovereign on this continent; in 1898 we take a rich American island from a European Power; and in 1903 we go through the form of preventing a South American Republic from subduing a revolution in one of her distant provinces, and eventually take a strip of that province because we believe we owe it to the world to build the Panama Canal. Again, let it be clear that I am not interested at this point in defending or attacking our actions in any of these cases—I merely desire to state what has happened and to show some of the fruits of the new Monroe Doctrine. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

Another one of the "fruits" which has not escaped the attention of our neighbors in South America is our intervention in Santo Domingo, which, although it may be an excellent thing for the people of that island, has undoubtedly interfered with their right to do as they please with their own money.

Furthermore, within the past three years we have twice landed troops in Central America and taken an active part by way of interfering in local politics. We believed that the conditions were so bad as to justify us in carrying out the new Monroe Doctrine by aiding one side in a local revolution.

Of our armed intervention in Cuba it is scarcely necessary to speak, except to refer in passing to the newspaper story, credited and believed in Cuba, that if American troops are again obliged to intervene in the political life of that country they will not be withdrawn, as has been the practice in the past.

The menace of intervention, armed intervention, the threatened presence of machine guns and American marines have repeatedly been used by Latin-American politicians in their endeavors to keep the peace in their own countries. And we have

done enough of that sort of thing to make it evident to disinterested observers that the new Monroe Doctrine, our present policy, is to act as international policeman, or at least as an elder-brother-with-a-big-stick, whenever the little fellows get too fresh.

Is this Doctrine worth while?

Let us see what it involves, first, from the European, second, from the Latin-American point of view.

By letting it be known in Europe that we shall not tolerate any European intervention or the landing of European troops on the sacred soil of the American Republics, we assume all responsibility. We have declared, in the words of Secretary Olney, that the United States is "practically sovereign on this continent, and that its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition. Therefore European countries have the right to look to us to do that which we prevent them from doing. A curious result of this is that some of the American Republics float loans in Europe, believing that the United States will not allow the Governments of their European creditors forcibly to collect these loans.

Personally I believe that it ought to be an adopted principle of international law that the armed intervention of creditor nations to collect bad debts on behalf of their bankers and bondholders is forbidden. If this principle were clearly understood and accepted, these bankers and underwriters would be far more particular to whom they lent any great amount of money and under what conditions. They would not be willing to take the risks which they now take, and many unfortunate financial tangles would never have a beginning. It is natural for a Republic which has great undeveloped resources, much optimism, and a disregard of existing human handicaps, to desire to borrow large amounts of money in order to build expensive railroads and carry out desirable public improvements. It is equally natural that capitalists seeking good interest rates and secure investments, should depend on the fact that if the debtor country attempts to default on its national loans, the Government of the creditors will intervene with a strong arm. It is natural that the money should be forthcoming, even though a thorough, businesslike, and scientific investigation of the possessions and resources of the borrowing nation might show that the chances of her being able to pay interest, and eventually to return the

capital, were highly problematical and to be reckoned as very high risks.

Millions of dollars of such loans have been made in the past. It is perfectly evident that many of these loans can not be repaid; that the time is coming when the creditor nations will look to us as the policeman or "elder brother" of the western hemisphere to see to it that the little boys pay for the candy and sweetmeats they have eaten. Is it worth while that we should do this?

One can not dodge the truth that the continuation of our support of this Doctrine implies that we will undertake to be responsible for the good behavior of all of the American nations. If we are the big-brother-with-the-club, who will not permit any outsider to spank our irritating or troublesome younger brothers, we must accept the natural corollary of keeping them in order ourselves, for we can not allow the American family to become a nuisance, and some members of it have a decided tendency in that direction. Is this task worth while? Will it not cost more than it is worth? Is there not a better way out of the difficulty?

Furthermore Europe knows that in order to continue to execute our self-imposed and responsible mission we must run counter to the most approved principles of the law of nations.

The right of independence is so fundamental and so well established a principle of international law, and respect for it is so essential to the existence of national self-restraint, that armed intervention, or any other action or policy tending to place that right in a subordinate position, is properly looked upon with disfavor, not only in Latin America, but by all the family of civilized nations. The grounds upon which intervention is permitted in international law differ according to the authority one consults, but in general they are limited to the right of self-preservation, to averting danger to the intervening state, and to the duty of fulfilling engagements. When, however, the danger against which intervention is directed is the consequence of the prevalence of ideas which are opposed to the views held by the intervening state, most authorities believe that intervention ceases to be legitimate. To say that we have the right to intervene in order to modify another state's attitude toward revolu-

tions is to ignore the fundamental principle that the right of every state to live its life in a given way is precisely equal to that of another state to live its life in another way.

In the last analysis no intervention is legal except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of international law has taken place or unless the family of civilized states concur in authorizing it.

If, then, our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine means practically disregard of the principles of the accepted law of nations, is it worth while to continue? Why should we not abandon the Monroe Doctrine, and publicly disclaim any desire on our part to interfere in the domestic quarrels of our neighbors? Why should we not publicly state to Europe that we shall not intervene except at the request of a Pan American Congress, and then only in case we are one of the members which such a Congress selects for the specific purpose of quieting a certain troublesome neighbor?

From the Latin-American point of view, the continuance of the Monroe Doctrine is insulting, and is bound to involve us in serious difficulties with our neighbors. We seem to be blind to actual conditions in the largest and most important parts of Latin America, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. We need to arouse the average citizen to study the commercial situation and the recent history of those three Republics. Let him ponder on the meaning of Brazil's \$100,000,000 of balance of trade in her favor. Let him realize the enormous extent of Argentina's recent growth and her ability to supply the world with wheat, corn, beef, and mutton.* Let him examine Chile's political and economic stability. Let him ponder whether or not these nations are fit to take care of themselves, and are worthy of being included in an alliance to preserve America for the Americans, if that it is worth while, and if there is any danger from Europe. Let him ask himself whether or not the "A B C" powers—that is, the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean Governments—deserve our patronizing, we-will-protect-you-from-Europe attitude.

The fact is we are woefully ignorant of the actual conditions in the leading American Republics. To the inhabitants of those

* In 1912 Argentina's exports amounted to \$480,000,000 of which \$200,000,000 represented wheat and corn and \$188,000,000 pastoral products.
—The Author.

countries the very idea of the existence of the Monroe Doctrine is not only distasteful but positively insulting. It is leading them on the road toward what is known as the "A B C" policy, a kind of triple alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, with the definite object of opposing the encroachments of the United States. They feel that they must do something to counteract that well-known willingness of the American people to find good and sufficient reasons for interfering and intervening; for example, for taking Porto Rico from Spain, for sending armies into Cuba, for handling the customs receipts of Santo Domingo, for taking a strip of territory which (South Americans believe) belongs to the Republic of Colombia, for sending troops into Nicaragua, and for mobilizing an army on the Mexican frontier. (In regard to the latter point it may be stated, in passing, that it is not the custom for South American nations to mobilize an army on a neighbor's frontier merely because that country is engaged in civil war or revolution.)

To the "A B C" powers even the original Monroe Doctrine is regarded as long since outgrown and as being at present merely a display of insolence and conceit on our part. With Brazil now owning the largest dreadnoughts in the world; with Argentina and Chile building equally good ones; with the fact that the European nations have long since lost their tendency toward monarchical despotism and are in fact quite as democratic as many American Republics, it does seem a bit ridiculous for us to pretend that the Monroe Doctrine is a necessary element in our foreign policy.

If we still fear European aggression and desire to prevent a partition of South America on the lines of the partition of Africa, let us bury the Monroe doctrine and declare an entirely new policy—a policy that is based on intelligent appreciation of the present status of the leading American powers—let us declare our desire to join with the "A B C" powers in protecting the weaker parts of America against any imaginable aggressions on the part of European or Asiatic nations.

Some people think that the most natural outlet for the crowded Asiatic nations is to be found in South America, and that Japan and China will soon be knocking most loudly for the admission which is at present denied them. If we decide that they should enter, well and good; but if we decide against

such a policy, we shall be in a much stronger position to carry out that plan if we have united with the "A B C" powers.

If these "A B C" powers dislike and despise our maintenance of the *old* Monroe Doctrine, it is not difficult to conceive how much more they must resent the new one. The very thought that we, proud in the consciousness of our own self-righteousness, sit here with a smile on our faces and a big stick in our hands, ready to chastise any of the American Republics that do not behave, fairly makes their blood boil. It may be denied that this is our attitude. Grant that it is not, still our neighbors believe that it is, and if we desire to convince them of the contrary we must definitely and publicly abandon the Monroe Doctrine and enunciate a new kind of foreign policy.

We ought not to be blind to the fact that there are clever authors residing in Europe who take the utmost pains to make the Latin-Americans believe—what they are unfortunately only too willing to believe—that we desire to be not only practically but actually sovereign on the western hemisphere. A recent French writer, Maurice de Waleffe, writing on "The Fair Land of Central America," begins his book with this startling announcement of a discovery he has made:

The United States have made up their mind to conquer South America. Washington aspires to become the capital of an enormous empire, comprising, with the exception of Canada, the whole of the new world. Eighty million Yankees want to annex not only 40,000,000 Spanish-Americans but such mines, forests, and agricultural riches as can be found nowhere else on the face of the globe.

Most of us, when we read those words, smile, knowing that they are not true; yet that does not affect the fact that the Latin-American, when he reads them, gnashes his teeth and believes that they are only too true. If he belongs to one of the larger republics, it makes him toss his head angrily and increases his hatred toward those "Yankis," whose manners he despises. If he belongs to one of the smaller republics, his soul is filled with fear mingled with hatred, and he sullenly awaits the day when he shall have to defend his state against the Yankee invaders. In every case the effect produced is contrary to the spirit of peace and harmony.

In another book, which is attracting wide attention and was written by a young Peruvian diplomatist, there is a chapter

entitled "The North American Peril," and it begins with these significant words: "To save themselves from Yankee imperialism, the American democracies would almost accept a German alliance or the aid of Japanese arms; everywhere the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles and in Central America hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders assumes the character of a Latin crusade." This is a statement not of a theory, but of a condition set forth by a man who, while somewhat severe in his criticism of North American culture, is not unfriendly to the United States, and who remembers what his country owes to us. Yet he asserts that in the United States "against the policy of respect for Latin liberties are ranged the instincts of a triumphant plutocracy."

The strident protest in this book has not gone out without finding a ready echo in South America. Even in Peru, long our best friend on the southern continent, the leading daily papers have during the past year shown an increasing tendency to criticize our actions and suspect our motives. Their suspicion goes so far as actually to turn friendly words against us. Last September a successful American diplomat, addressing a distinguished gathering of manufacturers in New York, was quoted all over South America as stating that the United States did not desire territorial expansion, but only commercial, and that the association should combat all idea of territorial expansion if any statement proposed it, as this was the only way to gain the confidence of South America. This remark was treated as evidence of Machiavellian politics. One journalist excitedly exclaimed, "Who does not see in this paternal interest a brutal and cynical sarcasm? Who talks of confidence when one of the most thoughtful South American authorities, Francisco Garcia Calderon, gives us once more the cry, no longer premature, 'Let us be alert and on our guard against Yankeeism.'"

Even the agitation against the Putumayo atrocities is misunderstood. "To no one is it a secret," says one Latin-American writer, "that all these scandalous accusations only serve to conceal the vehement desire to impress American and English influence on the politics of the small countries of South America; and they can scarcely cover the shame of the utilitarian end that lies behind it all."

Another instance of the attitude of the Latin-American press

is shown in a recent article in one of the leading daily papers in Lima, the Government organ. In the middle of its front page in a two-column space is an article with these headlines: "North American excesses—the terrible lynchings—and they talk of the Putumayo!" The gist of the article may easily be imagined. It begins with these words: "While the Saxons of the world are producing a deafening cry over the crimes of the Putumayo, imagining them to be like a dance of death, and giving free rein to such imaginings; while the American Government resolves to send a commission that may investigate what atrocities are committed in those regions, there was published, as regards the United States, in La Razón, of Buenos Aires, a fortnight ago the following note, significant of the 'lofty civilization and high justice' of the great republic of the north." Here follows a press dispatch describing one of the terrible lynchings which only too often happen in the United States. Then the Peruvian editor goes on to say, "Do we realize that in the full twentieth century, where there is not left a single country in the world whose inhabitants are permitted to supersede justice by summary punishment, there are repeatedly taking place, almost daily, in the United States lynchings like that of which we are told in the telegraphic dispatch?"

Is it worth our while to heed the "writing on the wall"?

Is it not true that it is the present tendency of the Monroe Doctrine to claim that the United States is to do whatever seems to the United States good and proper so far as the western hemisphere is concerned? Is there not a dangerous tendency in our country to believe so far in our own rectitude that we may be excused from any restrictions, either in the law of nations or in our treaty obligations, that seem unjust, trivial, or inconvenient, notwithstanding the established practices of civilized nations? Our attitude on the Panama tolls question, our former disregard of treaty rights with China, and our willingness to read into or read out of existing treaties whatever seems to us right and proper, have aroused deep-seated suspicion in our southern neighbors, which, it seems to me, we should endeavor to eradicate if we have our own highest good at heart.

Are we not too much in the state of mind of Citizen Fix-it, who was more concerned with suppressing the noisy quarrels of his neighbors than with quietly solving his own domestic diffi-

culties? Could we see ourselves as our southern neighbors see us in the columns of their daily press, where the emphasis is still on the prevalence of murder in the United States, the astonishing continuance of lynching, the freedom from punishment of the vast majority of those who commit murder, our growing disregard of the rights of others, bomb outrages, strikes, riots, labor difficulties,—could we see these things with their eyes, we should realize how bitterly they resent our assumed right to intervene when they misbehave themselves or when a local revolution becomes particularly noisy.

So firmly fixed in the Latin-American mind is the idea that our foreign policy to-day means intervention and interference that comments on the splendid sanitary work being done at Panama by Col. Gorgas are tainted with this idea.

On the west coast of South America there is a pesthole called Guayaquil, which, as Ambassador Bryce says, "enjoys the reputation of being the pesthouse of the continent, rivaling for the prevalence and malignity of its malarial fevers such dens of disease as Fontesvilla on the Pungwe River in South Africa and the Guinea coast itself, and adding to these the more swift and deadly yellow fever, which has now been practically extirpated from every other part of South America except the banks of the Amazon. . . . It seems to be high time that efforts should be made to improve conditions at a place whose development is so essential to the development of Ecuador itself." Recent efforts on the part of far-sighted Ecuadorian statesmen to remedy these conditions by employing American sanitary engineers and taking advantage of the offers of American capital were received by the Ecuadorian populace so ill as to cause the fall of the cabinet and the disgrace of the minister who favored such an experiment in modern sanitation.

Peru suffers from the conditions of bad health among her northern neighbors, and yet the leading newspapers in Peru, instead of realizing how much they had to gain by having Guayaquil cleaned up, united in protesting against this symptom of "Yanki" imperialism, and applauded the action of the Ecuador mob.

Is it worth while to continue a foreign policy which makes it so difficult for things to be done, things of whose real advantage to our neighbors there is no question?

The old adage that actions speak louder than words is perhaps more true in Latin America than in the United States. A racial custom of saying pleasant things tends toward a suspicion of the sincerity of pleasant things when said. But there can be no doubt about actions. Latin-American statesmen smiled and applauded when Secretary Root, in the Pan-American Congress at Rio Janeiro, said, "We consider that the independence and the equal rights of the smallest and weakest members of the family of nations deserve as much respect as those of the great empires. We pretend to no right, privilege, or power that we do not freely concede to each one of the American republics." But they felt that their suspicions of us were more than warranted by our subsequent actions in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua. Our ultimatum to Chile on account of the long-standing Alsop claim seemed to them an unmistakably unfriendly act and was regarded as a virtual abandonment by Secretary Knox of the policy enunciated by Secretary Root.

Another unfriendly act was the neglect of our Congress to provide a suitable appropriation for the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress.

Before 1908 Latin-American scientific congresses had been held in Argentina (Buenos Aires), Brazil (Rio Janeiro), and Uruguay (Montevideo). When it came Chile's turn, so kind was her feeling toward Secretary Root that the United States was asked to join in making the Fourth *Latin-American* Scientific Congress become the first *Pan-American*. Every one of the four countries where the international scientists met had made a suitable, generous appropriation to cover the expenses of the meeting. Chile had felt that it was worth while to make a very large appropriation in order suitably to entertain the delegates, to publish the results of the congress, and to increase American friendships. This First Pan-American Scientific Congress selected Washington as the place for the second congress, and named October, 1912, as the appointed time for the meetings. But when our State Department asked Congress for a modest appropriation of \$50,000 to meet our international obligations for this Pan-American gathering, our billion-dollar Congress decided to economize and denied the appropriation. When the matter came up again during the Congress that has just

finished its sessions, the appropriation was recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but was thrown out on a technical point of order.

Now, you can not make a Latin-American believe that the United States is so poor that it can not afford to entertain international scientific congresses as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile have done. They argue that there must be some other reason underlying this act of courtesy. No pleasant words or profuse professions of friendship and regard can make the leading statesmen and scientists throughout Latin America forget that it was not possible to hold the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress because the United States did not care to assume her international obligations. Nor will they forget that Chile spent \$100,000 in entertaining the First Pan-American Scientific Congress and that the 10 official delegates from the United States Government enjoyed the bounteous Chilean hospitality and were shown every attention that was befitting and proper for the accredited representatives of the United States.

In short, here is a concrete case of how our present policy toward Latin America justifies the Latin-American attitude toward the country that has been maintaining the Monroe Doctrine.

Finally, there is another side to the question.

Some of the defenders of the Monroe Doctrine state quite frankly that they are selfish, and that from the selfish point of view the Monroe Doctrine should at all costs be maintained. They argue that our foreign commerce would suffer were Europe permitted to have a free hand in South America. Even on this very point it seems to me that they make a serious mistake.

You can seldom sell goods to a man who dislikes you, except when you have something which is far better or cheaper than he can get anywhere else. Furthermore, if he distrusts you, he is not going to judge your goods fairly or to view the world's market with an unprejudiced eye. This can scarcely be denied. Everyone knows that a friendly smile or cordial greeting and the maintenance of friendly relations are essential to "holding one's customers." Accordingly, it seems that even from this selfish point of view, which some Americans are willing to take, it is absolutely against our own interests to maintain this elder-brother-with-the-stick policy, which typifies the new Monroe Doctrine.

Furthermore, Germany is getting around the Monroe Doctrine, and is actually making a peaceful conquest of South America which will injure us just as much as if we had allowed her to make a military conquest of the southern republics. She is winning South American friendship. She has planted colonies, one of which, in southern Brazil, has 350,000 people in it, as large a population as that of Vermont and nearly as large as that of Montana. Germany is taking pains to educate her young business men in the Spanish language, and to send them out equipped to capture Spanish-American trade. We have a saying that "Trade follows the flag." Germany has magnificent steamers, flying the German flag, giving fortnightly service to every important port in South America—ports where the American flag is practically never seen. She has her banks and business houses which have branches in the interior cities. By their means she is able to keep track of American commerce, to know what we are doing, and at what rates. Laughing in her sleeve at the Monroe Doctrine as an antiquated policy, which only makes it easier for her to do a safe business, Germany is engaged in the peaceful conquest of Spanish America.

To be sure, we are not standing still, and we are fighting for the same trade that she is, but our soldiers are handicapped by the presence of the very doctrine that was intended to strengthen our position in the new world. Is this worth while?

At all events let us face clearly and frankly the fact that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is going to cost the United States an immense amount of trouble, money, and men.

Carried out to its logical conclusion, it means a policy of suzerainty and interference which will earn us the increasing hatred of our neighbors, the dissatisfaction of Europe, the loss of commercial opportunities, and the forfeiture of time and attention which would much better be given to settling our own difficult internal problems. The continuance of adherence to the Monroe Doctrine offers opportunities to scheming statesmen to distract public opinion from the necessity of concentrated attention at home by arousing mingled feelings of jingoism and self-importance in attempting to correct the errors of our neighbors.

If we persist in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, we shall find that its legitimate, rational, and logical growth will lead us

to an increasing number of large expenditures, where American treasure and American blood will be sacrificed in efforts to remove the mote from our neighbor's eye while overlooking the beam in our own.

The character of the people who inhabit the tropical American republics is such, the percentage of Indian blood is so great, the little understood difficulties of life in those countries are so far-reaching, and the psychological tendencies of the people so different from our own, that opportunities will continually arise which will convince us that they require our intervention if we continue to hold to the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine.

It is for us to face the question fairly and to determine whether it is worth while to continue any longer on a road which leads to such great expenditures and which means the loss of international friendships.

That international good will is a desideratum it needs no words of mine to prove to anyone. Looked at from every point of view, selfishly and unselfishly, ethically, morally, commercially, and diplomatically, we desire to live at peace with our neighbors and to promote international friendship. Can this be done by continuing our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine?

Journal of Race Development. 4: 324-33. January, 1914

Monroe Doctrine. George F. Tucker

We should not forget that at the time of President Monroe's declaration this country had a population of only a few millions, and that her interests were inconsiderable in comparison with those of today, that the Spanish-American countries were emerging from colonial conditions that made the transition to independence and democracy difficult and problematical; that trade between civilized countries was not extensive and was largely limited to merchandise peculiar to an age when wants were few and luxuries little known; that transportation was not yet effected by the agencies which man has since called from latency; that knowledge the world over was the possession of the few, and that such a thing as the education of the masses was hardly contemplated; that racial affinities and prejudices were marked and prevalent—a fact due to the aloofness of nations, caused in

a large measure by slow and imperfect means of communication; that there were few, perhaps no, societies and associations organized to promote the cause of peace and to agitate for settlement of wars and disputes by compromise or arbitration, and that no one dreamed—not even the visionary and enthusiast—of the discoveries and inventions that were to modify the methods of trade and business, augment the wealth of the world, raise the standards of living, bring long separated peoples into closer relations and make possible cooperative efforts to promote amity and good-will among nations.

Is it not a fact that the Monroe Doctrine might possibly be applied today to the detriment of the southern republics in whose interest it may be invoked, and possibly to the discredit of the United States? It is fair to assume that there are only two nations that are likely in any event to oppose or violate this Doctrine or inhibition—Great Britain and Germany. In the past ninety years Great Britain has advanced from the rule of the few to that of the many, so that the subjects of the King enjoy about all the privileges of citizens of our country; she has covered the seas with her shipping, and has developed a colonial system the most remarkable and efficient in the history of the world; she has guarded and guards her subjects in every corner of the globe, and, wherever her flag flies, the lives and property of aliens are accorded the same protection as those of her own. Now is it not probable that, if Great Britain should interfere in the affairs of a Latin-American country, she would establish a system calculated to promote the interests of that country, and not at all inimical to those of the United States? And what system? Not that of the old Great Britain governed by gentlemen, but that of the Great Britain of today governed by the people.

Ninety years ago Germany was a collection of states without cohesion and with a not redundant population. Now regard the aspect of governmental unification, and consider her great advance not only in education and all the activities that go with learning, but in manufacturing and trade and commerce. The growth in population has been marvelous, and the label "Made in Germany," testifies everywhere to commercial expansion and prosperity, but her territory is hardly sufficient to maintain her constantly increasing numbers, and she naturally seeks other lo-

calities for those who are handicapped at home by the struggle for existence. Now if Germany should take over a Latin-American country, would its people be subjugated and deprived of their liberties, or would they affiliate with the conquerors and profit by the appropriation? And how would our own institutions be affected? Would there be ground for apprehension that such an appropriation would be a menace to our democratic government? The speaker does not answer these questions, but he adverts to the fact that there are several million German-Americans; that they have been famed for their indifference to political intrigue, and have been and are equally famed for their diligence, their frugality, their thrift, and their loyalty to their adopted land. So far as is known, they have never attempted to destroy the American republic, but on the other hand have been among the foremost to contribute to its prosperity.

But how about coaling stations and the transference to American shores of the European military system? This suggests other questions. Have not the great Powers of Europe all they can attend to in colonial enterprise and expansion, especially since their taking over of the available portions of Africa, under spheres of influence? Would not the maintenance of military strong-holds and coaling stations in Central and South America be an element of weakness rather than of strength? Commanding a large portion of the trade of these southern republics are not Great Britain and Germany, for example, better off than they would be if they were compelled by expensive military and naval measures to guard a commerce which prospers and increases under the protection of the countries with whom it is carried on?

The chief solicitude, perhaps, of the alarmists relates to the Panama Canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty has been supplanted by the Hay-Pauncefote convention. Under the direction, and at the expense of this country, the Canal is nearly completed. It is to be neutralized. The United States may maintain such military police as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder; belligerent vessels are restricted in method and activity, and the provisions of the treaty are to apply to waters adjacent to the Canal, within three marine miles of either end. And what is this solicitude? Is it not that the littoral is in peril, that is the shores adjacent to the Canal, particularly on the Atlantic

side; that some strong European Power may appropriate a part of this littoral, and that the position of the United States may be thus rendered insecure and the Monroe Doctrine made ineffective? Great Britain may be eliminated from consideration, for there is no reason to believe that, after settling the protracted controversy over Isthmian transit, she is going to pursue a course which may weaken the alliance she has entered into to further her own trade. With the English speaking peoples in accord, is there ground for apprehending interference with the littoral, or the establishment of coaling-stations in any parts thereof, or in any of the islands of the Caribbean Sea? Is not the logical conclusion that the successful operation of this great waterway will prove such a benefit to the commercial nations of the globe, that no one of them will be disposed to pursue a policy calculated to give umbrage to the others?

A matter which merits attention is the enforcement of money claims. The Latin-American republics have been frequent borrowers of European money-changers, and frequently also the disinclination or refusal to settle has led to threats of coercion. In one notable instance—a little over a decade ago—war was actually resorted to and the American people, misled by the yellow newspapers, were distracted by the bugaboo of an invaded Monroe Doctrine. The case was that of Venezuela. It is not contended that the government of Venezuela repudiated its obligations; in fact, that government only objected to the amount of the claims, and proposed that they be passed upon by a board of Venezuelans, while the creditor nations urged their reference to a mixed commission. The method adopted—the sinking of Venezuelan war vessels and the bombardment of Venezuelan ports—is believed to be one of the first attempts in history to enforce commercial demands by virtual acts of war. It is to be noted, however, that both Great Britain and Germany disavowed to the American government in advance any intention to acquire territory, the German ambassador assuring the State Department, "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory." The intention to acquire territory was disavowed, but were not the attitude and measures of Great Britain and Germany in a sense an interference in the affairs of Venezuela, and were the interests of South and Cen-

tral America, and those of the United States in any way jeopardized?

Before dismissing the subject, we feel that the attitude, the views, the preferences and purposes of the Latin-American governments deserve attention, for it may be that today they regard the assumed protectorate of the United States as different from the very acceptable service rendered ninety years ago. Suppose that one of the Latin-American republics desires to hand over its autonomy to a European Power or for a consideration to cede to that Power a bit of territory for the location of a coaling-station, has the United States a right to set up the Monroe Doctrine, and, if set up, would it prove a deterrent? Without answering this question can we not say that the United States has shown too little general interest in the affairs of her Spanish-American neighbors? The matter of interrelation is one which this country should not ignore, and which means far more to the Latin-Americans than the North American people at present comprehend. During the last twenty years several of our southern neighbors have made such progress, and have so increased their resources, that they are amply able to look out for their own affairs in the event of threatened aggression of European nations.

Review of Reviews. 34: 114. July, 1906

Commercial Side of the Monroe Doctrine

What has our adhesion to the Monroe Doctrine done for the extension of American commerce? This question has been raised in connection with the coming Pan-American Conference at Rio. Harold Bolce, a writer in the July number of Appleton's Magazine, ventures the assertion that our trade with South America would be greater if England owned that entire continent.

The latest figures show that little British Guiana bought more goods from America, by one million dollars' worth, last year than the whole of Venezuela did, and Venezuela has an area equal to all that of the United States east of the Mississippi River and north of the fringe of Gulf States. The Britisher the world over is a big buyer of American merchandise. To Canada, with its less than six million people, we sell more goods in six months than we do in a whole year to all the republics of South America, with its upward of forty million inhabitants. Theoretically,

it would appear that a practical nation like America would gather material benefits from its guardianship of a continent. The opposite is true. It is the European nations, protesting against the Monroe Doctrine, who have prospered most in the southern portion of the western hemisphere. In the past decade, for example, Germany's progress in Brazil has been phenomenal, while we have lost ground in that republic.

The latest returns show that the amount of merchandise bought by all nations, exclusive of the United States, amounted last year to 11.6 billions of dollars. Of that America supplied 14.33 per cent. If the Monroe Doctrine were of any value in getting foreign trade for the United States, our proportion of the commerce of South America would be greater than our share in the trade of countries beyond the pale of our political protection. But of South America's imports we supply only 13.28 per cent.

After recalling the disasters resulting to the London banking house of Baring and to American financial interests from the failure of Argentina to meet her obligations, in 1890, this writer continues:

Some people question Uncle Sam's right to act as the receiver for insolvent San Domingo, but any one who will study the path of panics will realize that it is a solemn obligation upon the part of the American nation to avert, whenever possible, any financial collapse in the countries of Latin America. The disaster that began in Buenos Ayres reached America when our harvests were prodigal, and when our factories were running overtime.

It is more picturesque, perhaps, to think of the Monroe Doctrine as safeguarding our export trade with South America. In 1890 we were shipping at the rate of \$32,000,000 worth of goods to the southern half of this hemisphere, but twenty years of such commerce would not compensate the United States for the loss we sustained in the three years of failures following the fall of the house of Baring. In that brief period of panic the liabilities of failures in the United States amounted to \$650,000,000.

Summing up the lessons of the past, Mr. Bolce shows that the downfall of a Latin-American republic represents,—first, the alarm of Europe and the collapse of some of its financial houses; second, a reflex disaster in the United States, and, third, the utter demoralization of the South American people who hold the spurious paper of the defunct republic.

The total export and import trade of South America now exceeds \$1,000,000,000,—a sum greater than that representing the trade of the United States in 1870.

North American Review. 173:832-44. December, 1901

Shall the Monroe Doctrine Be Modified? Walter Wellman

The weakness and falseness of the Monroe Doctrine is that it applies not only to the islands and seas near our shores and to the isthmus, where we have a large and unmistakable special interest, but broadly to the whole hemisphere, in a considerable part of which we have almost no actual interest at all, and where the interest of other Powers is in many cases equal to ours and in some cases far greater than ours. What is the evidence that the United States possesses an interest in middle and lower South America sufficiently greater than that of the remainder of the world to give the United States a reasonable right to exclusive privilege? Not in the preservation of a republican form of government, for as a general principle no nation has a right to dictate what the form of government of any of its neighbors shall be; besides, the Monroe Doctrine applied to Brazil when it was under a monarchy as well as now, when Brazil is a republic; further, the chief countries of Europe, whose possible activities in South America we seek to limit, are better democracies than the best of the governments we seek to perpetuate. Evidence is not found in trade, investment of capital, or colonization, for in all these respects several European nations have vastly greater interests in South America than the United States. It is not found in the danger of greater proximity of European Powers, for proximity is not of itself a danger, except in special circumstances or when accompanied by the menace of enmity. No one will assert that any European Power is the enemy of the United States. We have friendly relations with them in all other parts of the world; the assumption that our friendship would be endangered by having them nearer to us is of itself a false and unfriendly note. You may say that you will not have your friend as a dweller in your own house, but you may not with decency or consistency forbid him to live in your neighborhood.

Besides, when the Monroe Doctrine was born proximity counted for much more than it does in this day of electricity, cables, steam and sea power. Now it counts only under special circumstances. We should be justified in saying we did not want Germany in Cuba, or Russia in Mexico, or France in the

Isthmus. But what has the political control of Argentina, or Patagonia, or Brazil, or Chili, to do with the security of the United States? The proximity excuse, even if valid, would not hold as to South America. New York is farther from Rio Janeiro than from Hamburg, Bremen, Cherbourg or Liverpool. It is much farther from New York to Buenos Ayres than from New York to any port of western Europe.

The one broad justification of United States exclusiveness in central and lower South America—superiority of interest—does not exist. Is there any particular justification? It might be found in two new declarations accompanying the Monroe Doctrine, as follows:

1. That the United States will at once assume a suzerain's relations to all South American nations, maintaining responsibility for them, standing between them and the remainder of the world, securing or offering redress for all wrongs committed by them, and disciplining such of them as may be rash enough to reject our control.

2. That wherever government fails and disorder or wrong follows in South America, the United States will take over such territory in its rôle of primate Power—as a trustee for civilization—and through annexation and its own superior administration bring about better conditions.

Declaration of such policies as these would be aggression and imperialism of the boldest stamp, and would doubtless involve us in no end of troubles with South American states. But they would afford a better basis for the Monroe Doctrine than none at all, and would at least possess the merit of candor and consistency of an unmistakable though selfish sort. If the United States is going to fence off all America and put up "no trespass" signs against all comers, we must on demand show at least a color of justification. But we cannot in decency put up the signs, forbidding all others to go in and improve, and at the same time declare that we have no intention of doing so. We cannot assume an attitude of responsibility for the selfish purpose of keeping others out, and then repudiate that responsibility in order to save ourselves the trouble of meeting it.

The Monroe Doctrine, as applied to the whole hemisphere, is to-day the one example of a first-class Power setting its strength against progress. There is abroad to-day a world-

movement which follows natural law, which is as irresistible as the march of time itself—a movement in which we are ourselves mightily participating in various parts of the globe. This movement is the centralization process, a political phase of the natural law of survival of the fittest. In the present state of international morality, it does not mean the passing of the small into the control of the great, for the doctrine of the absolute domination of the strong over the weak is happily becoming obsolete. The essence of the law and of the movement which springs from it is the passing of the inefficient and unfit and the coming of the efficient and worthy. Thus there is constantly going on the transfer of control from the incompetent to the competent, from the ineffective to the effective, from the inferior to the superior. The first and most important function of government is uplifting the people governed. As the world is now constituted, broadly speaking, all governments which do this are insured against overthrow from without, for it is one of the glories of civilization at the beginning of the twentieth century that the strong do not prey upon the weak, so the weak be only competent. But every government which is both weak and incompetent, which fails to meet its responsibilities to its people and to the world, is inevitably threatened both from within and from without. For object-lessons on the bright side of the picture, it is only necessary to cite Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway. For examples on the darker side, it is only necessary to cite Hawaii, the causes which led to our ousting of Spain from Cuba and the Philippines, European overrunning of semi-savage Africa, the concert of all the Powers in distressed China. This principle of the constantly increasing responsibility of the superior and competent nations, of the constantly lessening sway, influence and territory of the inferior and the incompetent, is the international law of gravity. It is the mightiest force in the progress of the world, the advancement of civilization, the preservation of peace. It is the practical application of the theory of trusteeship which has wrought great works in Africa, in Asia, in the islands of the sea, and which, better than all, has brought with greater and more complex responsibility a higher morality to the chief nations of the world.

There is one exception to the universality of the application

of this principle, and only one. This is found in the western hemisphere. The youngest and, all things considered, the greatest and most progressive of the Powers, seeks to put up the barrier and prevent the world-movement touching the shores of America. It recognizes the virtue of the principle everywhere else, and itself aids in its application to the islands of the Pacific and to China; but it has declared it will not have it here. The United States stands absolutely alone in its championship of the incompetent against the competent, in its purpose to perpetuate the rule of the inferior and to bar out that of the superior. If Central and South American governments were Switzerlands, Belgiums, Netherlands and Scandinavias there might be excuse for the United States setting up the dead-line of its imperious will for their protection. But if, like the Swiss, the Belgians, the Dutch and the Scandinavians, these American governments were fulfilling their proper mission, adequately meeting their responsibilities, the protection of the United States would not be needed. The enlightened opinion of the world would protect them, as it protects the minor states of Europe.

The United States would occupy a wholly correct and justifiable position if it assumed that its great power and commanding influence gave it leadership in the western world; that it intends to meet the responsibilities of its leadership; that it will not sit idly by whilst a competent American government, one which has shown its fitness to survive, is being subverted by the superior force of some outsider; that it must have an early and loud voice in determining what is and what is not international morality on these continents. Such attitude would be irreproachable.

Were the United States to confine its South American declaration to that of a special interest, without any attempt to assert exclusiveness, it would have the free hand. It could meet every case that might arise upon the merits of that case. It could select the instances in which it would have nothing to say, and those in which it might have very much to say. It could protect the competent, but would not be bound to protect the incompetent. It could make sure that in every case to which it extended its interposition it had right and reason on its side. But this is not the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine sets up an

arbitrary, immovable, unvariable rule of action. It declares that not only may we of right, but that we shall and must, interfere in any and every case whatsoever, regardless of the circumstances, where native control is threatened from without. It binds us to interference not only where interference would be a duty, but where it would be a crime. It ties us to the principle that all native control, no matter how wretched or unstable, must be perpetuated at any cost; that no European control, no matter how desirable or promising, can be permitted under any circumstances.

Conditions have greatly changed since the Doctrine declared that European presence in this hemisphere would be a menace to the United States. One European nation is already here, with an area greater than our own, but her presence is not a menace. If British rule in Canada were incompetent; if the people were oppressed; if disorder ensued; if our peace and prosperity were menaced; if our sensibilities were harassed year after year, then it is quite probable we should have to put an end to it. Spain's rule in Cuba and Porto Rico was inefficient and led to so many evils that we finally ousted her, and were well within our rights in doing so. But we did not oust her because she is of Europe; nor because she is a monarchy; nor because she, as a European Power, was a menace to us. We ousted her solely because she was incompetent. We have taken good care to hold in our hands a power over the new Cuba which gives us the right to oust or correct any native misrule that may follow. But as to South America we have declared over and over again that we will not ourselves apply this wholesome rule, and through the Monroe Doctrine we assert that we will not permit any one else to do so.

If a new Prussia or Bavaria were set up in Brazil, a new Italy in Argentina, another Holland in Patagonia, a new Brittany in Guiana, who can say that the result would constitute a menace to the United States? Would there not then be all the greater reason for perpetual peace between those mother countries and the first power of the western world? Is it not true that the wider the Great Powers spread their people and their trusteeship, the more complex and diffuse becomes their responsibility; that the farther they extend their commerce and their capital, the more sure a perpetual world peace? Would not such a European colonization and control in South America make for good to the United States in every way—in greater

stability of government, in a higher civilization, in an uplifting of the people now there and great accretion to their numbers, in broadening markets?

The Monroe Doctrine had its origin more than three-quarters of a century ago. There was justification for it then, but the conditions have wholly changed. There is now no "Holy Alliance" trying to make absolutism and government by divine right dominate the earth. What the Monroe Doctrine was devised to meet has no longer to be met. The Doctrine was a move, and a good one, in the international game of that hour. If we could frighten off the absolutists with a "no trespass" placard, it was a clever thing to do. But why keep the placard up forever, after the rules and aim of the game have wholly changed?

No other nation has accepted the Monroe Doctrine. As yet, it has never been affirmed by any branch of our government save the executive. True, it is well supported by public opinion. But has that public opinion ever paused to analyze it in its modern application? Has it not, rather, placed the Doctrine upon a pedestal and made an idol and a fetich of it, without well comprehending what it signifies? Have not the people fallen down and worshipped it as a sanctified being, and without the slightest conception of whether it is a true or false god, a tower of strength or a sign of weakness? Foreign statesmen marvel that the United States should persist in attempting to force this rule of international relationship upon them. They have not as yet thought it wise to contest it, but they only await the coming of the hour—the occasion when the attitude of the United States is more than usually weak, because without a basis of natural right to stand upon—when the incentive to them is sufficiently important to make the contest worth while. It is certain as fate that the world will not go on forever, mute and astonished at our dead-line, but crossing it not. And it is certain, too, that when it is crossed, it will be crossed at its weakest point, and probably with two or three of the Powers moving side by side. What is the United States to do then? It is not pleasant to think of that emergency. If we are in the right, we shall have nothing to fear. But if we are in the wrong—and the other Powers will take care to select an instance in which we are in the wrong—it may not be so easy to retreat.

One justification for the Monroe Doctrine often urged is that it keeps European Powers out of America, and therefore minimizes the danger of friction with them. But it does not keep them out. They are there with their capital, their banks, their commerce, their colonists. Even the Monroe Doctrine does not pretend to reach that extreme of exclusiveness which would enable the United States to stop South American countries inviting European capital and European people into their territory. If we cannot stop Europeans going there, we cannot presume to control the perfectly natural consequences of their presence. Yet the validity of the Monroe Doctrine may be tested in precisely such an emergency. Suppose German colonists in large numbers settle in some South American country. They gain a numerical majority in a province. They own nine-tenths of the property, pay nine-tenths of the taxes and constitute the wholesome intelligent part of the community. Yet they are denied suffrage; are denied participation in the local government; are ruled by corrupt, oppressive, arrogant natives; life and property are insecure; the colonists appeal to Fatherland for help, and help is sent them; there is trouble between Germany and the native government; and, when it is over, the Kaiser establishes a colony and gives it the protection of the German flag. The Monroe Doctrine requires the United States to interpose and say this shall not be; that we will not permit these German colonists to go under the wing of the Fatherland. What right have we to say anything of the sort, and what would be Germany's righteous answer to our interposition? What would be the opinion of the world as to the merits of such a controversy? Should we not be asked where are our interests, our colonists, our capital, the rights of our citizens, that give us license to interfere?

Let us suppose that Italian colonists are so badly treated in some South American country, and Italy herself so wantonly insulted when she attempts to secure redress, that war follows. Surely we have no divine right to prevent Italy exercising her sovereign prerogative of going to war when she has been wronged and flouted. After victory in a costly conflict, Italy may find territory the only available indemnity. We had no right to intervene to stop the war; but now the Monroe Doctrine requires us to intervene to deprive Italy of the natural and proper recompense for her sacrifices.

Let it be supposed, again, that Scandinavian colonists become the numerical majority in the citizenship of a South American country. On some account, such as threatened troubles with some powerful and warlike neighbors, through plebiscite a majority of the voters of that country elect to attach themselves to Sweden and Norway as a colony, hoping thereby to obtain national security. Sweden and Norway accept the responsibility. But the Monroe Doctrine requires the United States to interpose. There may be no Americans or American interests in the colony. The union may be a consummation devoutly to be wished by all friends of peace and progress. It is not aggression that is proposed, or seizure by force, but an amicable arrangement. Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine compels the United States, for consistency's sake, to interpose; to say to the colonists they shall not do as they wish with their own; to say to the Scandinavian governments that their activities, praiseworthy though they are admitted to be, are restrained by our will as expressed by Mr. James Monroe in the year 1823.

To such lengths are we led when we adopt as our guide a rule made a long time ago for an emergency then existing but now unknown; a rule which not only commits us to a prescribed line of conduct for ourselves, but to the attempt to prescribe the conduct of our co-equals. While in our pride and prosperity we go confidently along, following the traditional path marked out in 1823, problems are arising in South America. European emigration, European capital are going thither. Difficulties, friction, complications, exasperations will arise. We expect to have a powerful voice in any political rearrangement of that continent which may ensue; and it is a vital, a living question whether we are going to speak as of this day, as practical men at the beginning of the twentieth century, or whether our voice is to come out of the distant past; whether we are to permit ourselves to be involved in trouble by an effort to maintain an antiquated doctrine which requires that we treat all cases according to a hard and fast rule, or whether we shall put in its place the modern, workable policy of the free hand which may be expressed in three words, "Primacy, not exclusiveness."

No nation now presumes to stake off a large part of the world outside its own sovereignty as reserved for its exclusive activities. If it attempts activity beyond its own boundaries, and beyond the

field where circumstances give it special rights, it does so frankly upon the basis of open rivalry—that all have the right to compete, and competition must be adjusted on the principle of “give and take.” Nearly all the nations have participated in the subdivision of Africa. Nearly all have taken a hand in Asia. The United States has as much right in China as Russia or England, if our policy is such as to send us thither. As Theodore Roosevelt so well said at Minneapolis last September: “The United States must not shrink from playing its part among the great nations. We cannot avoid hereafter having duties to do in the face of other nations.” The United States is not shrinking. We have been in China. We are in the great Philippine archipelago with our sovereignty, and we shall build a new nation there, nearly twice as far from our shores as Brazil is from Germany or Italy. We are more or less a factor in what may be called all the world politics of the times. We could not keep out if we would, and we would not if we could. Wherever we go we encounter no arbitrary dead-lines, no trespassing placards. It is not wholly consistent for us to play the game with a free hand in Europe, in Asia, in the islands of the sea, wherever we wish, and at the same time sit as the dog in the manger in all the great region to the south of us.

Century. 87: 233-41. December, 1913

Is There a Sound American Foreign Policy? W: Morgan Shuster

Conceding perfectly that it was a splendid stroke of diplomacy to frighten land-hungry monarchies away from South and Central America at a time when that territory was politically unformed and in a state of chaos, the question remains whether to-day, on impartial analysis, any reason exists for continuing such a stand. The following inquiries should aid in reaching a conclusion:

1. Is the Monroe Doctrine based on any great moral or ethical ground?
2. Is it of any strategical advantage to the United States?
3. Does it cement friendly relations between the United States and other great nations?

4. Does it create friendly political bonds between the United States and the South and Central American countries?

5. Does it aid those countries to maintain stable and enlightened governments, and thus assure to the world peace, order, and justice within their borders?

6. Does it tend to make those countries keep faith in their financial relations and engagements with the rest of the world?

7. Does it raise American prestige and create respect for the American citizen in those countries?

8. Does it benefit American trade and commerce with those countries or any other place?

The answer to every one of these questions must be an emphatic no, except to the second, to which a modified no may be returned.

1. The United States never assumed moral or ethical grounds in warning Europe against forcible colonization in the western hemisphere. It announced a policy then believed to be one of necessary self-protection. There was no other principle involved. The United States, on the contrary, has itself gone into the eastern hemisphere and colonized, with the avowed intention of bettering political and economic conditions.

2. There is no strategical advantage in keeping European nations out of the western hemisphere, except as to the zone of danger of attack on the Panama Canal, and if the Monroe Doctrine disappeared to-morrow, it would still be the right of the United States to take steps against the gathering of any armed force which might threaten the canal, either on territory now forming independent states or on adjacent colonies *already possessed by European nations*. There would be no need to invoke the Monroe Doctrine against any demonstration of that kind, now or at any time in the future.

3. Far from cementing friendly relations, the Monroe Doctrine is considered by Europe to be an offensive display of American arrogance, dictated by motives purely selfish, however futile might be the effort to follow them up.

4. The Monroe Doctrine, and especially certain official interpretations which have recently been put on it, is genuinely feared and hated by South Americans, whatever professions may be made by some. I happened to be in Buenos Aires during the summer of 1912 when the news of the Lodge resolution, adopted

by the Senate as a result of the Magdalena Bay discussion, was received. I can testify personally that this officially sanctioned interpretation or extension of the Monroe Doctrine aroused there great indignation against the United States, despite the fact that the Argentine people are naturally and normally most friendly toward Americans. That this resolution produced similar feelings in other South American countries was amply confirmed later.

5. That it could never aid the people of any nation, where the temptation to pay personal politics is ever present and strong, to know that they might riot with comparative immunity from punishment, seems self-evident. The whole tendency of such a situation is to foster national irresponsibility.

6. The answer to the fifth question applies equally well to the sixth. The belief that the Monroe Doctrine could be invoked to protect them in the last extremity has steadily encouraged extravagance and reckless financial engagements on the part of several Latin-American nations. The appeal made last April by Guatemala that the United States should stand between her and her European creditors is exactly in point.

Could there, in fact, be a greater temptation to small nations to be reckless in their dealings with European lenders than to have the United States stand guard over their territorial integrity at all hazards? In addition, the American people thereby virtually undertake the thankless and noisome task of collecting Europe's debts. It is well known that the American Government will go to lengths for European creditors to which it would refuse to go for its own citizens. One result of this is that American bankers have always been loath to finance any Latin-American business, public or private, unless there was a substantial participation therein by European capital, in order that there might always be, in case of necessity, a club with which to beat the United States Government into more vigorous assertion of the lenders' or investors' rights. Could there be a more humiliating position for Americans?

Meanwhile the bankers of Europe laugh at our ingenuousness, and give thanks that there is a cheap and ready method of getting their Latin-American chestnuts pulled out of the fire.

7. In considering the question of American prestige as af-

fectured by the Monroe Doctrine, it must be remembered that one's reputation is always determined, justly or unjustly, by others. Not by its own consciousness of right is the standing of the United States fixed in the eyes of the Latin-American peoples, but by their opinions as to the real motives underlying the American political attitude toward them. It is true that the American nation is constantly misrepresented in the western hemisphere, but it is the Monroe Doctrine which gives the handle to those who wish to create suspicion and distrust.

In the United States there are already some who expect, and in South and Central America there are many who fear, the coming of a vast American federation, stretching from Alaska to Cape Horn, with every range of climate and production, but with a governing and directing nucleus situate in the north temperate zone, represented by appointive executives or elective officials and political agents, as the local situation may indicate, but all subject to the quickening impulses of those in power at Washington.

A dream it might be for an Alexander or a Napoleon, but a ludicrous nightmare in this twentieth century. Fortunately, it exists principally in the perfervid imaginations of persons of radical anti-American tendencies; but even so, it is a theme with which to excite antipathy, a horn on which to blow a call to unite against the feared and hated "imperialists" from the North.

8. There can be no doubt that the feelings of Latin-Americans toward the Monroe Doctrine do not help American trade and commerce with them, either on sentimental lines or in a practical way. Other things being nearly equal, a business man prefers to deal with those toward whom he feels friendly; in many cases he will even put up with something a little different from what he actually desires in order to do business with a friend. The personal equation plays a specially large part in business with Latin-America, and to that extent American trade competitors are actually handicapped.

Then the effect of the American Government's policy of hesitating to assert vigorously purely American financial claims, lest it touch an already irritated spot, is of course to give European bankers and investors an additional advantage in the South American field.

Viewed from every point, therefore, this unique American foreign policy does not stand forth as ethically sound, just, wise, practicable, or expedient.

There remain only two other questions: Could it be maintained, if it should actually be defied? Is it practical to modify or drop it?

As to the first question, it must be remembered that the European Powers, even Great Britain, have never accepted this policy save at times when it was convenient to tolerate it. It has escaped serious challenge thus far principally because the European nations have been torn by fears and jealousies of one another, and this state has served to keep active attention focused nearer home. There is no reason to think, however, that before the dream of universal disarmament comes true, some powerful nation or group of nations will not deliberately deny the United States' vaguely derived, loudly proclaimed, contingent, but exclusive, equity in every square mile of territory in the western hemisphere, which, through the partial or complete breaking down of the existing forms of government, may become exposed to intervention and occupation.

The world's present distribution of territory and inhabitants cannot last forever. The rapidly increasing population of certain European and Asiatic nations, the additional room which will be absolutely required by them, the growing trade and increasing interests of Europe in South America, the ever-present land-hunger—all these factors, in the face of the vast stretches of a rich undeveloped and sparsely settled continent, will inevitably bring it about that hitherto rival nations will recognize their common welfare, call a truce among themselves, and test this vague suzerainty of the United States at some convenient time and place. Pretexts for aggressive action will never be lacking.

When the day of trial approaches, the American people will receive scant warning. Ex-President Roosevelt recognized this when he said, "The Doctrine will be respected as long as we have a first-class, efficient navy—not *very much longer*." But did he mean a navy strong enough to defeat England's, or Germany's, or the English and French fleets combined?

Our national hat is already in the ring. When a serious move is made to kick it out, the American people will be suddenly faced by the most tremendous crisis in their history. There will be

only two alternatives: to fight an appalling war, probably against overwhelming odds; or to retire under pressure in national humiliation.

It is useless to claim that the United States could count on England for aid. She has made her alliances based on what are deemed her imperative geographical and political necessities. To her, in this matter, the United States is a formidable trade rival pursuing a somewhat fatuous political course.

Despite the higher instincts of man's intellectual side,—love of peace and justice, abhorrence of war's cruelty and suffering,—the attitude of any large number of people gathered into a nation has always been principally, if not conspicuously, influenced by purely material considerations.

For example, England dared to make no small part of the world her empire because of her geographical isolation, her immunity to attack by land. This powerful sense of security at home had much to do with shaping her policies. France, on the other hand, though exposed on every side by land and sea, plays her important part through faith in her wealth and in the enforced assistance of England should she ever again be seriously threatened with invasion. Germany is similarly exposed to attack, and, if anything, more so than France. Her coasts are within easy striking distance of England's superior navy; her frontiers are menaced on one side by the French army and on the other by Russia's formidable forces. Only southward may she look for some respite from the strain of constant preparedness. Germany has been so occupied in knitting herself together and insuring continued existence as an empire that she has had little time to acquire important colonies. Russia lies like a colossus across northern Europe and Asia, protected, except from attack by Germany and Austria, by climatic conditions and the nature of her frontiers. She easily holds her western boundaries against Europe while extending her flag and influence eastward over Asia until she touches Japanese interests in the north or threatens India in the south. Italy's passive attitude in European affairs is largely due to her exposed position on the Mediterranean.

With regard to the United States, her mainland territory is fortunately several thousand miles from the natural military and naval bases of the European Powers. This was her great safeguard in the early days of the republic, and it has never ceased

to be. Virtually free by nature from serious danger of land invasion, she has grown to be a world Power through prolonged peace and industry, with little of the strain and drain entailed by the maintenance of immense military establishments such as have economically weakened Europe.

But this gracious isolation ceases to aid the American flag and prestige when the United States indulges in irritating challenges, which, if accepted, would necessitate the issue being decided far beyond her own coasts. Off Sandy Hook or the Panama Canal, the American fleet may be doubly efficient, with shore batteries behind it and harbors and supplies within easy reach. But what becomes of this advantage of geographical isolation from European naval bases if a hostile fleet shall defy the Monroe Doctrine off Rio de Janeiro or Curityba or at Montevideo? Has the United States in such case any strategical advantage at all? In other words, is the American navy capable of defending against attack by one or more great world Powers not only the Atlantic, Pacific, and gulf coast-lines of the United States, but the immense coast-line of another vast continent? The question may well cause reflection to the most ardent jingo.

Unless the American people are determined on building and maintaining an absolutely commanding fleet, the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine under modern conditions becomes somewhat blatant.

To understand better how the nations of Europe regard it, let us suppose that just before the Spanish-American War was declared, and while Spain was endeavoring to subdue the Filipino rebellion, it had occurred to Japan to proclaim her aversion to the taking of the Philippine Islands by any other western power. Is there any doubt as to the way that the United States would have regarded such a declaration?

It would be prudent for the American people to study carefully and analyze a foreign policy which is a constant menace to their pride and tranquillity; which exacts care, risk, responsibility, and expenditure from its sponsor, and renders up only shadowy advantages. Common sense and political strategy unite in demanding that the false and unnecessary features of the Monroe Doctrine be abandoned before some sudden shift in the world's political balance may compel it. Otherwise red danger looms

large for the United States the day when some great Powers compose their fancied difficulties and forget old animosities.

There always remains, of course, the question how the United States could modify or withdraw from certain features and corollaries of the Monroe Doctrine without appearing either to show weakness or to invite and sanction hostile aggression against Latin-American countries. The problem is a complicated one; but if the American people once became convinced that a change of policy should be had, the means and the opportunity for a President to make a "new interpretation" would not be hard to discover.

It should be possible to make plain to our fellow-Americans to the south that while the United States desires to build up and maintain with them the most intimate and cordial political and trade relations, based on genuine friendship and mutual confidence and respect, it should be clearly understood that the United States recognizes the most complete sovereignty and freedom of action on the part of all existing independent nations in the western hemisphere, including both their privileges and their liabilities according to the law of nations, but that because of propinquity and similarities in institutions and forms of government, the United States has an inherent special interest in any dispute, controversy, or change of sovereignty in which any American nation or portion thereof might become involved, and therefore expects that interest to be considered in any settlement which might be made of, or any consequences which might arise from, any such dispute, controversy, or change.

The question of how a change may be brought about in the eyes of the world, and particularly with the Latin-American nations, regarding the real attitude of the United States in its foreign relations and line of conduct may well engage the serious attention of all thinking Americans. It is a duty which should not be evaded because of its difficulty or the obscurity which surrounds the exact degree of harm resulting or danger threatening from the actual state of affairs.

Even in acting upon the Monroe Doctrine itself the United States has not appeared to be entirely consistent. The alacrity with which American marines were poured into Nicaragua, a tiny nation, contrasted with the indecision which has been plainly

and not unnaturally, shown regarding a somewhat similar condition of affairs in a neighboring country of much greater resisting powers, must inevitably make even the one American foreign policy smack somewhat of opportunism in unbiased foreign eyes.

Is it not wise to reshape a policy to meet greatly changed conditions while it is still intact and even unthreatened?

Fortnightly Review. 70: 1013-26. December, 1901

Some Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. Sydney Brooks

If Americans could only for a little while free themselves from the bondage to rhetoric and sentiment, and collect themselves for the effort of seeing things as they are, they would, I believe, recognise that to abandon the Monroe Doctrine would entail as little harm to their political and material interests as to their moral. In their present condition they either cannot or will not see, at any rate they do not acknowledge, what are the obvious effects of their cherished policy on South America. The Monroe Doctrine perpetuates in South America the predominance of a religion which Americans detest, of a race which they despise, and of a system of government which in all but the name is a flat negation of everything America stands for. It rules out Teutonic civilisation in favour of the religious and military dispositions beyond which, after eighty years' trial, the Spanish and Portuguese *mestizos* have proved their incapacity to advance. In the name of Republicanism it condemns a whole continent to weakness, backwardness, and anarchy. It precludes all moral progress as decisively as it hampers material development; it blocks the way to all that might make South America stable and prosperous, that might open up what are perhaps the richest untapped markets in the world, that might stimulate the Americans themselves by contact with neighbours on their own level. On almost every page of Professor A. H. Keane's "Central and South America," though the Monroe Doctrine is never mentioned, one finds the traces of its blighting influence. Here is a colossal continent with a destiny that should rival Russia's, magnificently watered, inhabited by Caucasians, all of it sparsely populated and much of it barely explored, teeming with mineral and agricultural wealth, and yet lying half-derelict, the prey of revolu-

tionary turbulence—and all for lack of a strong government that would ensure to capital the fruits of its enterprise.

As things are, there appears to be nothing in front of South America but a cycle of revolutions. The hope of a stable, orderly rule ever being evolved under the presidency of half-caste attorneys and guerilla chieftains is one that, after the experience of the last eighty years, no one entertains. From Patagonia to Panama there broods over the continent the spirit of insecurity, disorder, and insurrectionary violence. There is no real guarantee, except perhaps in the case of Chili and Argentina, that what is now happening in Colombia and Venezuela may not to-morrow be the fate of any and every South American state. Such a guarantee can only be forthcoming under a firm, well-established and responsible government, and no such government is possible unless and until either the United States or some European Power takes the matter in hand. But the Americans, at all events for the present, have no intention of expanding southwards. They do not colonise South America themselves; they are not reserving it for any private schemes of aggrandizement; they barely even trade with it. Such benefit as they derive from warning-off Europe from South America is altogether indirect, and this again differentiates Pan-Americanism from such an honestly self-seeking and tangible movement as Pan-Germanism. When Americans drop declamation on the subject and condescend to argument, their reasoning runs substantially as follows:—"It is to our interests to keep South America impotent and in a restless state of anarchy because only so can we maintain the hegemony of the American continent without trouble or expense to ourselves. Under existing conditions our position is invulnerable; nobody can conquer America, and we are consequently spared the burden of huge armaments and their inevitable drain on the productive energy of the people. But once admit that European Powers have the right to absorb South America at will, and the whole situation is changed: We should then be no longer the sovereign of the new world; our 'fiat' would be 'law' only within the precise confines of the United States, and the national prestige and authority would be proportionately diminished. More than that. By allowing our rivals in peace and our possible enemies in war to establish themselves at our very doors, we provide them gratuitously with a jumping-off ground from which they may be

tempted to spring at our throat, and we lay upon ourselves the necessity of guarding against their encroachments by shouldering the dead-weight of militarism, to our long and happy exemption from which the nation owes much of its prosperity."

To decide how far these arguments are sound and how far illusions, it is almost enough just to glance at the map. The United States is already girdled on three sides with a chain of foreign holdings, one of them all but as large as herself with a contiguous boundary line of over 3,000 miles. Yet no American considers that Canada, or Great Britain through Canada, is in any way a menace to the security of the United States. If through all these years the possession of Canada, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, the Lesser Antilles, Trinidad, Belize and British Guiana by Great Britain; of Guadeloupe and its dependencies, Martinique, St. Pierre and Miquelon and French Guiana by France; of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz by Denmark, and of Dutch Guiana by Holland—has been found compatible with the maintenance by Americans of a regular army of 21,000 men and of a navy third or fourth rate in size whatever it may be in quality, with what force can it be argued that the acquisition, let us say, of a portion of Brazil by Germany, 3,000 miles at least from American territory, would endanger the United States or necessitate the addition of a single man or a single ship to the national defences? The very conditions which Americans picture to themselves as a calamity to be warded off at any cost, do as a matter of fact, and in all their essentials exist at this moment without causing them the slightest anxiety. That is to say, the country is, and has been for a hundred years, "threatened" by a score of fortified positions and naval stations held by foreign powers almost within sight of the American coast. And if these, in spite of the manifest fitness of many of them as bases of operations, can be regarded without uneasiness, can be held guiltless of harbouring any peril to the United States, wherein would lurk the danger of the annexation by a European Power of Patagonia or Uruguay? One may even go further, and conceive the whole of South America proper, from the Bay of Panama to Cape Horn, partitioned among the Governments of Europe without being able to say where or how the safety of the United States would be jeopardised. The invulnerability of America would be no less complete then than now, her power

would be just as great, her resources in no ways diminish, her frontiers as much or as little exposed as they are to-day. It can, I believe, be shown that even the danger of a conflict would be lessened, and that Europe's anxiety to keep the peace with America would be considerably more pronounced than one can pretend it to be at this moment. For however much the various Powers might quarrel among themselves in South America, they would all be at one in desiring the friendship of their mighty neighbour to the north. Self-interest would constrain them with a compelling force there could be no escaping, not to risk their colonies by provoking a conflict with the United States; and the possibility of an anti-American coalition with which Americans torture their imaginations, should they abandon the Monroe Doctrine, is the veriest bugaboo. But it is said that American prestige would be damaged. Would it? The prestige, if one can call it such, that the Monroe Doctrine confers upon the United States, is that of the dog in the manger simply. It produces in Europe nothing but exasperation, enmity and a maddening desire, which one of these days will be uncontrollable, to combine for a decisive rush; and even among the South American states themselves it has aroused a suspicious resentment which its occasional usefulness as a diplomatic cloak has by no means allayed. Among the many hallucinations which surround the Monroe Doctrine, none has been more curious than the belief which Americans held quite seriously up to a year or two ago, that it was a sort of self-acting barrier against European "aggression," and had only to be advertised as such to be automatically effective. The idea that they might one day be called upon to fight for it has only just occurred to them; but, having occurred to them, they at once and with remarkable intensity begin the building of a powerful fleet. This, to be sure, is only common-sense, but it carries with it an inference which Americans should lose no time in digesting. The Monroe Doctrine, instead of being a protection against "the burden of militarism," invites it. Whether the appearance of Europe on South American soil would entail on the United States any considerable addition to her fighting strength is at least extremely arguable. What is clear is that to make the Doctrine effective Americans must ultimately be prepared to face one, and possibly more than one, of the strongest Powers of the old world. They cannot issue a challenge to all Europe without the

force, if necessary, to oppose all Europe; and the lowest standard of naval strength which the Monroe Doctrine imposes upon them is that which regulates the policy of the British Admiralty. They must, that is, build and equip a fleet that shall be more than equal to the strongest combination that any two Powers can bring against them. This, of course, is not a very formidable undertaking to a country of the wealth and resources of the United States, a country which light-heartedly pays out every year on padded and fraudulent pension claims more than any nation on earth expends on its fleet. But it altogether does away with the convenient fallacy that the Monroe Doctrine is an insurance against large armaments. In their anxiety to avoid a problematical increase, which at the worst would be a small one, in their war strength, Americans, without quite realising it, are incurring the certain liabilities of what may prove the naval supremacy of the world, of what must at all events be a colossal fleet. So far as "militarism" goes, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine seems likely to affect America as the retention of Alsace-Lorraine has affected Europe.

There seems to be an idea in England that the devotion of Americans to the Monroe Doctrine has been somewhat weakened by the Spanish War, and that having interfered so decisively in the affairs of the old world, they now feel it to be logically impossible to resist the claims of Europe to have a voice in South American destinies. I do not believe the idea is at all a correct one, or that the Spanish War has had anything but a precisely contrary effect. It has whetted the appetite for land, has confirmed the American sense of invincibility, and has turned out such a pleasant prelude to the drama of expansion, that if tomorrow the freedom of transit across the Isthmus of Panama were to be threatened by the Venezuelan revolutionists, President Roosevelt would have the whole country behind him in settling the Central American problem by annexation. Moreover, one has to remember that the Monroe Doctrine wears only such aspects as Americans care to give it, and that it is they, and not Europe, who determine the construction to be put upon it. It has, in consequence, the virtue of a most complaisant elasticity, and I honestly do not know of anything in the remotest degree touching upon South America that it could not be stretched to cover. Long before the Spanish War it was appealed to to


justify the seizure of Cuba on the ground that if America did not take it somebody else would. The Southern slave-holders, whose political influence depended on the extension of slavery to fresh states, used it as a pretext for the annexation of Texas; and General Grant sought to prove that it made the absorption of San Domingo inevitable. The Monroe Doctrine even provided the basis of a protest against the confederation of the Canadian provinces. Perhaps its most amazing distortion is to be found in a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, issued in 1898, just when the Cuban question was nearing its crisis:—"We cannot consent upon any conditions that the depopulated portions of Cuba shall be *recolonised* by Spain any more than she should be allowed to found a new colony in any part of this hemisphere or islands thereof." On the other hand, it has several times been overlooked when precedent would have seemed to demand its employment. It is a fact, for instance, that the French were turned out of Mexico without the Monroe Doctrine being once mentioned in official despatches. It is somewhat difficult, therefore, to say at any given moment what the Doctrine involves or precisely represents. Mr. Olney, for instance, in the notorious despatches to which I have already referred, declares that "it does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states," but further on he announces that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." How these two statements are to be reconciled is by no means obvious. "It does not," he goes on, "relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor prevent any European Power directly interested from enforcing such obligations, or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them." But here, again, every one knows, though Mr. Olney does not state it, that the "merited punishment" inflicted must be such as the United States approves, and must never take the form of permanent seizure of the offending state's territory. "It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American state, or in the relations between it and other American states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American state, or to prevent the people of such state from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure." I imagine the

time may come when the words I have italicised will be quoted against the United States Government with uncomfortable aptness; for it is quite conceivable that some day or other the Germans in Brazil or the Italians in Argentina may voluntarily enroll themselves as self-governing colonies under the flag of the Motherland. In which case, no doubt Mr. Olney's unfortunate admission will be quietly dropped, and some American statesman of, say, 1950, will succeed in proving that the new contingency comes entirely within the category of forbidden things. A certain Mr. Howard, of Texas, speaking in Congress nearly fifty years ago, was rash enough to say that the Monroe Doctrine did not mean "that every settlement upon any sand-bank on this continent is an offence which is to result in war." One gives, perhaps, the best rough-and-ready definition of its scope by saying that to the American of to-day that is just what it *does* mean.


It is very doubtful whether, at this stage of the world's history, it is possible for one nation permanently to exclude all other nations from a country which she herself refuses to control or accept any responsibility for. And that is exactly the position into which the Monroe Doctrine forces the United States. The Americans admit no liability whatever for the outrages, disorders, and financial crookedness of the half-caste republics under their patronage. It is not their behaviour to Europe, but Europe's behaviour towards them that the United States claims the right to supervise. If any European Power were to claim a similar irresponsible suzerainty over even the most worthless region in Africa, it would be instantaneously challenged; and it is altogether too much to expect that the Monroe Doctrine, which takes upon itself to dispose of the one valuable domain still left open on this rapidly dwindling planet, should not eventually be brought to a decisive test. It seems part of the inevitable evolution of things that an over-crowded Europe, ceaselessly endeavouring to lower the social pressure by emigration, and to carve out by conquest or annexation exclusive reserves for traders, should one day fling itself upon South America as it already has upon Africa and China. It is possible to imagine a score of incidents that might call for European intervention in the near future; for South America is a land of sporadic unrest, and one knows how conveniently apt the property of the citizens of a country that is bent on expansion is to get damaged and to need

protection whenever there is the slightest disorder. Whether by accident or design, or as the result of the steady ousting of the *mestizo* adventurers from authority by the foreign settlers, the United States seems destined to be faced with these alternatives:—to fight and keep South America as it is, to “Egyptize” the great continent on her southern borders, or to submit to seeing it parcelled out among the nations of Europe. I cannot doubt what will be the choice of America. Dominated by tradition and sentiment, and carried away by the national conviction that anything that touches the American continent must affect the fraction of it which she occupies, she will elect to fight. She will act as she was ready to act at the time of the Venezuelan affair, when, be it never forgotten, she was prepared to plunge Anglo-Saxondom into war and risk a hundred million pounds’ worth of trade sooner than see a strip of territory, eighteen hundred miles from her southernmost boundary, pass from the control of half-caste revolutionists into British hands. Whenever the issue is raised again I believe her course will be the same. Once more she will espouse the lower civilisation against the higher, will support a system for which she has no moral or intellectual sympathy against a system all but identical with her own, and will stand with all her power in the path of those renovating influences that can alone redeem South America. No consideration of national safety, as I have tried to argue, really counsels such a course, and material interests are all against it. It will nevertheless be adopted, unless—what under the conditions of American politics it is vain to hope for—there should be a sudden accession of *Geist*, a wider outlook among the leaders, and a campaign of education to free this momentous question from its entangling alliance with sophistry and passion. A recent writer declares the Monroe Doctrine to be simply the principle of self-protection under a concrete name. It may have been so once, but the developments of the last eighty years appear to have changed it into an infringement of the sovereign rights of other nations, far greater in its scope than any warranted by simple self-preservation. Self-preservation, for example, may, and as some think will, make it necessary for the United States to extend her authority over Mexico and the Isthmus of Panama; but by no possible stretch of reasoning can it be held to justify the policy that would make of all South America a *terra clausa*.









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